Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Railroad employee (Employee) filed suit against his employer (Railroad) under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), alleging that Railroad was negligent in its use of large ballast rather than small ballast in areas where Employee worked. Employee claimed that walking on the large ballast caused him to develop osteoarthritis in both knees. A jury found Railroad seventy percent negligent and Employee twenty percent negligent and awarded Employee $1,246,000 for his injuries. The court of special appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether and when a railroad employee's negligence action under FELA may be precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a negligence action alleging the improper use of ballast will be precluded only to the extent to which the ballast performs a track-support function, and under such circumstances, the railroad should bear the burden of proving the facts that support preclusion; and (2) here, Employee's FELA claim was not precluded by FRSA because Railroad failed to prove that the ballast complained of performed a track-support function. View "CSX Transp., Inc. v. Pitts" on Justia Law

Insured was injured in an accident. Insured's policy with Insurer included uninsured motorist (UM) bodily injury coverage and personal injury protection (PIP) coverage. Insured's Employer's third-party workers' compensation (WC) administrator asserted a subrogation right against any PIP or UM recovery by Insured. At issue in this case was the correct interpretation of Md. Code Ins. 19-513. The district court asked the Court of Appeals to determine whether section 19-513(e) requires an insurance company to deduct WC benefits payable to an insured for UM and PIP when the insured has not reimbursed its provider and the insured intends to reimburse the WC provider in the future. The Court of Appeals held (1) under the plain meaning of section 19-513(e), an insured's benefits payable under UM and PIP coverage shall be reduced to the extent that the insured recovered benefits under WC and the WC provider has not been reimbursed; and (2) if the applicable workers' compensation law treats "write-downs" of medical bills as WC benefits, and the WC benefits have not been reimbursed, then the insurer shall deduct those benefits, calculated as discounts, from its benefits payable to the insured under section 19-513(e). View "Travco Ins. Co. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Decedent worked as a firefighter for Baltimore City. After Decedent died, his widow, Petitioner, began receiving survivorship benefits from Decedent's pension. Petitioner later filed a dependent's claim for death benefits under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act. The dispute at the hearing concerned what provision of the Act was applicable to Petitioner's claim. The City argued that Md. Code Lab. & Empl. 9-610, which reduces compensation death benefits by the amount of pension benefits, should apply. Petitioner argued that Md. Code Lab. & Empl. 9-503(e), which allows firefighters' dependents to collect both pension and workers' compensation up to the amount of what had been the firefighter's weekly salary, should apply. Petitioner's claim was pending when section 9-503(e) was amended to include dependents in its scope of coverage. The Workers' Compensation Commission determined that section 9-503(e) governed the claim and awarded Petitioner benefits. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the City, ruling that Petitioner had no preexisting right to dual benefits prior to the statute's amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the amendments involved a substantive change in the law that precluded it from applying retroactively to pending cases. View "Johnson v. Baltimore" on Justia Law

Respondent was injured while performing his job as a school police officer in Baltimore City. After the City terminated his employment, Respondent applied for line-of-duty disability retirement. A hearing examiner denied Respondent's application, concluding that Respondent did not satisfy the eligibility requirements of Baltimore, Md., Code 22, 9(j), which requires a claimant to prove he sustained at least a fifty percent total impairment as the direct result of a line-of-duty accident. The hearing examiner concluded that Respondent did not satisfy the statutory requirements because the impairment to Respondent's back was not independent of all other causes, reasoning that Respondent's degenerative disc disease contributed to the disability of his back. The circuit court reversed, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Respondent's preexisting condition did not preclude him from qualifying for line-of-duty disability retirement because he proved that fifty percent of his total level of disability was the direct result of the injury he sustained while performing in the line of duty. View "Employees' Ret. Sys. of City of Baltimore v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

A collective-bargaining agreement between Baltimore County and Baltimore County Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 4 (FOP) contained an arbitration clause and a retiree health-insurance provision. FOP believed the provision locked in place the health-insurance subsidy as it existed at the time of an officer's retirement. After the agreement expired and the County decreased the health-insurance subsidy, FOP initiated arbitration. The County protested, arguing (1) it had no duty to arbitrate because the collective-bargaining agreement had expired, and (2) the health-insurance subsidy was not locked in place but was subject to change from year to year. FOP was successful in arbitration and on appeal before the circuit court, but the court of special appeals vacated the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) an arbitration clause may survive the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement when it concerns rights that vested during the life of the agreement; and (2) when deciding the issue of arbitrability requires interpretation of the underlying agreement and consideration of the merits of the dispute, the issue of arbitrability should initially be determined by the arbitrator. View "Baltimore County Fraternal Order of Police Lodge v. Baltimore County" on Justia Law

In 2002, county voters adopted an amendment to the county charter relating to the resolution by binding arbitration of collective bargaining impasses with the county's law enforcement employees and uniformed firefighters. In 2003, the county council adopted an ordinance implementing that charter provision. In 2011, the county council amended the 2003 ordinance to provide that binding arbitration did not require the council to appropriate funds or enact legislation necessary to implement a final written award in arbitration. An uncodified section of the 2011 council bill also provided that, if any part of the 2011 ordinance were held invalid, the entire county code section enacted by the 2003 ordinance, as amended through the 2011 ordinance, would be deemed repealed by operation of law, with the result that impasses would be addressed by a code section that did not authorize binding arbitration. Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that the 2011 ordinance violated the 2002 charter amendment. The circuit court held the 2002 charter amendment violated the Maryland Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2002 charter amendment bound the county council; and (2) portions of the 2011 ordinance, as well as its uncodified section 3, violated the charter and were invalid. Remanded. View "Atkinson v. Anne Arundel County" on Justia Law

Respondent sustained six injuries while playing for the Washington Redskins on four separate occasions. Consequently, Respondent filed with the Maryland Workers Compensation Commission six separate claims against his employer, the Washington Redskins (Petitioner). The Commission denied five of Respondent's claims on the ground that he was not a "covered employee" because he was working for the Redskins outside of the State when he sustained the injuries underlying the claims. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a football player employed by the Washington Redskins is a "covered employee," and therefore entitled to avail himself of Maryland's workers' compensation laws, when injured while practicing and playing football outside of Maryland. View "Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants" on Justia Law

This case involved a claim by a former professional football player (the athlete) for benefits under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act based on an injury during pre-game warm-up at the employer's stadium in Maryland. The employment agreement contained a forum selection clause providing, inter alia, that claims for workers' compensation benefits should be governed by Virginia law and that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission should have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve such claims. The Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission decided that it could properly exercise jurisdiction over the athlete's claim, that the athlete had sustained an accidental injury arising out of the course of his employment, and that the athlete's disability was causally related to his accidental injury. The circuit court upheld the decision. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the forum selection clause in the employment contract was ineffective to divest the Commission of the ability to exercise jurisdiction; and (2) injuries occurring while playing and practicing professional football are accidental injuries and thus compensable under the Act. View "Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa" on Justia Law

Respondent was injured in an automobile collision involving Norman Iglehart while both were acting within the scope of their employment with the Board of Education of Prince George's County. The workers' compensation commission awarded Respondent compensation. Subsequently, Respondent filed a complaint against Iglehart and the Board (collectively, Petitioners) seeking damages as a result of Iglehart's negligence and the respondeat superior liability of the Board. The trial judge dismissed the Board from the action but directed it remain a party for the purposes of potential indemnification of Iglehart required under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-518(h). The judge then ordered that judgment be entered against Iglehart and the Board. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 5-519 contains an indemnification provision that allows an injured party to bring a tort suit against the county board of education employee who caused the injury, and accordingly, the injured party must join the employer board as a defendant in the action; and (2) this statutory scheme does not violate the exclusivity rule stating that an injured employee's sole remedy against her employer is through the Workers' Compensation Act. View "Bd. of Educ. v. Marks-Sloan" on Justia Law

The Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc. (FOP) filed a grievance under its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Montgomery County following the County's unilateral decision to discontinue a long-standing practice of allowing shop stewards to sit in on disciplinary interrogations for training purposes. The County filed a motion to dismiss the grievance, arguing that arbitration of the issue was preempted by the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR). The arbitrator determined the grievance was not preempted and denied the motion to dismiss. Subsequently, the County filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award in the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the arbitrator's decision and granted summary judgment on behalf of the FOP. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the LEOBR was not implicated by the steward training grievance and, therefore, did not preempt its arbitration under the CBA. View "Montgomery Co. v. FOP Lodge 35" on Justia Law