Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Insurance Law
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Karen Dwyer was the primary driver of a vehicle owned by her father, Alan Dwyer. Alan had forbidden Ameen Abdulkhalek, the father of Karen’s children, to drive the car. The vehicle was insured by a policy in Alan’s name with Erie Insurance Exchange. When Karen gave the car keys to Abdulkhalek and asked him to retrieve the children, Abdulkhalek was involved in an accident after first making a trip to a gas station. The circuit court determined that Abdulkhalek’s use of the vehicle was not covered under an omnibus clause in the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) an omnibus clause in an automobile policy that extends liability coverage to a permissive owner of an insured vehicle also encompasses a driver who operates the car for the benefit of an individual who has permission from the named insured to use the vehicle; (2) coverage does not extend to that driver, however, if he deviates from the purpose for which he was authorized to drive the car for the benefit of the first permittee; and (3) because Abdulkhalek operated the car for a purpose other than that requested by the Karen, the omnibus clause did not extend coverage to Abdulkhalek. View "Payne v. Erie Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

Posted in: Insurance Law
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An Employer appealed from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) ordering Employer to pay additional temporary total disability benefits to Employee, who was injured during his employment. After a jury trial, the trial court granted Employee’s motion for judgment and affirmed the award, concluding that the Commission decision was a piece of evidence that needed to be considered by the jury and that Employer was required to introduce the Commission decision into evidence. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant was not required to move the award into evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in a de novo workers’ compensation jury trial, the appellant is not required to move the Commission decision into evidence. View "Gales v. Sunoco & Amer. Zurich Ins." on Justia Law

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The question before the Court of Appeals in these three consolidated cases was the appropriate method for crediting payments made under a workers’ compensation award when that award is increased on appeal. At issue was whether the credits should be computed on the basis of the number of weeks paid or the amount of money expended. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue in favor of the workers in each case by relying on legislation passed specifically to supersede earlier decisions of the Court, holding that, when crediting an employer/insurer for payments made under a workers’ compensation award that is subsequently amended, credit should be given for the total amount of dollars paid under the initial award. View "W.R. Grace & Co. v. Swedo" on Justia Law

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After Elms Construction Company, owned by Richard Elms (Elms), began installing windows and doors for Renewal by Anderson (Renewal), Elms fell from a ladder and injured his right foot. Elms filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission, alleging that he was Renewal’s common law employee at the time of the injury. The Commission concluded that Elms was an independent contractor, rather than a common law employee of Renewal, and was therefore not entitled to collect workers’ compensation benefits. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Elms was Renewal’s common law employee. The court of special appeals vacated the circuit court’s opinion and remanded. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and remanded with directions to affirm the circuit court’s judgment, holding (1) the Commission misconstrued the law as applied to the facts when it concluded that Elms was an independent contractor and not an employee of Renewal; (2) the court of special appeals erred when it held that a statutory employment analysis under section 9-508 of the Workers’ Compensation Act must precede a common law employment analysis; and (3) by application of the common law to the facts of this case, Elms was Renewal’s employee at the time of the accident. View "Elms v. Renewal by Anderson" on Justia Law

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David Springer was sued by J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC for, inter alia, engaging in false and misleading advertising, defamation, and false light. Springer was insured under an insurance policy issued by Erie Insurance Exchange. The policy contained a provision that excluded personal liability coverage arising out of “business pursuits.” Erie refused to provide Springer with a legal defense in the J.G. Wentworth lawsuit, arguing that the suit was triggered by Springer’s business interests and was thus barred under the “business pursuits” exclusion. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Erie. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court, holding that Erie and the trial court should have considered more than the face of the J.G. Wentworth complaint before establishing Springer’s alleged business interests and denying Springer’s claim. View "Springer v. Erie Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

Posted in: Insurance Law
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After Mr. Greenfield unsuccessfully filed criminal charges against Petitioner, Petitioner filed a complaint against Mr. and Mrs. Greenfield (Respondents) alleging, inter alia, defamation and false light/invasion of privacy. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents as to all claims. Respondents subsequently moved for an award of attorney's fees and costs while acknowledging that their attorney's fees and costs had been paid by their insurance carrier (Insurer). The circuit court denied the motion as to Mr. Greenfield but granted it as to Mrs. Greenfield, finding that she had been joined in the action without substantial justification and that she had "incurred" the costs of her defense within the meaning of Maryland Rule 1-341, even though Insurer had paid the costs of litigation on her behalf. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a party compelled to defend him or herself against abusive litigation may recover the costs associated with that litigation under Rule 1-341, regardless of the individual or entity that actually pays such expenses. View "Worsham v. Greenfield" on Justia Law

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Ember Buckley was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Harvey Betts when the vehicle was involved in an accident. Buckley, who sustained injuries in the accident, settled with GEICO, Betts’ insurer, for the full policy limits and signed a full release of all claims against Betts and a hold harmless agreement in favor of GEICO. Buckley then attempted to recover for the remainder of her outstanding medical bills under her uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) policy with The Brethren Mutual Insurance Company (“Brethren”), which denied coverage. Buckley filed suit, alleging breach of contract and seeking the policy limit in compensatory damages. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Brethren, concluding that the release was a general release, and thus released all entities from future claims, regardless of whether they were a party to the release. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the general release did not prejudice Buckley’s claim against Brethren. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the broad, all-inclusive language of the release must be read with an eye toward the parties’ overall intent; and (2) that the court of special appeals correctly held that the release did not waive Buckley’s UM claim against Brethren. View "Brethren Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buckley" on Justia Law

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After she was injured in a motor vehicle accident, Petitioner filed suit against Charles Serio, the tortfeasor. Petitioner’s motor vehicle insurer, GEICO, with whom Petitioner had underinsured motorist (“UM”) coverage, intervened as a defendant to protect its possible interest in the litigation. At trial, the parties stipulated that Serio was at fault for the accident, and the only issues before the jury were causation and damages. Petitioner’s counsel offered a proposed jury instruction on the nature of UM coverage, but the trial court refused the instruction, noting that insurance was not the issue at trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Petitioner for the amount of her medical bills but did not award damages for future medical expenses or pain and suffering. Petitioner unsuccessfully filed a motion for a new trial, arguing in not giving an instruction about the nature of UM coverage, the trial court confused the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury about the reason Plaintiff’s UM carrier was a party to the tort suit because the issue of UM coverage was not before the jury. View "Keller v. Serio" on Justia Law

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A holding company, whose subsidiaries owned power-generating facilities, filed a complaint against multiple insurers regarding the terms of liability policies the company purchased in the 1970s and 1980s. At issue in this case was whether New York or Pennsylvania law applied to the interpretation of the policies. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the holding company, determining that Pennsylvania law governed the interpretation of the policies. One of the insurers, TIG Insurance Company (“TIG”), appealed. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the insurance contracts were made in Pennsylvania, and therefore, Pennsylvania law applied to the policies at issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed and adopted the opinion of the court of special appeals with the exception of the court’s discussion addressing TIG’s argument that the place of countersigning a policy determines the applicable state law because that argument was not preserved for appeal. View "TIG Ins. Co. v. Monongahela Power Co." on Justia Law

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A county-owned police patrol vehicle was damaged in a single-car collision while Respondent, a county police officer, operated the vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The County, a self-insured entity, filed a complaint against Respondent seeking to recover the cost of repairs to the vehicle. The district court ruled that the County could recover damages against Respondent based on an exclusion in the self-insurance guarantee purportedly excluding or disclaiming all insurance coverage on the basis that Respondent operated his vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Maryland's compulsory motor vehicle insurance scheme does not permit a self-insurer such as the County to disclaim or exclude insurance coverage in a self-insurance guarantee where an individual causes a collision while driving under the influence of alcohol; and (2) the exclusion in the guarantee in this case was invalid because it violated the state compulsory motor vehicle insurance scheme, was not expressly authorized by the General Assembly, and was against public policy. View "Montgomery Co. v. Distel" on Justia Law