Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tyrone Lawson was a seventeen-year veteran of the Bowie State University Police Department until his termination for violating the Department's chain of command policy. Specifically, Lawson had drafted a letter disclosing alleged abuses by his fellow officers, and instead of reporting the violations to the Department's Chief of Police, Lawson presented the letter to the university's vice president of student affairs. Lawson was later fired for, among other things, insubordination. Lawson sought relief, arguing that he was entitled to whistleblower protection because the letter constituted a "protected disclosure" as contemplated by Md. Code Ann. State Pers. & Pens. 5-305. The ALJ concluded that Lawson's letter was not a protected disclosure because it was part of Lawson's crusade to improve the Department. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari and reversed, holding that the ALJ improperly conflated Lawson's personal motivation for disclosure with the statutory requirement that an employee have a reasonable belief that the information disclosed evidences a violation. Remanded. View "Lawson v. Bowie State Univ." on Justia Law

While employed with Alpharma, a pharmaceutical company, Debra Parks was involved in marketing a prescription drug known as Kadian. Parks filed a complaint in circuit court for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, claiming that Alpharma was involved in illegal marketing activities and that after Parks had raised her concerns with various people at Alpharma, Alpharma retaliated against her by terminating her employment. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. While Parks' appeal was pending in the intermediate appellate court, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari on its own initiative. The Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court on the basis that Parks failed to identify any clear mandate of public policy allegedly violated by Alpharma and allegedly reported by her that would constitute some of the required elements of a wrongful discharge claim. View "Parks v. Alpharma" on Justia Law

Jerry Hansen suffered a heart attack while working for Laurel City and assumed disabled status. When he attempted to return to work, he was informed he would no longer be employed with the City. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Hansen filed suit in the circuit court seeking damages. The City filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Hansen had not satisfied the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA). The circuit court dismissed the suit, and the court of special appeals affirmed. On appeal, Hansen argued that he complied with the required notice provision of the LGTCA by delivering written notice of his claims against the City to the City Administrator. The Supreme Court held that Hansen's failure to plead expressly in his complaint satisfaction of the LGTCA notice provision prevented Hansen from pursuing his claim. Accordingly, the Court did not decide whether Hansen's conduct complied with the applicable notice provision. View "Hansen v. City of Laurel" on Justia Law

Wayne Nocar, who was doing construction work on a house, died after falling through a stairwell opening in a floor that C&M Builders had built. Kelly Strub sued C&M on behalf of her son, alleging negligence in the death of Nocar. The trial court determined the C&M was not negligent. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court held (1) C&M owed a duty to Nocar to comply with the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA), and (2) C&M's motion for judgment asserting the evidence showed that Nocar assumed the risk of his fatal injury as a matter of law was properly denied by the lower court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) an employer does not owe a duty under MOSHA to provide a safe workplace to a person who is not his employee after the employer has left the worksite and has no control over worksite conditions, and (2) where it is clear that any person in Nocar's position must have understood the danger of falling, the issue of assumption of the risk may be decided by the court rather than the jury. Thus the issue should have been decided in C&M's favor by the lower court on C&M's motion. View "C&M Builders, L.L.C. v Strub" on Justia Law

After lobbying for legislation authorizing collective bargaining for its members, the Maryland Transportation Authority Police Lodge #34 of the Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. (FOP) struck a written memorandum agreement with the Maryland Transportation Authority (MTA), in which the MTA agreed to fund a multi-million take-home vehicle (THV) program provided the bills were withdrawn and no collective bargaining legislation covering the MTA was passed that session. When a new governor took office, he declined to continue funding for the THV program. The FOP sued on theories of breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The circuit court granted MTA's motion to dismiss, finding that the agreement was unenforceable and violated the state's collective bargaining laws. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case with instructions to affirm the judgment of the circuit court, holding that because the legislature did not expressly authorize the MTA and its employees to bargain collectively at the time the agreement was executed, the agreement was unenforceable. View "Maryland Transp. Auth. v Maryland Transp. Auth. Police Lodge #34" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Thomas, a retired Maryland State Police officer, applied for special disability retirement benefits after being found guilty of neglect of duty, submitting inaccurate reports, and submitting false reports and being sanctioned with suspension and demotion. Petitioner's argument that he was entitled to the benefits was rejected by the Board of Trustees of the State Retirement and Pension System of Maryland (the Board). After that administrative decision was affirmed upon judicial review by the circuit court and court of special appeals, petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals concluded that because petitioner's incapacity arose out of his "willful negligence," he was not entitled to special disability benefits provided by Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. 29-111(b)(1). Affirmed. View "Thomas v. State Ret. & Pension Sys. of Md." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a breach of contract claim against its former employee claiming that the employee violated the terms of her employment agreement by breaching the duty of loyalty and by breaching a non-solicitation clause which was included in the contract. The employee filed a counterclaim alleging that petitioner withheld her bonus in violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Code Ann., Labor and Employment section 3-501. At issue was whether an employee who breached her duty of loyalty could seek certain of the provisions of the contract which she breached. Also at issue was whether a party could recover attorneys' fees pursuant to a contract provision that provided reimbursement of fees incurred when a third party retained and paid counsel and the party did not pay attorneys' fees, nor had any obligations to pay attorneys' fees. The court held that the employee's breach of duty of loyalty did not result in forfeiture of her rights under the fee shifting provision of the non-solicitation clause where the clause presented divisible rights and obligations from the remainder of the contract. The court also held that the employee was entitled to attorneys' fees under the fee shifting provision where she prevailed under the terms of the contract and the breach did not result in the forfeiture of her rights.