Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A commercial tenant operating a beer and wine store in Maryland entered into a five-year lease requiring it to pay base rent as well as additional charges—including real estate taxes, water and sewer bills, late fees, HVAC replacement costs, and attorneys’ fees—that the lease defined as “Additional Rent.” The lease contained a clause by which the tenant waived its statutory right of redemption, meaning it could not prevent eviction by paying the overdue amounts after judgment. After the tenant fell behind on these additional charges but remained current on base rent, the landlord filed a summary ejectment action to repossess the premises.The District Court for Frederick County found the tenant liable for most of the claimed additional charges and, relying on the lease’s waiver clause, awarded the landlord possession with no right of redemption. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Frederick County vacated that judgment, holding that some attorneys’ fees were improperly included as unpaid rent and that the tenant lacked adequate notice of certain charges, making the redemption waiver unenforceable.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. It held that in nonresidential leases, a waiver of the statutory right of redemption does not violate Maryland public policy and is enforceable unless a traditional contract defense applies. The court also clarified that the statutory pre-suit notice requirement in Real Property Article § 8-401(c)(1) applies only to residential tenancies and not to commercial ones. However, it held that a landlord may recover possession only for rent that is due and unpaid under the lease, and summary ejectment cannot be based on charges of which the tenant had no prior notice before suit was filed.The Supreme Court of Maryland vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded for recalculation of the rent due, instructing that only charges for which the tenant had received prior notice and the contractual time to pay could support possession. View "Kapneck 14-16 v. Breezy's Speakeasy" on Justia Law

Tenants of two units in a multi-family residential building filed rent escrow complaints in the District Court of Maryland in Prince George’s County, alleging hazardous conditions such as infestations, water damage, and fire risks. The property lacked a valid rental license due to housing code violations. The tenants sought repairs and a return of rent paid during the unlicensed period, arguing that, under Assanah-Carroll v. Law Offices of Edward J. Maher, P.C., they owed no rent while the property was unlicensed and should not have to pay rent into escrow.The District Court ordered the tenants to pay rent into escrow starting September 2023, and dismissed their complaints when they declined to do so. The tenants appealed to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. By the time of the appeal, one tenant had vacated, and the landlord had obtained the necessary license and disclaimed any intent to collect rent from the unlicensed period. The circuit court heard the appeal de novo and dismissed it as moot, noting that the landlord was not seeking rent for the unlicensed period.On further review, the Supreme Court of Maryland concluded that no live controversy remained. The tenants no longer had possession of the units, and the landlord had renounced claims for rent during the unlicensed period. The court rejected arguments that collateral consequences or exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied, finding no judgments of possession or damages had been entered and recent legislative changes had altered the statutory framework. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Wilson v. Tanglewood Venture" on Justia Law

A woman who receives a housing voucher due to her disability applied to rent an apartment in a complex owned by a property management company. The monthly rent for the unit was $1,590, and her voucher would have covered $1,464, leaving her responsible for $126 per month. Her only other income was $841 per month in supplemental security income. The property owner applied its standard policy, requiring all applicants to demonstrate monthly income at least 2.5 times the full rent, aggregating all sources of income, including voucher subsidies. The applicant’s combined income and voucher fell short of the $3,975 threshold, so her application was denied.After the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights found no probable cause for her discrimination claim, the applicant sued in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, alleging that the owner’s minimum-income requirement constituted impermissible source-of-income discrimination under Maryland’s Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act, which prohibits discrimination based on “source of income” in housing. The owner moved for summary judgment, arguing its policy was facially neutral and applied equally to all sources of income. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the owner, finding that the policy did not discriminate based on the source of income, only the amount.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. The Court agreed with the circuit court that the owner was entitled to summary judgment on the disparate treatment claim, as the policy was facially neutral and applied equally. However, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that the owner was not entitled to summary judgment on the disparate impact claim. The Court explained that a facially neutral policy may still violate the HOME Act if it disproportionately affects voucher holders without a legitimate business justification. The judgment of the circuit court was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Hare v. David S. Brown Enterprises" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Maryland General Assembly passed the Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act, which added "source of income" to the list of prohibited considerations in housing rental or sale. The appellant, a housing voucher recipient, applied to rent an apartment in the appellee's complex. The appellee applied a minimum-income requirement, combining all sources of income to determine if the total exceeded 2.5 times the full gross rent. The appellant's combined income, including her voucher, did not meet this threshold, leading to the rejection of her application. The appellant sued, claiming the minimum-income requirement constituted source-of-income discrimination under § 20-705.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted summary judgment to the appellee, finding that the appellee's policy did not discriminate based on the source of income but rather on the amount of income. The court ruled that the appellee neutrally applied its income qualification criteria and rejected the appellant based on the amount of her income, not its source.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the appellee's counting of voucher income in the same manner as other income sources did not entitle it to summary judgment. The court found that this approach did not resolve the appellant's disparate impact claim, which asserts that a facially neutral policy has a disparate impact on a protected group without a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, emphasizing the need to address the disparate impact analysis. View "Hare v. David S. Brown Enterprises" on Justia Law

Copinol Restaurant, Inc. ("Copinol") and 26 North Market LLC ("North Market") entered into a commercial lease agreement for a property in Frederick, Maryland, with a term ending on March 31, 2032. Copinol failed to pay rent on time in May 2023, prompting North Market to terminate the lease and demand that Copinol vacate the premises. When Copinol did not vacate, North Market filed a tenant holding over action in the District Court of Maryland, seeking possession of the property and damages.The District Court of Maryland ruled in favor of North Market, granting it possession of the property. Copinol appealed to the Circuit Court for Frederick County, which initially ruled in Copinol's favor, stating that the tenant holding over statute did not apply because the lease had not expired. However, after North Market filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, the circuit court reversed its decision and affirmed the District Court's judgment, awarding possession to North Market.Copinol then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court of Maryland granted. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the tenant holding over statute, RP § 8-402, does not apply where a tenant is in possession of property pursuant to a lease that has not expired by lapse of time. The Court further held that a landlord cannot contractually modify the statutory meaning of the phrase "expiration of a lease" to avail itself of the tenant holding over statute in a manner inconsistent with its plain language. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Copinol. View "Copinol Restaurant v. 26 N. Market" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Maryland has ruled that the term "rent" under Real Property § 8-401, as applied to residential leases, refers to the fixed, periodic payments a tenant is required to make for use or occupancy of a rented premises. This definition excludes additional charges such as late fees, attorney’s fees, and court costs. The court also ruled that any provision in a residential lease that allows a landlord to allocate payments of "rent" to other obligations, thereby subjecting a tenant to eviction proceedings based on failure to pay "rent", violates Real Property § 8-208(d)(2). Further, penalties for late payment of rent, capped at 5% of the monthly amount of rent due, are inclusive of any costs of collection other than court-awarded costs. Finally, the court ruled that the Circuit Court erred in declining to review the merits of the tenants’ second renewed motion for class certification. The case has been remanded for further proceedings in line with these holdings. View "Westminster Management v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that when a landlord attempts to collect unpaid rent from a tenant during a period when the landlord was unlicensed a tenant may have a claim under the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (MCDCA) and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) to the extent that the landlord's unlawful collection activity caused the tenant to suffer damages, including any rent payments made responding to the landlord's attempts to collect unpaid rent.Specifically, the the Court of Appeals held (1) a tenant who voluntarily paid rent to a landlord who lacked a rental license may not bring a private action under the MCPA or MCDCA to recover restitution of rent based upon the landlord's lack of licensure pursuant to the Baltimore City Code, Art. 13, 5-4; and (2) when a municipality or county enacts a rental license law conditioning the performance of a residential lease upon the issuance of a rental license a landlord may not file an action against a tenant to recover unpaid rent attributable to the period when the property was not licensed. View "Assanah-Carroll v. Law Offices of Maher" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that Baltimore City Council's enactment of a local law did not create a private right of action for Baltimore City tenants to recoup rent payments and related fees they paid in connection with their use and occupancy of rental dwellings during a period when the landlord did not have a valid rental license.Petitioners, tenants in a multi-unit apartment building, filed a putative class action alleging that Respondent did not hold an active rental license for the property, as required by the Baltimore City Code, and seeking to recoup paid rent and other fees paid to Respondent. The circuit court dismissed the case prior to a determination of issues relating to class certification. The court of special appeals largely agreed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 5-4(a)(2) of Article 13 of the Baltimore City Code does not provide a private right of action to recover rent and related payments that a tenant made during a period in which the landlord was unlicensed. View "Aleti v. Metropolitan Baltimore, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court determined that the Legislature, through its enactment of a comprehensive statutory framework governing residential landlord and tenant relations, achieved an appropriate balance between a landlord's right to recover a landlord's property interest at the conclusion of a tenancy and a tenant's right to safe and habitable housing conditions during the pregnancy.After Plaintiff provided Defendants, who resided in Plaintiff's building as a month-to-month tenants, with a sixty-day written notice to quit and Defendants refused to vacate the premises, Plaintiff filed tenant holding over actions under N.Y. Real Prop. 8-402. In both cases, the circuit ordered that possession of the property be returned to Plaintiff. Defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to hold that the tenants holding over statute is unavailable to an unlicensed landlord seeking a writ of possession of the landlord's property after the expiration of a tenancy. The Supreme Court declined to adopt such a holding and affirmed. View "Velicky v. CopyCat Building LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the court of special appeals dismissing an amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, holding that Petitioners' amended complaint adequately set forth a cause of action under Md. Code Real Prop. (RP) 7-113.Petitioners, occupants of residential property that they owned or leased, brought this action against Respondents, a mortgage servicer and a real estate broker, after Respondents posted eviction notices on Petitioners' properties in an attempt to gain possession of the properties without a court order. Petitioners claimed that Respondents violated RP 7-113 and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), Md. Code Comm. Law 13-101 et seq. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) Petitioners set forth a cause of action under RP 7-113; and (2) this Court has not established a more demanding standard for pleading damages in private actions brought under the MCPA. View "Wheeling v. Selene Finance LP" on Justia Law