Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were the parents of a daughter who died and another daughter who received injuries after Michael Eaton struck the Plaintiffs' car. Plaintiffs filed suit against the owner of the Dogfish Head Alehouse (Dogfish Head), claiming that Dogfish Head had served alcohol to Eaton while he was "clearly intoxicated" and thus breached its duty to them not to furnish alcohol to intoxicated persons. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Dogfish Head, concluding that the court was bound by the Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Hatfield and Fedler v. Butler in which dram shop liability was not recognized as a cause of action in the state. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether it should recognize dram shop liability. The Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) Maryland does not recognize a cause of action against a tavern for harm caused off premises by an intoxicated person in the absence of a special relationship between the tavern and the person harmed or the actor who caused the harm; and (2) absent such a relationship in this case, Dogfish Head did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs, as members of the general public, to prevent the harm caused by Eaton. View "Warr v. JMGM Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Joan Dixon died from mesothelioma caused by exposure to asbestos. Joan's husband, Bernard, handled asbestos in brake products while working for Ford Motor Company. The Dixons also used a compound manufactured by Georgia-Pacific Corp. in building their home and an adjacent structure that possibly contained asbestos. Bernard, Joan's estate, and the couple's children pursued legal action against Ford and Georgia-Pacific, claiming negligence for failing to warn Joan of the dangerous nature of their products. The jury returned verdicts in favor of Plaintiffs against Ford. The court disagreed with the jury's conclusion that the Georgia-Pacific compound was not also a substantial contributing factor and entered judgment for Ford on its cross-claim against Georgia-Pacific. The court of special appeals reversed the judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that the trial court erred in allowing opinion evidence by Plaintiffs' principal expert. The Court of Appeals (1) reversed and remanded with instructions to affirm the judgments entered against Ford, holding that the trial court did not err in allowing the expert's testimony; and (2) reversed the judgment granting Ford's cross-claim against Georgia-Pacific, holding that the jury's verdict on the issue of Georgia-Pacific's liability was not against the weight of the evidence. View "Dixon v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted mesothelioma allegedly from exposure to asbestos fibers brought into her home on the clothing of her grandfather, who was exposed to asbestos-laden products during the course of his employment. Plaintiff sued her grandfather's employer (Employer), asserting strict liability and negligence claims. After a trial, a judgment was entered against Employer for more than $5 million. Employer appealed, claiming, among other things, that it had no duty to warn Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, at the relevant time back in 1968-69, there was no duty to warn persons such as Plaintiff of the danger of exposure to the dust on her grandfather's clothes. Remanded. View "Georgia Pac., LLC v. Farrar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a soccer player who had volunteered to assist in coaching a team of young soccer players in a program of the Soccer Association of Columbia (Defendant). Plaintiff was injured when the soccer goal, which was not anchored to the ground, fell on top of him after he grabbed the upper crossbar. Plaintiff subsequently filed a negligence complaint against Defendant. Defendant asserted the defense of contributory negligence. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendant, finding that because both parties were negligent, Plaintiff was barred from any recovery. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Court of Appeals should abrogate Maryland's long-established common law principle of contributory negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Court would not change the common law and abrogate the contributory negligence defense in negligence actions in the face of the General Assembly's repeated refusal to do so. View "Coleman v. Soccer Ass'n of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action for negligence and assault against Defendant. Upon reaching a verdict, the jury foreman answered the court clerk's questions about the negligence count by using the verdict sheet submitted to and completed by the jury. The trial court found Defendant to be negligent based on these answers. However, it was not until after the jury was dismissed that the judge received the jury's completed copy of the verdict sheet, upon which the jury indicated that it intended to award damages. The trial judge enrolled the verdict sheet as the jury's verdict, awarding damages accordingly. The court of appeals vacated the award because that portion of the jury's verdict had not been announced in open court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) after a jury verdict is orally announced, the verdict is subject to a judge's revisory powers; (2) revision is permissible only when the intent of the jury is manifest beyond doubt; and (3) the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in revising the verdict to include the award of damages as shown on the verdict sheet, as the revision effectuated the intent of the jury. View "Turner v. Hastings" on Justia Law

In 2009, Respondents, residents of the Jacksonville community, were awarded damages by a jury for an Exxon contractor's puncture of an underground gasoline feed line at an Exxon Mobil-owned gasoline service station. Several thousand gallons of gasoline leaked into the local underground aquifer and contaminated the source of the wells supplying water to Respondents' households. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the damages award and ordered all costs to be paid pro rata by Respondents. Respondents subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. Exxon responded with an amended request for bond premium costs seeking reimbursement. The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration and Exxon's request but changed the mandate in Ford to order that the parties shall bear their own costs, concluding that requiring Respondents to bear $1 million in premium bond costs was unreasonable under the circumstances. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in two separate lawsuits, sued a medical doctor and medical center for medical negligence, lack of informed consent, and fraud. Prior to the trial date, Defendants successfully moved to bifurcate the trials. The administrative judge of the circuit court vacated the trial judge's orders bifurcating the trials and reassigned the cases to another judge for trial. Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition to reverse the administrative judge's orders. The Court of Appeals vacated the administrative judge's orders and reinstated the orders of the trial judge, holding that, under the circumstances, the administrative judge did not have the authority to review and vacate the trial judge's decision to bifurcate the trials and to unilaterally reassign the cases. View "St. Joseph Med. Ctr. v. Circuit Court (Turnbull)" on Justia Law

Respondent, a minor who was having trouble breathing, was transferred by helicopter from a hospital to a university medical center. Present on the flight was a paramedic employed by Petitioner TransCare Maryland, Inc., who had been invited to ride along by the UMMS nurse for training purposes. During the flight, Respondent's heart rate and oxygen level began to drop because the endotracheal tube had allegedly become dislodged and was blocking Respondent's airway. Respondent, by his mother, filed a complaint against TransCare, a commercial ambulance company, alleging medical malpractice on the basis that its employee had failed to provide the requisite standard of care and that TransCare was liable for Respondent's resulting brain injury under the principle of respondeat superior. The circuit court granted summary judgment for TransCare, concluding that TransCare was immune under the Good Samaritan Act and the Fire and Rescue Act. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that neither statute applied to a private, for-profit ambulance company. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that neither statute relieved TransCare of liability for the allegedly negligent actions of its employee while its employee was in training. View "Transcare Maryland, Inc. v. Murray" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of the alleged exposure of Plaintiff to lead paint at the homes in which she spent her childhood. Petitioner, by her mother, sued the owners of two of the homes, for negligence and unfair trade practices under the Consumer Protection Act. Only the claims against the second owner proceeded to trial. The circuit court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant after excluding proposed expert opinion testimony of a pediatrician to establish Defendant's building as the source of Plaintiff's lead exposure and elevated blood lead levels. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the proposed expert testimony; but (2) summary judgment in this case was not appropriate, as disputes of material fact existed to foreclose a grant of summary judgment. View "Ross v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore City" on Justia Law

Railroad employee (Employee) filed suit against his employer (Railroad) under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), alleging that Railroad was negligent in its use of large ballast rather than small ballast in areas where Employee worked. Employee claimed that walking on the large ballast caused him to develop osteoarthritis in both knees. A jury found Railroad seventy percent negligent and Employee twenty percent negligent and awarded Employee $1,246,000 for his injuries. The court of special appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether and when a railroad employee's negligence action under FELA may be precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a negligence action alleging the improper use of ballast will be precluded only to the extent to which the ballast performs a track-support function, and under such circumstances, the railroad should bear the burden of proving the facts that support preclusion; and (2) here, Employee's FELA claim was not precluded by FRSA because Railroad failed to prove that the ballast complained of performed a track-support function. View "CSX Transp., Inc. v. Pitts" on Justia Law