Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Frank Loane filed a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his driver's license should not be suspended after he refused to submit to a chemical breath test upon being stopped by a police officer for failing to obey lane directions. Respondent argued that his license could not be suspended unless the MVA first proved where the stop occurred, whether on a highway or private property used by the public in general, in accordance with Md. Code Ann. Transp. II 16-205.1. The ALJ rejected respondent's argument that the MVA failed to prove the location and then suspended respondent's driver's license for 120 days pursuant to the statute. Respondent filed a petition for judicial review of the ALJ's decision. The circuit court determined there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding and reversed and remanded the case. The MVA filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the statute does not require the MVA to prove at the show cause administrative hearing that the officer stopped respondent on a highway or private property used by the public in general. Remanded. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Loane" on Justia Law

The county planning board approved a detailed site plan for a parcel of commercial property in Prince George's County. The county district council elected to review the planning board's approval, after which several individuals, including petitioners Rishi Gosain and Abid Chaudhry, filed with the district council an appeal of the planning board's approval. The district council ultimately affirmed the planning board's decision, and petitioners filed a petition for judicial review of the final decision by the district council in the circuit court. The circuit court entered an order dismissing the petition, finding the petitioners lacked standing to bring the action. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons than the lower courts. At issue was the meaning of the phrase "any person or taxpayer in Prince George's County" under Md. Ann. Code art. 28, 8-106(e), which authorizes appeals of final district council decisions. The Court found the petitioners lacked standing to bring the action because they neither resided or had a property interest in a residence in the county, nor owned or leased real property in the county, nor paid property taxes to the county. View "Gosain v. County Council of Prince George's County" on Justia Law

The Board of County Commissioners of Cecil County voted to grant a water services and wastewater franchise to two related companies, after which it approved an agreement providing for the sale and transfer to the companies of county-owned water and wastewater facilities. County residents filed petitions for judicial review of the decisions. The circuit court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment on the issue of its right to award the franchise agreements and ultimately concluded that the Board had a right to sell the county-owned property. The residents appealed, arguing that Md. Code Ann. art. 25, 8(a) prohibits the Board from conveying the property. At issue was whether Md. Code Ann. art. 25, 8(a) prohibited the Board from selling facilities that will continue to provide essential services to county citizens. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Board was not prohibited from entering into the asset purchase agreements at issue. View "Appleton Regional Cmty. Alliance v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Cecil County " on Justia Law

Developer Eastern Petroleum Company sought the necessary approvals for the proposed expansion of a gas station from the appropriate local agencies, each of which held public hearings. The respondents, a group of nearby residents (citizens), appeared in opposition at the agency level. After the hearings the local agencies granted both zoning approvals. The district council elected to review the zoning decisions, but before any review proceedings, the council withdrew its election to review the local decisions and declared the agency decisions final. The citizens filed an action for judicial review of the council's decision in the circuit court, which dismissed the action. On appeal, the court of special appeals reversed and remanded. At issue was whether the withdrawal of election to review was a final decision and whether the administrative exhaustion requirement precluded the citizens' claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding that (1) the citizens were eligible to seek review of the council decision, (2) the citizens exhausted their administrative remedies by appearing at the agency hearings, and (3) the district council may not withdraw its election to review and finalize the local agency decisions without following the statutory procedure to review. View "County Council v. Billings, et al." on Justia Law

After lobbying for legislation authorizing collective bargaining for its members, the Maryland Transportation Authority Police Lodge #34 of the Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. (FOP) struck a written memorandum agreement with the Maryland Transportation Authority (MTA), in which the MTA agreed to fund a multi-million take-home vehicle (THV) program provided the bills were withdrawn and no collective bargaining legislation covering the MTA was passed that session. When a new governor took office, he declined to continue funding for the THV program. The FOP sued on theories of breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The circuit court granted MTA's motion to dismiss, finding that the agreement was unenforceable and violated the state's collective bargaining laws. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case with instructions to affirm the judgment of the circuit court, holding that because the legislature did not expressly authorize the MTA and its employees to bargain collectively at the time the agreement was executed, the agreement was unenforceable. View "Maryland Transp. Auth. v Maryland Transp. Auth. Police Lodge #34" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Thomas, a retired Maryland State Police officer, applied for special disability retirement benefits after being found guilty of neglect of duty, submitting inaccurate reports, and submitting false reports and being sanctioned with suspension and demotion. Petitioner's argument that he was entitled to the benefits was rejected by the Board of Trustees of the State Retirement and Pension System of Maryland (the Board). After that administrative decision was affirmed upon judicial review by the circuit court and court of special appeals, petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals concluded that because petitioner's incapacity arose out of his "willful negligence," he was not entitled to special disability benefits provided by Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. 29-111(b)(1). Affirmed. View "Thomas v. State Ret. & Pension Sys. of Md." on Justia Law

At issue on review by the Supreme Court is whether people aggrieved by the Board of County Commissioners of Kent County can appeal the Commissioners' decision to an appellate court. The Commissioners approved a request that effectively amended the County's local Critical Area Plan under the Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays Critical Area Protection Program. Petitioner Jerry Smith and several Kent County Residents challenged the Court of Special Appeals's decision to dismiss their challenge to the Commissioners' ruling that granted increased development of a particular parcel of property within the County. A procedural problem arose from a proclamation that said the County's decision is not effective until it's approved by the State Critical Area Commission. While consideration of the initial development request was pending before the Critical Area Commission, Petitioners sought judicial review in the circuit court of the County Commissioners' initial approval of the development. The court affirmed the County's approval for the development; Petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the matter as premature. On review of the enabling statutes creating the Critical Area Protection program and the records of proceedings, the Supreme Court held that the County's approval of the development was not a final action, "considering that the [Critical Area] Commission's required decision may modify, reject, delay or even preclude the local approval from becoming effective. As a non-final order ⦠no immediate right existed to have judicial review take place." The Court affirmed the lower court's decision in dismissing Petitioner's case.