Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Maryland Real Estate Commission revoked the real estate licenses of Joel Pautsch pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Bus. Occ. & Prof. 17-322(b)(24)(i) based on Pautsch's convictions for child abuse. The circuit court affirmed after finding there was competent, material and substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial evidence upon which the Commission relief to support its finding that there was a nexus between Pautsch's convictions and his professional activities; and (2) the sanction was neither arbitrary nor capricious because Pautsch's crimes undermined his trustworthiness in dealing with the public during the course of providing real estate brokerage services and negatively impacted his character and reputation. View "Pautsch v. Real Estate Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner Megan Cathey was a developmentally disabled adult who, pursuant to a court order, lived with her mother in New Jersey for two weeks a month and with her father in Maryland for the remaining two weeks. Petitioner's father applied for Developmental Disability Administration (DDA) services, but the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene determined that Petitioner's interstate custody did not give her the requisite Maryland residency to qualify for such services. The Department's board of review affirmed, and the circuit court upheld the board's decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) for the purposes of developmental disabilities law, Petitioner was a "resident" of Maryland during the time she spent with her father in Maryland; (2) as such, Petitioner was eligible for DDA services during the time she lived with her father in Maryland; and (3) the concept of "residence" as presented in the relevant portion of the Code of Maryland Regulations was not exacting as the legal concept of "domicile." Remanded. View "Cathey v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

Woodmore Towne Centre applied for a non-tidal wetlands permit to construct a road extension and stream crossing in order to provide primary access into a development. After the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) approved the permit, Patuxent Riverkeeper, a nonprofit environmental group, initiated a judicial review action against MDE and Woodmore. The circuit court dismissed the action for lack of standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Riverkeeper had standing under Md. Code Ann. Envir. 5-204(f) to initiate a judicial review action because one of its members had alleged sufficient harm to his aesthetic, recreational, and economic interests in connection with the issuance of the non-tidal wetlands permit at issue. View "Patuxent Riverkeeper v. Dep't of Env't" on Justia Law

Petitioners were nonresidents who neither lived nor worked in Maryland but had a source of income in the State. In 2005, the Comptroller of the Treasury issued a notice of assessment against Petitioners' 2004 joint Maryland nonresident income tax returns for failure to pay the Special Nonresident Tax (SNRT). The assessment included the amount owed for the SNRT and interest. Petitioners challenged, on federal and state constitutional grounds, the State's authority to impose the SNRT. The tax court (1) declared the SNRT to be constitutional, and (2) denied Petitioners' request to abate the accrued interest, reasoning that the court lacked the authority to do so. The circuit court affirmed as to the constitutionality of the tax but determined that the tax court could abate the interest assessment. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the SNRT does not violate the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Privileged and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2) the SNRT does not violate Maryland's equal protection doctrine; and (3) the tax court's power of review extends to the abatement of interest assessments. Remanded to consider whether Petitioners were entitled to the abatement of interest. View "Frey v. Comptroller of the Treasury" on Justia Law

Appellant Tonya Walker received housing benefits administered pursuant to the Section Eight Housing Program, which required certain family obligations to be satisfied for continued participation in the program. Appellant's housing benefits were later terminated by the Department of Housing and Community Development for her alleged violations of the family obligations. Appellant challenged that decision at an informal administrative hearing. A hearing officer affirmed the Department's decision. Appellant sought judicial review, asserting that the informal hearing was intended to be a "contested case" under Maryland's APA, to which certain rights and procedures apply but were not followed in her case. The circuit court affirmed the Department's decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that judicial review of the decision could not be conducted on the present record because the hearing officer did not develop a record that contained the requisite factual findings, including resolution of disputed facts, and a clear statement of the rationale for the decision. Remanded. View "Walker v. Dep't of Housing" on Justia Law

A landowner submitted a site development plan to the county planning board, proposing to construct a mixed-use condominium building. Joel Broida, who lived across the street from the landowner's parcel of land, filed a motion to deny approval of the site development plan. The planning board approved the plan. Broida appealed. A hearing examiner dismissed the appeal, holding that Broida lacked standing. Broida appealed. The board of appeals (Board) split evenly on the issue of Broida's standing and decided to re-vote at a later date. The landowner then filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment, declaring that the Board's split decision was final and required the appeal to be dismissed. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the landowner. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Broida had standing to appeal. The court therefore did not address whether there was a final Board decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) there was no final administrative decision and, therefore, the landowner failed to exhaust its administrative remedies; and (2) because there was no final administrative decision, the lower courts erred in reaching the merits of the case, and the declaratory judgment action should have been dismissed. Remanded. View "Renaissance v. Broida" on Justia Law

Tyrone Lawson was a seventeen-year veteran of the Bowie State University Police Department until his termination for violating the Department's chain of command policy. Specifically, Lawson had drafted a letter disclosing alleged abuses by his fellow officers, and instead of reporting the violations to the Department's Chief of Police, Lawson presented the letter to the university's vice president of student affairs. Lawson was later fired for, among other things, insubordination. Lawson sought relief, arguing that he was entitled to whistleblower protection because the letter constituted a "protected disclosure" as contemplated by Md. Code Ann. State Pers. & Pens. 5-305. The ALJ concluded that Lawson's letter was not a protected disclosure because it was part of Lawson's crusade to improve the Department. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari and reversed, holding that the ALJ improperly conflated Lawson's personal motivation for disclosure with the statutory requirement that an employee have a reasonable belief that the information disclosed evidences a violation. Remanded. View "Lawson v. Bowie State Univ." on Justia Law

The Maryland State Retirement System (System) filed a claim against Milliman, an actuary, asserting that Milliman had understated the contributions required to fund three of the State's ten retirement and pension systems because of Milliman's misinterpretation of a particular data code. The Retirement System Procurement Officer determined that Milliman had failed to comply with its contractual duties and awarded damages to the System. On appeal, the State Board of Contract Appeals determined that the actuary had substantially breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the damages. The circuit court affirmed the Board's findings that Milliman breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the award of lost investment earnings but reversed the Board's award of amounts equaling lost contributions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, holding (1) Milliman was liable to the System for repeatedly misinterpreting a data code; (2) the System was not negligent in the development or transmission of data provided to Milliman and, therefore, contributory negligence did not bar the System's recovery; and (3) the circuit court erroneously reduced the Board's damage award representing lost contributions. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment of the circuit court and affirmed the Board's decision. View "Milliman, Inc. v. State Ret. & Pension Sys." on Justia Law

Jerry Hansen suffered a heart attack while working for Laurel City and assumed disabled status. When he attempted to return to work, he was informed he would no longer be employed with the City. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Hansen filed suit in the circuit court seeking damages. The City filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Hansen had not satisfied the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA). The circuit court dismissed the suit, and the court of special appeals affirmed. On appeal, Hansen argued that he complied with the required notice provision of the LGTCA by delivering written notice of his claims against the City to the City Administrator. The Supreme Court held that Hansen's failure to plead expressly in his complaint satisfaction of the LGTCA notice provision prevented Hansen from pursuing his claim. Accordingly, the Court did not decide whether Hansen's conduct complied with the applicable notice provision. View "Hansen v. City of Laurel" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action, the Court of Appeals was asked to consider whether records of an investigation undertaken by the county police department's internal affairs division related to alleged violations of administrative rules of the department by two of its officers in connection with an automobile accident involving the assistant fire chief can be disclosed to the county's inspector general. After a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court ordered the disclosure of the records of the internal investigation, but not information of a personal nature. The Court of Appeals held that records of an internal investigation pertaining to the alleged violation of administrative rules are personnel records pursuant to Md. Code Ann. State Gov't 10-616(i) and, therefore, may not be disclosed under the Maryland Public Information Act to the county inspector general. Accordingly, the Court vacated judgment of the circuit court and remanded for entry of a declaratory judgment in conformance with this opinion. View "Montgomery County v. Shropshire" on Justia Law