Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of transporting a handgun in a motor vehicle. A police officer found the handgun in a vehicle he suspected Petitioner had been using a short time earlier for "hacking," which is the provision of taxi services without a license. The police officer located the vehicle by pressing a car remote he had seized, along with a set of car keys, while frisking Petitioner. Before trial, Petitioner moved to suppress the car keys and remote on the ground that the officer seized those items from Petitioner's pants pocket by exceeding the proper scope of a lawful Terry frisk. Petitioner then argued the handgun must be suppressed as the tainted fruit of the earlier seizure of the keys and remote. The circuit court denied Petitioner's motion to suppress the physical evidence. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the officer violated Minnesota v. Dickerson by seizing the keys and car remote without the incriminating character of those items being "immediately apparent." The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that, by application of the plain feel doctrine, the officer lawfully seized the keys and remote he touched while frisking Petitioner, and therefore, the seizure of the items in dispute was lawful. View "McCracken v. State" on Justia Law

These petitions for certiorari pertained to contribution among joint tort-feasors and arose from a medical malpractice action in which Petitioners, the Spences, alleged wrongful death and survival claims against Petitioner Mercy Medical Center and Respondents, a medical doctor and his practices. The issue of contribution arose because the Spences and Mercy entered into a pre-trial settlement by which the Spences agreed to dismiss their claims against Mercy without exacting an admission of liability. After Mercy was dismissed as a party, the case proceeded to trial against Respondents, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the Spences. Respondents subsequently initiated a separate action against Mercy seeking contribution. The Spences contemporaneously brought suit against Respondents seeking a declaration that Respondents were not entitled to contribution. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the Spences' release extinguished any right Respondents had to seek contribution against Mercy because Respondents did not join Mercy as a third party defendant in the original action after it was dismissed as a party. The Court of Appeals held that Respondents were not prohibited from pursuing contribution from Mercy in a separate action because the release's conditional language did not fully relieve Mercy's contribution liability. View "Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Julian" on Justia Law

The owners of two properties leased them to developer-tenants for the purpose of building an apartment building on each. As construction was beginning, the landlords breached the leases by refusing to provide estoppel certificates and contesting the tenants' building permits. The landlords' breach prevented the tenants from obtaining financing, which ended the development project. The tenants sued for lost profits. Before trial, the circuit court ruled against the landlords on several motions, holding in part (1) the landlords could not introduce evidence of the 2008 crash in the real estate market to show that the tenants would not have made profits, and (2) the tenants could introduce evidence of the landlords' reasons for breaching, including communications with their former counsel. The jury awarded the tenants over $36 million in damages, holding the landlords jointly and severally liable. The court of special appeals held the landlords could not be held jointly and severally liable but otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did nor err in excluding all evidence of post-breach market data in measuring damages; and (2) the landlord waived the attorney-client privilege as to communications relevant to the subject matter of the claim of bad faith. View "CR-RSC Tower I, LLC v. RSC Tower I, LLC" on Justia Law

Here the trial judge denied a defense motion for judgment of acquittal on three charges against Defendant. The district court then terminated the prosecution of those charges for a purely procedural reason - non-compliance with the rule on service of process - that the court made clear was unrelated to guilt or innocence. The court, however, recorded its action on the docket sheet as "not guilty," a label that denoted an acquittal. This case raised the question whether the protection against double jeopardy precluded the State from pursuing an appeal of that decision. The circuit court held that, in these circumstances, the trial court's action was tantamount to a preliminary motion to dismiss and that the State could therefore appeal the trial court's decision concerning service of process. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a mis-labeled dismissal of charges for a purely procedural reason unrelated to guilt or innocence does not trigger the protection against double jeopardy. View "Kendall v. State" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial, Respondent was convicted of theft for cashing a counterfeit check and not returning the money in violation of Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 7-104(d). Respondent appealed the conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction because the State did not prove that she obtained control over the proceeds of the check knowing the money was delivered by mistake. The court of special appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 7-104(d) applies to someone who obtains property knowing that the property is lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake and has a concurrent, or later formed, intent to steal it; (2) the statute, however, does not apply to someone who obtains property not knowing at that time that the property is lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered; and (3) therefore, the requirements of section 7-104(d) are not met when there is no evidence upon which the factfinder reasonably could find, or when, as here, the judge at a bench trial expressly finds that the State failed to prove the defendant knew at the time she obtained the property that it had been delivered under a mistake. View "State v. Weems" on Justia Law

A collective-bargaining agreement between Baltimore County and Baltimore County Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 4 (FOP) contained an arbitration clause and a retiree health-insurance provision. FOP believed the provision locked in place the health-insurance subsidy as it existed at the time of an officer's retirement. After the agreement expired and the County decreased the health-insurance subsidy, FOP initiated arbitration. The County protested, arguing (1) it had no duty to arbitrate because the collective-bargaining agreement had expired, and (2) the health-insurance subsidy was not locked in place but was subject to change from year to year. FOP was successful in arbitration and on appeal before the circuit court, but the court of special appeals vacated the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) an arbitration clause may survive the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement when it concerns rights that vested during the life of the agreement; and (2) when deciding the issue of arbitrability requires interpretation of the underlying agreement and consideration of the merits of the dispute, the issue of arbitrability should initially be determined by the arbitrator. View "Baltimore County Fraternal Order of Police Lodge v. Baltimore County" on Justia Law

This consolidated opinion resolved two cases heard by the Court of Appeals concerning the appropriate scope of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) immunity from suit. In both cases, Veronica Tinsley and Kim Hodge, Petitioners, slipped, fell, and were injured at WMATA operated metrorail stations. Petitioners presented a common question of whether their claims were barred by Section 80 of the WMATA Compact, and Hodge presented an additional question of whether Section 75 of the Compact limited the scope of WMATA's immunity, such that its alleged failure to abide by various County code sections rendered an immunity defense unavailable. The Court upheld WMATA's immunity from suit, concluding (1) WMATA was immune because its underlying decision regarding proper maintenance procedures was grounded in concerns of economic and public policy; and (2) Hodge's contention that Section 75 waived WMATA's immunity in her case was without merit. View "Tinsley v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with one count of sexually abusing a minor, two counts of second degree rape, and six counts of second degree sexual offense. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress statements he had made to police, arguing that he had not been given Miranda warnings at the time he arrived at the police station. The circuit court agreed and suppressed the statements. The court of special appeals reversed, determining that Petitioner was not in custody at the time he gave the statements at issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a belief held by a suspect that police may have probable cause to arrest him or her is not sufficient to render the individual in custody for Miranda purposes; and (2) the motion to suppress Petitioner's statements should have been denied because, given the totality of the circumstances, Petitioner was not in custody at the time he made the statements. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

In this case the Court of Appeals was asked to decide on the existence and possible means of locating a general easement that provided a right-of-way from a major road. The easement in question crossed the property of USA Cartage Leasing, LLC as an access route for neighboring property owned by Todd Baer. Maryland's recording statute for deeds requires that a deed contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it with reasonable certainty. This case presented the novel question of whether this requirement, in the context of a grant of land that includes an easement, applied to the description of the easement itself or merely to that of the servient property. The court of special appeals determined that the correct answer was the latter and instructed the circuit court to locate the easement according to the principles set forth in section 4.8 in the Restatement 3d of Property: Servitudes. The Court of Appeals affirmed and adopted the Restatement's approach for locating a valid general easement that is not precisely defined in the deed or by custom or usage. View "USA Cartage Leasing, LLC v. Baer" on Justia Law

This was the latest in a series of opinions by the Court of Appeals involving the constitutional provision and the implementing legislation authorizing a limited number of slot machines at specified Maryland facilities, including facilities in the area of Anne Arundel County (County). A County zoning ordinance authorized slot machines in certain areas of the County. The circuit court determined that the ordinance was not subject to referendum under the County charter. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (1) held the circuit court's judgment was appealable, as (i) the Legislature no no intention of applying the non-appealability principle of Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 12-302(a) to cases under the Election Article, and (ii) where the Election Article authorizes judicial review but is silent regarding an appeal, Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc.12-301 authorizes an appeal; and (2) reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded with instructions to order that the ordinance be placed on the ballot at the general election in accordance with the referendum provisions of the County charter, holding that the ordinance was simply a local ordinance re-zoning an area, and as such, it was not exempt from a referendum. View "Citizens Against Slots At The Mall v. PPE Casino Resorts Md., LLC" on Justia Law