Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee received two knee injuries while working as a firefighter for Employer. Employee filed claims with the Worker's Compensation Commission, requesting disability compensation for the loss of income stemming from each injury. The Commission ordered that Employee should receive temporary partial disability compensation for the period in which he worked light duty after both injuries. Employer sought judicial review. At issue before the circuit court was whether a loss of Employee's ability to work overtime, and its associated loss in overtime compensation, qualified as a lessening of Employee's wage earning capacity for the purposes of Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-615(a). The circuit court affirmed the Commission's order, ruling that the term "wage earning capacity" could fairly include overtime compensation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the term "wage," as used in the phrase "wage earning capacity" in section 9-615(a), includes compensation paid for overtime hours worked prior to temporary partial disability; and (2) the Commission correctly determined that Employee's wage earning capacity was "less," under section 9-615(a), entitling him to compensation payment in accordance with the calculation scheme set forth in that section. View "Montgomery County v. Deibler" on Justia Law

Respondent and Cross Petitioner (Respondent), a former church employee, filed a sixteen-count civil action against Petitioners and Cross Respondents (Petitioners), including a church and a bishop, claiming that she was the victim of sexual harassment and employment discrimination. The circuit court granted Petitioners' motion to exclude all evidence of Respondent's job performance, citing the First Amendment's ministerial exception. After dismissing certain counts on the ground that they were barred by the statute of limitations, the court granted summary judgment to Petitioners. The court of special appeals reversed in part and remanded, concluding that Respondent was entitled to a new trial on four of her claims, which the court found were timely filed under the continuing violation doctrine. The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari and affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Respondent's claims of hostile work environment and gender discrimination were not barred by the statute of limitations or the ministerial exception; and (2) the remainder of Respondent's claims at issue would necessarily involve judicial inquiry into church governance, and such an inquiry was prohibited by the First Amendment. Remanded. View "Prince of Peace Lutheran Church v. Linklater" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Douglas and Vanessa Wietzke, filed a four-count complaint against the Chesapeake Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists (the Church), alleging nuisance, trespass, and negligence in connection with the construction of a new parking lot by the Church. The Wietzkes claimed the lot was the cause of continued flooding of their home and requested damages and injunctive relief. The circuit court granted the Church's motion for judgment on the negligence claim then entered judgment in favor of the Church on the nuisance and trespass claims. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to answer several questions, most of which related to the trial judge's denial of several of the Wietzkes' requested jury instructions. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Wietzke's proposed jury instructions, (2) the model jury instructions requiring a finding of unreasonable conduct in a private nuisance action were a correct exposition of the law, and (3) the trial court erred in granting the Church's motion for judgment on the Wietzkes' negligence claim as the evidence could have supported a negligence claim. View "Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conference Ass'n" on Justia Law

Three separate sets of repairs were made to a waste hauler purchased by Consolidated Waste from Standard Equipment. Consolidated Waste filed a complaint in circuit court, seeking to recoup the cost of the second round of repairs and claiming that the first and second set of repairs, performed by Standard Equipment, were made in such a way as to constitute a breach of contract and negligence. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Standard Equipment. After appealing to the court of special appeals, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari. The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion (1) by excluding evidence of the third round of repairs, performed by a different company, as a reasonable trial judge could have determined that the danger of prejudice outweighed substantially any probative value of the evidence; and (2) by utilizing a verdict sheet supplied by Standard Equipment. View "Consolidated Waste Indus. v. Standard Equip. Co." on Justia Law

Jerry Hansen suffered a heart attack while working for Laurel City and assumed disabled status. When he attempted to return to work, he was informed he would no longer be employed with the City. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Hansen filed suit in the circuit court seeking damages. The City filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Hansen had not satisfied the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA). The circuit court dismissed the suit, and the court of special appeals affirmed. On appeal, Hansen argued that he complied with the required notice provision of the LGTCA by delivering written notice of his claims against the City to the City Administrator. The Supreme Court held that Hansen's failure to plead expressly in his complaint satisfaction of the LGTCA notice provision prevented Hansen from pursuing his claim. Accordingly, the Court did not decide whether Hansen's conduct complied with the applicable notice provision. View "Hansen v. City of Laurel" on Justia Law

Wayne Nocar, who was doing construction work on a house, died after falling through a stairwell opening in a floor that C&M Builders had built. Kelly Strub sued C&M on behalf of her son, alleging negligence in the death of Nocar. The trial court determined the C&M was not negligent. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court held (1) C&M owed a duty to Nocar to comply with the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA), and (2) C&M's motion for judgment asserting the evidence showed that Nocar assumed the risk of his fatal injury as a matter of law was properly denied by the lower court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) an employer does not owe a duty under MOSHA to provide a safe workplace to a person who is not his employee after the employer has left the worksite and has no control over worksite conditions, and (2) where it is clear that any person in Nocar's position must have understood the danger of falling, the issue of assumption of the risk may be decided by the court rather than the jury. Thus the issue should have been decided in C&M's favor by the lower court on C&M's motion. View "C&M Builders, L.L.C. v Strub" on Justia Law

Petitioner sued the owners of her childhood home alleging injuries from lead paint on the premises. At issue was the trial court's instruction regarding the joint responsibilities of landlords and tenants in keeping the property in good condition. The court held that the inclusion of the instruction was error because neither plaintiff's contributory negligence nor negligence of her family members were at issue in the case. The court also held that the error was prejudicial because it introduced into the jury deliberations the idea that plaintiff, or her family, could have also been to blame for the injuries and such an argument was not only irrelevant to the case but prohibited by law and policy. The court further held that the inclusion of the argument could have permitted the jury to speculate or precluded a finding of liability where it was otherwise appropriate.

Petitioner, a police officer, filed a complaint against respondent under the theory of respondeat superior and alleged negligent hiring/supervision and negligence in supervising 911 dispatch protocols when he suffered severe injuries from a car accident that occurred while he was pursuing a suspect from an "armed robbery." At issue was whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that a police officer injured during a high-speed pursuit was barred by the common-law firefighter's rule from recovering in a tort action alleging negligence by a police dispatcher in giving the police officer faulty information that led to the commencement of the high-speed chase. Also at issue was whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in declining to address whether a "special duty" exception to the firefighter's rule should be recognized in Maryland. The court held that the firefighter's rule barred petitioner's claim where he failed to show the court a reason, based either in law or policy, to limit application of the firefighter's rule and where adopting such a limitation on the rule ran counter to its undergirding public policy, which recognized that the very nature of the firefighter's or police officer's occupation limits the public safety officer's ability to recover in tort for work-related injuries. The court also held that petitioner's general opposition to the application of the firefighter's rule was not sufficient to allow the circuit court the opportunity to decide the issue and therefore, the court also declined to decide the issue.

Petitioner Stephen Norman and two others owned equal shares in Sussex Title Company. Respondents Scott Borison and the Legg Law Firm filed on behalf of their clients a proposed class action lawsuit against multiple defendants-companies, including Sussex, for their alleged participation in âthe single largest mortgage scam in Maryland history.â Respondents did not name Petitioner as a defendant in any version of their original complaint. However, in the second amended complaint, Petitioner was mentioned in certain allegations. Petitioner claims that respondents defamed him by republishing the pleadings to the press and on the internet, and by making verbal comments to the press about the lawsuit. The Supreme Court found that an absolute privilege applies to Respondentsâ challenged statements contained in the pleadings because they âreasonably contemplated [the] proceedingsâ of the class action suit. The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs judgment dismissing Petitionerâs defamation action.