Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case centered on the implied consent, administrative per se law (“Law”), under which a suspected drunk driver may choose either to take or to refuse a breath test to measure blood alcohol concentration. A test refusal or a particular test result both result in an automatic suspension of the driver’s license. At issue was whether a detained driver has a right to consult with legal counsel before making the decision of whether to take the breath test. The driver in this case (“Driver”) asked the arresting officer if she could call an attorney before making that choice. Driver's request was refused. Driver subsequently took the test, which indicated she had an elevated blood alcohol concentration. In accordance with the Law, Driver’s license was suspended for ninety days. An administrative law judge upheld Driver’s suspension. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the denial of Driver’s request to contact her attorney violated her right to due process. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, even if a suspected drunk driver is denied the opportunity to consult counsel before deciding whether to take a breath test, the driver remains subject to the administrative license suspension that the test assigns to the test refusal or test result. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Deering" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a homicide detective with the Baltimore City Police Department, was involved in an incident with the Baltimore City Police, which resulted in Petitioner being charged with seven violations of four administrative rules. A hearing board found Petitioner guilty of two of the charges. Petitioner sought judicial review, alleging that his hearing was unfair because the Department failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in violation of section 3-104(n)(ii) of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”). The circuit court reversed the Police Commissioner’s final order imposing the hearing board’s recommended sanction because the Department failed to disclose the information. The intermediate appellate court reversed, determining that because the information would not have tended to exonerate Petitioner of the administrative charges, it did not fall within the definition of “exculpatory.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Legislature did not intend to import Brady v. Maryland and its progeny into the administrative LEOBR process by including the term “exculpatory” in section 3-104(n). View "Ellsworth v. Baltimore Police Dep’t" on Justia Law

Respondents each suffered on-the-job accidents, resulting in permanent partial disability. In both cases, at least one of the Respondent's injuries was a "scheduled injury" and the other was an "unscheduled injury." The Workers' Compensation Commission awarded Respondents benefits at the "second tier" rate. In making the awards pursuant to Md. Stat. Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-629, the Commission combined, in each case, the awards for the scheduled and unscheduled injuries. Both Robinson's and Anderson's employers appealed. The circuit court reversed the Commission's awards. The court of special appeals reversed the circuit court's judgments, holding that the Commission could combine awards for scheduled injuries with awards for other cases to determine whether the second tier compensation rate was applicable. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it is permissible under the Workers' Compensation Act to combine compensation awards in order to determine which of the three levels of compensation prescribed by Md. Stat. Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-628 through 9-630 is appropriate. View "Montgomery County v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Montgomery County Council adopted Resolution No. 17-149 (Resolution), which “changed” three contract provisions for fiscal year 2012 in the pre-existing collectively-bargained agreement (CBA) with members of the County’s police force. Specifically, the Resolution changed certain employment benefits of the CBA. The Fraternal Order of the Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35 filed suit against the County and the Council, challenging the legality of the Council’s actions in adopting the Resolution and the actions of the Council and the County in implementing the changes in the resolution. The circuit court declared that the Council’s actions were permissible under the Police Labor Relations Act (PLRA), the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the CBA. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its authority under the PLRA in deciding not to fund fully - and thereby, to change - certain benefits in the CBA, where the changes were fiscal in nature and the County Executive and the FOP did not submit a re-negotiated agreement to the Council. View "Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the State Center Project, a $1.5 billion redevelopment project intended to revitalize property owned by the State in Baltimore. In 2005, the State issued a public request for qualifications to solicit a master developer for the project. The State Center, LLC was chosen as the master developer. The Maryland Department of General Services (“DGS”), the Maryland Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) and the State Center, LLC negotiated for the Project, entering a series of agreements between 2007 and 2010 to complete the Project in a timely manner. In 2010, Plaintiffs, property owners in downtown Baltimore and taxpayers, filed suit against the DGS, MDOT, and the State Center and its subsidiaries, seeking a declaratory judgment that the formative contracts for the Project were void and seeking an injunction to halt the Project. The trial court voided the formative contracts, concluding that they violated the State Procurement Law. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded with directions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, holding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of laches due to an unreasonable delay in bringing their claims, causing prejudice to the defendants. View "State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Amafica Woodland lived in a residence owned and managed by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (“HABC”) from her birth in 1995 until her mother and grandmother vacated the residence in 1997. In 2009, Woodland sued HABC, claiming injury from her exposure to lead paint at the residence and asserting compliance with the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). The trial court allowed the case to proceed to trial, finding substantial compliance and good cause for Woodland’s failure to provide written notice of her intent to sue within 180 days of injury. A jury subsequently found in favor of Woodland. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in finding that Woodland had substantially complied with the LGTCA’s notice requirements, but the court’s alternate finding that Woodland had good cause for failing to comply made this error moot; and (2) erred in considering material not in evidence as part of its ruling that Woodland met the good cause exception for non-compliance with the LGTCA notice requirement, but this error was harmless. View "Housing Auth. of Baltimore City v. Woodland" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Comptroller of Maryland issued assessments of tax and interest against Petitioners, two out-of-state subsidiary corporations, based on Petitioners’ relationship with their Maryland parent, Petitioners’ substance as corporations, and all of the entities’ activity in Maryland. The tax court affirmed. Petitioners appealed, arguing, among other things, that Maryland did not have the authority to tax Petitioners because they did not have a sufficient nexus with Maryland for the Comptroller’s assessment of taxes to be constitutional. The court of special appeals upheld the Comptroller’s assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court did not err in (1) concluding that the Comptroller had authority to tax Petitioners under the Court’s holding in Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., which allows the Comptroller and tax court to find nexus when a subsidiary lacks economic substance, because Petitioners did not have economic substance as separate business entities; and (2) upholding the apportionment formula used by the Comptroller in its assessment of Petitioners. View "Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of Treasury" on Justia Law

Prince George’s County enacted a resolution creating the Victoria Falls Special Taxing District (District) under authority granted by a State enabling act (Act). Taxpayers challenged the resolution and sought tax refunds. The tax court denied the Taxpayers’ claims. The circuit court and intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court properly upheld the County’s resolution creating the District, where changes in land ownership within the District occurred after the time of application for creation of the District but before final action on the application, as the State Legislature did not intend to require that the County determine whether any change in land ownership may have affected the super-majority landowner requirement expressed in the Act for applying for the District; and (2) the tax court properly ruled that the County’s approval of the request to create the District that did not include twenty-five of the 609 lots contained within the planned Victoria Falls community was lawful under the Act’s requirement that the District be used to finance infrastructure improvements in “any defined geographic region within the county.” View "Victoria Falls Comm. for Truth in Taxation, LLC v. Prince George's County" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute over the paving of a parking lot located on park land leased to a restaurant. A formal agreement between the restaurant and a community organization restricted the paving of the property, and the restriction was incorporated in administrative zoning orders. Still, the lot was paved. Baltimore County was, in this case, landlord of the property, code enforcer, and final administrative adjudicator of disputes arising under local land use laws. As administrative adjudicator, the County forbade the paving. As landlord, the County directed its tenant, Oregon, LLC, to pave the lot. As code enforcer, it refrained from taking action in response to the apparent violation of a final administrative order issued by the Board of Appeals. Plaintiffs brought suit against the County and Oregon seeking declaratory and mandamus relief. The circuit court ruled against Plaintiffs. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals largely affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) Plaintiffs need not initiate an administrative proceeding to pursue enforcement of the Board’s orders; (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment with respect to the mandamus counts of the complaint; and (3) the circuit court has authority to issue a declaratory judgment as to whether the Board’s orders were violated. Remanded. View "Falls Road Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Baltimore County" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a paid firefighter employed by Respondent, Montgomery County. Petitioner filed a claim pursuant to the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, claiming that he sustained injuries in an accident that occurred when he was traveling to work on his motorcycle after leaving physical training. The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission disallowed Petitioner’s claim, finding that Petitioner did not sustain an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The circuit court upheld the Commission’s decision, ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to workers’ compensation because the injury occurred while “he was coming and going” to work. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding that Petitioner’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment and was covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act because (1) Petitioner’s travel was incidental to his employment, which travel cannot be excluded from coverage by application of the going and coming rule; and (2) “but for” his travel between work-related sites Petitioner would not have been injured. View "Roberts v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law