Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), the amount of compensation due to a “covered employee” - which may include a sole proprietor - who has a “permanent total disability resulting from an accidental personal injury” is based on the employee’s “average weekly wage” (AWW). At issue in this case was how to calculate the AWW of a sole proprietor who elects coverage for an accident personal injury under the Act. Petitioner, a self-employed sole proprietor who elected to obtain workers’ compensation coverage as a covered employee, was injured while working as a subcontractor. The Workers’ Compensation Commission issued an award of compensation, but the parties disputed the amount of compensation due. The Commission ultimately calculated Petitioner’s AWW based on his net profit rather than his gross receipts. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the AWW of a sole proprietor who elects coverage under the Act is calculated based on the sole proprietorship’s net profit, not on the sole proprietorship’s gross receipts or gross income. View "Long v. Injured Workers' Ins. Fund" on Justia Law

Adkins started working at PRMC in 2005, delivering and organizing supplies. In April 2011, Adkins went to PRMC’s emergency room after experiencing pain. Adkins was diagnosed with a tear in the joint of her hip and a deformation in her hip socket. She scheduled surgery and completed paperwork under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2612, stating that she would return to work in October 2011. PRMC approved Adkins’s leave, explaining that her 12-week FMLA leave would expire on November 17, 2011, After surgery, Adkins’s pain intensified. Doctors advised that recovery could take up to a year. On November 7, 2011, Adkins returned to work, stating that she was still in pain and would be unable to fulfill her job responsibilities that day. An “Employee Charting Note” states that “[a]ll parties” agreed that Adkins could not return to work; that Adkins had “been educated on FMLA and to start looking at job postings,” and that Adkins reported having applied for a position. PRMC granted a 14-week extension, after which Adkins was terminated. Adkins unsuccessfully applied to positions. The trial court rejected her suit under the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act, Code 20-601 on summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding disputes of material fact with respect to whether: Adkins was qualified to perform the essential functions of a specific job with or without a reasonable accommodation, and whether Adkins was terminated because of her disability. View "Peninsula Regional Med. Ctr. v. Adkins" on Justia Law

In two cases before the Workers’ Compensation Commission, the Commission concluded that under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-806, the amount owed to the Subsequent Injury Fund (SIF) by the employers in these cases - the Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) and Baltimore County - is 6.5 percent of the Commission’s award of compensation prior to the deduction of any statutory offset. The circuit courts affirmed the decisions of the Commission. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The MTA and the County each filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them in this opinion to address the question of whether the SIF assessment under section 9-806 should be calculated based on the amount of an award prior to the statutory offsets granted by Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-610 and 9-503(e). The Court answered the question in the affirmative and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. View "Injured Workers' Ins. Fund v. Subsequent Injury Fund" on Justia Law

Prince George’s County terminated the employment of Marlon Ford, a member of the County Police Civilian Employees Association, after a criminal investigation during which Ford was questioned regarding alleged crimes. The Association filed a grievance on Ford’s behalf. An arbitrator vacated the termination of Ford’s employment, determining that the County had violated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the County and the Association because officers of the county police department failed to advise Ford of his right to have a representative from the Association present during the criminal investigative interview. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) under the County’s code, the County lacked the authority to enter into a CBA that requires a Weingarten advisement before a criminal investigative interview of one of the County’s police civilian employees; and (2) therefore, the arbitrator the arbitrator exceeded his authority by basing the arbitration award on the determination that the County violated the CBA because its police officers failed to make a Weingarten advisement. View "Police Civ. Empl. Ass'n. v. Prince George's Co." on Justia Law

While living in Maryland, Petitioner opened a personal line of credit and a credit card account with Respondent. Respondent later filed two complaints against Petitioner in a Maryland district court, one for the outstanding balance on the credit card account and the other for the amount owed on the line of credit. At the time of the filings, Petitioner was living and working in Texas. Respondent was awarded default judgments. Respondent subsequently secured two writs of garnishment in the same actions from the district court. The writs were served on the resident agent of Petitioner’s employer. Petitioner moved to quash the writs, arguing that his wages earned solely for work he performed in Texas were not subject to garnishment in Maryland. The district court denied the motions to quash. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court in its continuing and ancillary jurisdiction properly ordered Petitioner’s wages earned in Texas to be subject to garnishment served upon Petitioner’s employer because of the employer’s continuous and systematic business in Maryland. View "Mensah v. MCT Fed. Credit Union" on Justia Law

A local public school superintendent decided to terminate a school nurse, who was a “noncertificated” employee. The school nurse challenged her termination by way of a grievance process set forth in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the school board and a union. The superintendent denied the grievance, asserting that the termination was an illegal subject of collective bargaining. The union, on behalf of the school nurse, made a demand for arbitration. The school board filed a motion for injunctive relief seeking to enjoin the arbitration. The Maryland State Board of Education (State Board) and the Public School Labor Relations Board (PSLRB) both issued opinions in the matter. The circuit court affirmed the decision of the State Board, which concluded that the binding arbitration provision of the CBA was illegal, and reversed the decision of the PSLRB, which came to the opposite conclusion. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the PSLRB was the entity with the jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the termination of a noncertificated employee is a proper subject of binding arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. View "Bd. of Educ. v. Howard County Educ. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner was terminated from her position as the Clerk-Treasurer of the Town of Hurlock two and one-half years after she entered into a written employment agreement with the Mayor-elect. Under the employment agreement, Petitioner was to serve a four-year term. Petitioner brought this action against Respondent, the Town, alleging breach of contract and seeking damages and other relief. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the four-year term of employment in the agreement was inconsistent with the Town Charter and therefore ineffective. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the language of the Town Charter means that an official like the Clerk-Treasurer is an at-will employee; and (2) the Mayor and Council of Hurlock lacked authority under the Town Charter to enter into an agreement conferring a fixed term of employment in this case. View "Clough v. Mayor & Council of Hurlock" on Justia Law

Mark Hranicka filed a workers’ compensation claim as a result of an injury he sustained during a motor vehicle accident. The workers’ compensation claim was withdrawn. Thereafter, Hranicka submitted to the Workers’ Compensation Commission a second claim. The claim was electronically submitted to the Commission before expiration of the two-year statute of limitations but not filed on paper until after the expiration of the two-year period. Respondents contested the claim, arguing that it was time-barred under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-709(b)(3). The Commissioner determined that the claim was not time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that electronic submission of a claim does not constitute “filing” pursuant to Code of Maryland Regulations, and therefore, the Commission erred in ruling that the filing date of a claim could be the date of the claim’s electronic submission for purposes of the statute of limitations. View "Hranicka v. Chesapeake Surgical, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act creates a presumption that certain disabling medical conditions are occupational diseases suffered in the line of duty and are therefore compensable. The statute caps those benefits, however. The retirement benefits at issue in this case derived in part from an optional retirement program offered by Baltimore County. The program provided that senior employees who opted to remain on the job be compensated with enhanced retirement benefits that could be taken in a lump sum upon retirement or in higher recurring retirement payments. The two retired firefighters in these cases participated in the program and also qualified for workers’ compensation benefits as a result of the special presumption for public safety employees. At issue in these cases was how the lump sum retirement payment was to be included in the formula for capping the retirees’ workers’ compensation benefits. The Court of Appeals rejected the methods proposed both by the retirees and by the County and adopted the approach by the Workers’ Compensation Commission in the Thiergartner case for converting the lump sum portion of the retirement benefits to a weekly figure. View "Baltimore Co. v. Thiergartner" on Justia Law

After voluntarily leaving his job with Employer, Respondent applied for unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (DLLR) denied the claim for benefits, determining that Respondent quit his job without good cause. The hearing examiner upheld the DLLR’s findings. The DLLR Board of Appeals declined to hear Respondent’s appeal, thereby adopting the hearing examiner’s decision as its own decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed a petition for judicial review. Instead of filing an answering memorandum, the DLLR Board requested that the circuit court remand the case back to the Board before the court conducted its review. The circuit court granted the Board’s motion for remand. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed Employer’s appeal, concluding that the remand order was was not a final judgment or otherwise appealable. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the remand order was not a final, appealable judgment. View "Metro Maint. Sys. South, Inc. v. Milburn" on Justia Law