Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a jury trial, Petitioner McKenzie Nicolas was convicted of resisting arrest and second degree assault stemming from a confrontation with two officers at Petitioner's home. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a jury note with no date or time stamp found in the appellate record does not establish that the trial court received the jury communication in order to trigger the requirements of Md. Rule 4-326(d); but (2) the court of special appeals erred in holding that Petitioner's convictions for second degree assault do not merge into his conviction for resisting arrest for sentencing purposes where the record is ambiguous as to whether the jury convicted Petitioner of second degree assault based on acts different than those underlying his conviction for resisting arrest. Remanded. View "Nicolas v. State" on Justia Law

Decedent Elliott Multi died in March 2005. Plaintiffs were the widow of Decedent and the adult children of her marriage with Decedent. Plaintiffs filed a claim against the University of Maryland Medical Systems Corporation (Defendant), alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to join a necessary party, a stepson whom Decedent had adopted during a prior marriage. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims for failure to join the stepson as a "use" plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court abused its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims as a sanction for the omission of the stepson as a use plaintiff, as there was no basis for inferring that the stepson was omitted for the purpose of hiding the litigation from him or in the hope that Plaintiffs would increase their recovery. Remanded. View "Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp. v. Muti" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ocie Black was convicted of child sexual abuse, second degree sex abuse, and third degree sex abuse and sentenced to thirty-two years incarceration. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in failing to disclose a jury note to him and his trial counsel. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a jury note with no date or time stamp found in the appellate record does not establish that the trial court received the jury communication at issue in order to trigger the requirements of Md. Rule 4-326(d), which governs communications between a jury and the trial court; and (2) therefore, the trial court's responsibilities under the rule were never triggered. View "Black v. State" on Justia Law

Dr. Shailendra Kumar sued Dr. Anand Dhanda, alleging breach of contract and breach of a covenant not to compete. The contract at issue provided for disputes to be initially addressed through mandatory, non-binding arbitration. Dhanda filed a motion to dismiss the action, asserting that the suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Kumar opposed dismissal, arguing that the complaint was timely because his cause of action had either not accrued or that limitations was tolled until the completion of arbitration. The trial court dismissed the action as time-barred, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while non-binding arbitration may have been a condition precedent to litigation, it neither affected the accrual of the underlying breach of contract claims, nor otherwise tolled the statute of limitations applicable to maintaining an action in court. View "Kumar v. Dhanda" on Justia Law

Montgomery County law enforcement officers, situated at a "listening post" in Montgomery County, and operating under an ex pare order issued by a judge of the county circuit court under the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, intercepted a mobile phone communication from a target mobile phone, caller, and receiver located in Virginia. As a result of the intercepted communication, the police seized from the caller, Tyrone Davis, controlled dangerous substances when he returned to his Maryland residence. Davis moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the wiretap order did not authorize interception of the extraterritorial communication. The hearing judge denied Davis's motion to suppress, citing federal case law defining the location of an "interception" as where the mobile communication was first intercepted or redirected and where it was first heard by law enforcement officers. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed after adopting the federal standard for determining the proper jurisdiction and scope for an ex parte wiretap order, holding that as long as the "listening post" where an officer first hears the intercepted communications is within the geographical jurisdiction of the court issuing the order, the interception is proper under the Maryland statute. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

While incarcerated, Petitioner Daniel Genies masturbated in sight of a female correctional officer, while smiling and making eye contact with her, despite her orders to stop. Genies was subsequently charged with committing the common law offense of indecent exposure and violating Md. Code Ann. Corr. Servs. 8-803, which prohibits an inmate with intent to harass a correctional officer from indecently exposing private parts of the inmate's body in the officer's presence. A jury acquitted Genies of the statutory offense but convicted him of the common law offense. The court of special appeals affirmed. Genies appealed, arguing that the statutory, specific intent crime preempted the field, with respect to indecent exposure by an inmate to a correctional officer, and thus the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charge of common law indecent exposure. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in failing to dismiss the common law charge because section 8-803 was intended to serve as a discrete offense, supplementing rather than supplanting the common law, so both prevailed; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Genies's motion for a new trial without a hearing. View "Genies v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a pair of adult children, sued Griffith Energy Services, an energy company that spilled heating oil in Petitioners' parents' home, and its attorneys for fraud and negligent supervision. Petitioners' parents (Parents) had previously sued Griffith and won a judgment after a jury trial. The circuit court dismissed Petitioners' lawsuit, holding, inter alia, that Petitioners' claims were barred by res judicata. The court of special appeals affirmed, reaching only the res judicata issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners were in privity with Parents, and (2) thus, the intermediate appellate court did not err in holding that Petitioners' claim was barred by res judicata. View "Cochran v. Griffith Energy Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a long-standing dispute between Appellants, the Tomes Landing Condominium Association and MRA Property Management, and Appellees, twenty-five condominium unit purchasers. The unit purchasers were granted partial summary judgment in the amount of one million dollars against MRA and the Association on the ground that the operating budget that MRA and the Association supplied as part of a "resale package" provided to the unit purchasers violated the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (Act) because the budgets had the effect of misleading the unit purchasers in connection with their purchases of the condominiums. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the etnry of summary judgment was inappropriate, as (1) the Act could apply to disclosures made in a resale certificate by a condominium association and its management company during the sale of a condominium; and (2) there existed a dispute of material facts as to whether the operating budgets provided by MRA and the Association to the unit purchasers constituted unfair or deceptive trade practices under the Act. View "MRA Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Petitioner Muhammad Abdul-Maleek was convicted in the district court of theft. Petitioner exercised his right to appeal and was afforded a de novo trial by jury in the circuit court. The jury likewise convicted Petitioner of left, and the circuit court imposed a more severe sentence than that imposed by the district court. Petitioner appealed, asserting that the circuit court impermissibly based his sentence on the fact that he exercised his right to appeal and receive a de novo jury trial. The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence, holding that Petitioner was entitled to resentencing because the court's comments at sentencing could cause a reasonable person to conclude that the sentence was based in part on Petitioner's exercise of his right to a de novo trial on appeal. Remanded for resentencing. View "Abdul-Maleek v. State" on Justia Law

In 1999, the Baltimore City Council enacted an urban renewal plan (Plan) to renew a portion of Baltimore City. A five-block area located in the renewal area was the subject of protracted litigation between 120 West Fayette, LLLP and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. The current iteration of the litigation focused on a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the City and the Maryland Historical Trust relating to the treatment of historic properties in connection with the Plan. The MOA required the City to submit redevelopment plans to the Trust for approval. After the Trust's director provided conditional approval of a fifth set of plans 120 West Fayette (Appellant) filed a complaint seeking a declaration of rights interpreting the terms of the MOA. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that Appellant was neither a party to, nor an intended beneficiary of, the MOA, and therefore, Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant, at best an incidental beneficiary to the MOA, could not file a suit requesting declaratory judgment that interprets and enforces an agreement to which it had no part. View "120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law