Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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At issue in this case was whether apportionment of damages is appropriate in the wrongful death and asbestos litigation context and whether a “use plaintiff” - a plaintiff for whom an action is brought in another’s name and does not join in the action - is precluded from recovering damages by not formally joining in the proceedings. In four asbestos cases, plaintiffs and use plaintiffs were separately awarded damages for their wrongful death claims against Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust (WGAST). The court of special appeals concluded (1) the failure of the use plaintiffs to join the action as party plaintiffs before the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations precluded the use plaintiffs from recovering damages; and (2) the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on apportionment of damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) apportionment of damages is appropriate only where the injury in question is reasonably divisible among multiple causes, and in this case, the resulting injury was not reasonably divisible; and (2) the use plaintiffs in this case were part of the action for purposes of the trial resulting in jury verdicts and money judgments entered in their favor. View "Carter v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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In each of these two consolidated cases, plaintiffs brought a negligence action against landlords to recover for injuries resulting from lead paint poisoning. Both plaintiffs relied on circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence that lead paint in the subject properties was a substantial contributor to the injuries. In both cases, the trial judges granted summary judgment to the landlords, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie negligence case with regard to the causation element. The Court of Appeals affirmed after setting forth principles under which a lead-paint poisoned plaintiff may establish through circumstantial evidence a prima facie negligence case for lead paint poisoning, holding that plaintiffs in this case failed to meet their initial burden of proving circumstantially a prima facie negligence case. View "Hamilton v. Kirson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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Jai Medical Systems Managed Care Organization, Inc. (JaiMCO) is an entity that contracts with health care providers to provide health care services to patients enrolled in the State Medicaid program. Dr. Steven Bennett participated as a specialty care provider in the network of JaiMCO. Petitioner chose Dr. Bennett to treat a bunion on her foot that was causing her pain. After Dr. Bennett performed surgery to remove the bunion Petitioner developed gangrene, and her foot had to be partially amputated. Petitioner sought to hold JaiMCO liable for Dr. Bennett’s negligence on a theory of apparent agency, asserting that JaiMCO created the appearance that Dr. Bennett was its agent and that she reasonably relied on that appearance. A jury returned a verdict in Petitioner’s favor. The court of special appeals reversed, determining that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a managed care organization may be vicariously liable for the negligence of a network physician under a theory of apparent agency; but (2) even if Petitioner subjectively believed Dr. Bennett was an employee of JaiMCO, the belief was not reasonable under the facts of this case. View "Bradford v. Jai Med. Sys. Managed Care Org., Inc." on Justia Law

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After Mr. Greenfield unsuccessfully filed criminal charges against Petitioner, Petitioner filed a complaint against Mr. and Mrs. Greenfield (Respondents) alleging, inter alia, defamation and false light/invasion of privacy. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents as to all claims. Respondents subsequently moved for an award of attorney's fees and costs while acknowledging that their attorney's fees and costs had been paid by their insurance carrier (Insurer). The circuit court denied the motion as to Mr. Greenfield but granted it as to Mrs. Greenfield, finding that she had been joined in the action without substantial justification and that she had "incurred" the costs of her defense within the meaning of Maryland Rule 1-341, even though Insurer had paid the costs of litigation on her behalf. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a party compelled to defend him or herself against abusive litigation may recover the costs associated with that litigation under Rule 1-341, regardless of the individual or entity that actually pays such expenses. View "Worsham v. Greenfield" on Justia Law

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Decedent died from colorectal cancer that spread to her spine. Decedent had sought treatment for several years from Defendant, who failed to diagnose the cancer. Plaintiffs, Decedent's surviving husband and children, filed wrongful death claims against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs' claims were precluded because Decedent had not brought a timely personal injury lawsuit against Defendant, nor could she have at the time of her death as it would have been barred by the statute of limitations applicable to medical negligence claims. The circuit court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a wrongful death beneficiary's right to file a lawsuit is not contingent upon the decedent's ability to bring a timely negligence claim on the date of her death; and (2) Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-109 does not apply directly to a wrongful death action arising out of alleged medical malpractice, and thus it does not bar Appellants' wrongful death action. View "Mummert v. Alizadeh" on Justia Law

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Three-year-old Christopher Paul suffered severe injuries after nearly drowning in a pool at an apartment complex near his parents’ home. Christopher’s mother filed a complaint against the owner and manager of the apartments and the operator of the pool (collectively, Petitioners), alleging that Petitioners breached a duty to maintain the pool in a reasonably safe condition and breached statutory and regulatory duties by failing to comply with pool regulations set forth in state and county codes. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Petitioners based in part on Christopher’s status as a trespasser when he entered the pool area. The court of special appeals reversed, holding (1) Petitioners were required to comply with the relevant regulations and statutory provisions concerning pool barriers, which were “designed to create a cause of action in tort for the protection of the swimming public”; and (2) a defendant need not owe a common-law duty to a plaintiff before violation of a statute can be used as evidence of negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners’ alleged violation of the Code of Maryland Regulations, if proven, would demonstrate the breach of a duty from Petitioners to Christopher; and (2) such a duty, derived from statute, would apply irrespective of Christopher’s legal status on the property when the incident occurred. View "Blackburn Ltd. P'ship v. Paul" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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Respondents, the estate of Anthony Fusco and Anthony's surviving children and widow, filed survival and wrongful death actions against Petitioners, Dr. Kevin Shannon and his medical practice (together, “Dr. Shannon”) for failing to obtain informed consent for the administration of radiation therapy and a drug, Amifostine, to Anthony, Dr. Shannon’s patient. After a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Dr. Shannon. The court of special appeals reversed, determining that the trial judge erred in excluding that testimony of Dr. James Trovato, a pharmacist, as Dr. Trovato may have been qualified to offer an opinion due to his substantial experience studying and advising patients regarding oncology medications, including Amifostine. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial judge did not err in excluding Dr. Trovato’s testimony because, in his written proffer, Dr. Trovato simply enumerated the risks associated with Amifostine and did not opine about the likelihood and severity of the risks implicated in the administration of the drug. View "Shannon v. Fusco" on Justia Law

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Amafica Woodland lived in a residence owned and managed by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (“HABC”) from her birth in 1995 until her mother and grandmother vacated the residence in 1997. In 2009, Woodland sued HABC, claiming injury from her exposure to lead paint at the residence and asserting compliance with the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). The trial court allowed the case to proceed to trial, finding substantial compliance and good cause for Woodland’s failure to provide written notice of her intent to sue within 180 days of injury. A jury subsequently found in favor of Woodland. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in finding that Woodland had substantially complied with the LGTCA’s notice requirements, but the court’s alternate finding that Woodland had good cause for failing to comply made this error moot; and (2) erred in considering material not in evidence as part of its ruling that Woodland met the good cause exception for non-compliance with the LGTCA notice requirement, but this error was harmless. View "Housing Auth. of Baltimore City v. Woodland" on Justia Law

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Ember Buckley was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Harvey Betts when the vehicle was involved in an accident. Buckley, who sustained injuries in the accident, settled with GEICO, Betts’ insurer, for the full policy limits and signed a full release of all claims against Betts and a hold harmless agreement in favor of GEICO. Buckley then attempted to recover for the remainder of her outstanding medical bills under her uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) policy with The Brethren Mutual Insurance Company (“Brethren”), which denied coverage. Buckley filed suit, alleging breach of contract and seeking the policy limit in compensatory damages. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Brethren, concluding that the release was a general release, and thus released all entities from future claims, regardless of whether they were a party to the release. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the general release did not prejudice Buckley’s claim against Brethren. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the broad, all-inclusive language of the release must be read with an eye toward the parties’ overall intent; and (2) that the court of special appeals correctly held that the release did not waive Buckley’s UM claim against Brethren. View "Brethren Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buckley" on Justia Law

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After she was injured in a motor vehicle accident, Petitioner filed suit against Charles Serio, the tortfeasor. Petitioner’s motor vehicle insurer, GEICO, with whom Petitioner had underinsured motorist (“UM”) coverage, intervened as a defendant to protect its possible interest in the litigation. At trial, the parties stipulated that Serio was at fault for the accident, and the only issues before the jury were causation and damages. Petitioner’s counsel offered a proposed jury instruction on the nature of UM coverage, but the trial court refused the instruction, noting that insurance was not the issue at trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Petitioner for the amount of her medical bills but did not award damages for future medical expenses or pain and suffering. Petitioner unsuccessfully filed a motion for a new trial, arguing in not giving an instruction about the nature of UM coverage, the trial court confused the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury about the reason Plaintiff’s UM carrier was a party to the tort suit because the issue of UM coverage was not before the jury. View "Keller v. Serio" on Justia Law