Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On two separate occasions, Respondent Edy Sanchez filed for benefits with the Workers' Compensation Commission while previous orders, in the same claim, were pending on appeal in the courts. The Commission decided that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Respondent's requests because of the pending appeals. The circuit court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not retain jurisdiction pending an appeal because the issues raised in the new filings did not fit within the jurisdictional provisions of Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-742. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had jurisdiction over Respondent's new issues under section 9-736(b). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under section 9-736(b), the Commission retains jurisdiction to hear new issues while other issues in the same claim are pending on appeal, so long as no evidence was taken or decision made on the new issues in the hearing from which the appeal was taken; and (2) section 9-742 was not intended to reduce the Commission's ongoing jurisdiction to grant relief, notwithstanding the appeal. View "Potomac Abatement, Inc. v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Maryland Insurance Commissioner approved a filing by Allstate Insurance Company and Allstate Indemnity Company (collectively, Allstate) giving notice of its intent to cease writing new property insurance policies in certain geographic areas of the state. The Commissioner concluded that the filing was subject to administrative review under Md. Code Ann. 19-107(a) and Md. Code Ann. Ins. 27-501(a) and that it satisfied the pertinent criteria under both statutes. The circuit court affirmed both aspects of the Commissioner's ruling. The court of special appeals affirmed but on alternative grounds, holding that section 27-501(a) did not apply to the filing and that, even if it did, the statute was not violated. The Court of Appeals affirmed but, again, on different grounds, holding (1) the Commissioner did not err in finding that section 27-501 did apply to the Allstate filing, and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the Commissioner's decision. View "People's Ins. Counsel Div. v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Verizon Maryland, a telecommunications company, and the staff of the Public Service Commission (PSC) obtained PSC approval of a global settlement of six pending cases. Verizon employed an alternative form of regulation (AFOR) under Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Co. (PUC) 4-301 that included up to $6,000,000 in bill credits to customers with out-of-service complaints that were not resolved in compliance with specified standards. PSC approved the AFOR pursuant to PUC 4-301. A technicians union objected, contending that the service quality aspects of the AFOR did not ensure the quality, availability, and reliability of service required by PUC 4-301. The circuit court affirmed PSC's approval of the AFOR. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that PSC acted within its discretion in approving the AFOR, as PUC 4-301's use of the term "ensuring" did not require that PSC be completely certain that Verizon's incentive strategy would result in compliance with standards. View "Commc'ns Workers of Am., ALF-CIO v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md." on Justia Law

After Petitioners, Montgomery Preservation, Inc. and others, made proper formal requests, the Montgomery County Planning Board of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (MNCPPC) decided not to recommend a certain building for historic designation, and not to amend the county's master plan or historic preservation to include the building. The Planning Board forwarded this non-recommendation to the Montgomery County Council, which, sitting as an administrative agency, concluded it could take no action on the matter and therefore did nothing. Petitioners sought a writ of administrative mandamus, claiming that the Council's inaction rendered the Planning Board's previous recommendation final and appealable. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, holding that no judicial review of the Planning Board's recommendation could take place because the Council had indeed "acted" under the relevant statute. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Planning Board's recommendation was not a final appealable agency decision. View "Montgomery Preservation v. MNCPP" on Justia Law

On February 22, 2007, a prostitute alleged that she had sexual intercourse with Petitioner, an officer with the Baltimore Police Department (BDP). On June 26, 2008, the BDP administratively charged Petitioner with six violations of BDP general orders arising out of his alleged sexual misconduct and his alleged false statements to investigators with the BDP's internal investigation division on July 11, 2007 and August 1, 2007. On July 11, 2008, the BPD terminated Petitioner. Petitioner appealed, contending that the administrative charges were barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in section 3-106 of the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights. The circuit court granted the BPD's cross-motion for summary judgment as it related to the false statement charge, ruling that it was filed within the one-year limitations window. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the limitations period begins when the officer makes the false statement, not when the earlier misconduct that underlies the investigation was alleged to have occurred. View "Robinson v. Baltimore Police Dep't" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the Maryland insurance commissioner, issued a cease-and-desist order to Respondents, several premium finance companies that provided loans primarily to customers of the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, purporting to prevent them from charging interest on loans to consumers to pay automobile insurance premiums in excess of the statutory maximum. Respondents requested a hearing. An associate deputy insurance commissioner presided over a hearing at the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) and issued a final order affirming the commissioner's cease-and-desist order. The circuit court concluded that the administrative hearing violated Respondents' right to fundamental fairness and due process of law because the commissioner delegated the decision-making authority to a subordinate. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the court of special appeals and circuit court and affirmed for the most part the decision of the MIA, holding, inter alia, that (1) the MIA hearing was fair and without undue "command influence"; and (2) the commissioner's interpretation of Md. Code Ann. Ins. 23-304 was correct, and Respondents violated the statute when their premium finance agreements operated to assess a finance charge in excess of 1.15 percent for each of thirty days. View "Md. Ins. Comm'r v. Cent. Acceptance Corp." on Justia Law

The Board of Physicians sanctioned Petitioner, a medical doctor, upon finding that Petitioner violated several subsections of Md. Code Ann. Health Occ. 14-404 when he falsely indicated on an application for renewal of his medical license that he was not involved in a medical malpractice action. The circuit court and court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not err in either its interpretation of Md. Code Regs. 10.32.02.03.C(7)(d) or its application of that regulation to the statement of Petitioner's counsel that Petitioner would be in court on a date proposed to conduct an unrelated case resolution conference; (2) the Board properly decided that Petitioner violated section 14-404(1)(3) by failing to include on his application the pendency of the malpractice action; and (3) the Board did not err in determining that the term "willful" means intentional for purposes of section 14-404, and the record contained substantial evidence that Petitioner willfully made false statements in connection with his involvement in a medical malpractice action in his application for license renewal. View "Kim v. Bd. of Physicians" on Justia Law

The Maryland Real Estate Commission revoked the real estate licenses of Joel Pautsch pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Bus. Occ. & Prof. 17-322(b)(24)(i) based on Pautsch's convictions for child abuse. The circuit court affirmed after finding there was competent, material and substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial evidence upon which the Commission relief to support its finding that there was a nexus between Pautsch's convictions and his professional activities; and (2) the sanction was neither arbitrary nor capricious because Pautsch's crimes undermined his trustworthiness in dealing with the public during the course of providing real estate brokerage services and negatively impacted his character and reputation. View "Pautsch v. Real Estate Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner Megan Cathey was a developmentally disabled adult who, pursuant to a court order, lived with her mother in New Jersey for two weeks a month and with her father in Maryland for the remaining two weeks. Petitioner's father applied for Developmental Disability Administration (DDA) services, but the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene determined that Petitioner's interstate custody did not give her the requisite Maryland residency to qualify for such services. The Department's board of review affirmed, and the circuit court upheld the board's decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) for the purposes of developmental disabilities law, Petitioner was a "resident" of Maryland during the time she spent with her father in Maryland; (2) as such, Petitioner was eligible for DDA services during the time she lived with her father in Maryland; and (3) the concept of "residence" as presented in the relevant portion of the Code of Maryland Regulations was not exacting as the legal concept of "domicile." Remanded. View "Cathey v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

Woodmore Towne Centre applied for a non-tidal wetlands permit to construct a road extension and stream crossing in order to provide primary access into a development. After the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) approved the permit, Patuxent Riverkeeper, a nonprofit environmental group, initiated a judicial review action against MDE and Woodmore. The circuit court dismissed the action for lack of standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Riverkeeper had standing under Md. Code Ann. Envir. 5-204(f) to initiate a judicial review action because one of its members had alleged sufficient harm to his aesthetic, recreational, and economic interests in connection with the issuance of the non-tidal wetlands permit at issue. View "Patuxent Riverkeeper v. Dep't of Env't" on Justia Law