Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellees’ farm was condemned by the Board of Education for the purpose of building a school. On Appellees’ behalf, the Board paid the State agricultural land transfer tax and the County farmland transfer tax. Appellees requested from the County a refund of a portion of the County farmland transfer tax, arguing that the County, in calculating the County farmland transfer tax, was incorrect in concluding that the twenty-five percent State surcharge was not part of the combined transfer tax. The County denied the request for a refund. The Tax Court affirmed, concluding that the State surcharge was to be collected in addition to the State agricultural land transfer tax and the County farmland transfer tax. The circuit court reversed. The Court of Special Appeals certified the case to the Court of Appeals to answer a question of law. The Court of Appeals answered (1) the agricultural land transfer tax, as set forth in Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 13-407(a)(2) and (3), includes the State surcharge imposed under Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 13-303(d), and the State surcharge must be calculated into the tax ceiling on a county’s agricultural land transfer tax; and (2) therefore, Appellees were entitled to a refund in the amount of the overcharge of the County farmland transfer tax. View "Montgomery County v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Respondent lived in his home for nearly ten years before razing the existing house in order to build a new house on the lot. Respondent benefitted from the application of the homestead tax credit with respect to increases in the value of the prior structure while he lived in it. The new construction increased the value of the property by approximately $500,000. The tax assessor, while retaining Respondent’s existing credit, included the full value of the renovation in the value to be taxed. The Maryland Tax Court affirmed the assessor’s interpretation. The circuit court reversed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the “taxable assessment” used to compute the homestead tax credit under Md. Code Tax-Property (TP) 9-105 should include the value of renovations when a homeowner razes and rebuilds a home. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals and circuit court affirmed the decision of the tax court, holding that, when a homeowner razes and rebuilds a home, the homeowner may retain existing homestead tax credit if the homeowner satisfies certain criteria and the tax credit computation for the property with the rebuilt house is to be done in accordance with TP 9-105(c)(5) and TP 9-105(e)(1). View "Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. Andrecs" on Justia Law

Zimmer Development Company wished to construct on a parcel of property in Prince George’s County a small retail center and filed a proposed Comprehensive Design Plan (CDP) and Specific Design Plan (SDP) for the development of the property. The Planning Board approved the CDP and SDP subject to conditions. The District Council elected to review the approval and remanded the CDP and SDP to the Planning Board to consider specific areas of concern. On remand, the Planning Board again approved the CDP and SDP. The District Council elected again to review the Board’s revised decision and, after oral arguments, denied the CDP and SDP. The circuit court reversed and remanded to the District Council with directions to approve the CDP and SDP as approved by the Planning Board. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the District council was authorized to reverse the Planning Board’s decision regarding the CDP and SDP only if it was not supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal otherwise; (2) the District Council’s ultimate consideration of the Planning Board’s approvals was limited to the issues remanded to the Planning Board; and (3) the circuit court’s order reversing the decision of the District Council denying the CPD and SDP was appropriate. View "County Council of Prince George's County v. Zimmer Dev. Co." on Justia Law

Respondent filed a complaint against a sergeant of the Maryland State Police that was “sustained.” Respondent subsequently sought records of the internal investigation conducted by the State Police in response to her complaint, but the State Police denied the request. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Maryland Public Information Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State Police, concluding that the records were mandatorily exempt from disclosure as “personnel records.” The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment, concluding that the circuit court erred in failing to require the State Police to create an index of the withheld documents and, in addition, by not conducting an in camera review of the documents to determine whether the documents could be redacted. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded to the circuit court for the entry of a declaratory judgment, holding that the internal affairs records of an investigation into the conduct of a specifically identified state trooper is a “personnel record” under the Act, and, in this case, not capable sufficiently of redaction were disclosure necessary. View "Dep’t of State Police v. Dashiell" on Justia Law

Lafarge North America, Inc., the operator of a ready-mix concrete plant, sought a refund from the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC) for allegedly improperly assessed and paid water and sewer service charges for operation of the plant. Large’s claim was deemed denied because of the WSSC’s failure to render a timely decision. The circuit court reversed the WSSC’s deemed denial of Lafarge’s claim and remanded the matter to the WSSC with directions to determine and issue an appropriate refund, concluding that the deemed denial was not supported by substantial evidence in the record and was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, given the legislative intent to provide for refunds when charges are erroneously assessed, it is appropriate to remand the case to the WSSC for calculation of the amount of the refund due. View "Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Lafarge N.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Hranicka filed a workers’ compensation claim as a result of an injury he sustained during a motor vehicle accident. The workers’ compensation claim was withdrawn. Thereafter, Hranicka submitted to the Workers’ Compensation Commission a second claim. The claim was electronically submitted to the Commission before expiration of the two-year statute of limitations but not filed on paper until after the expiration of the two-year period. Respondents contested the claim, arguing that it was time-barred under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-709(b)(3). The Commissioner determined that the claim was not time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that electronic submission of a claim does not constitute “filing” pursuant to Code of Maryland Regulations, and therefore, the Commission erred in ruling that the filing date of a claim could be the date of the claim’s electronic submission for purposes of the statute of limitations. View "Hranicka v. Chesapeake Surgical, Ltd." on Justia Law

These proceedings involved a development project spearheaded by K. Hovnanian’s Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC (Appellee). Appellee obtained all of the necessary permits and approvals from state and local agencies, except one. At issue in these proceedings was Appellee’s application for a State wetlands license. Appellee filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and for a writ of mandamus against the Board of Public Works seeking an order compelling the Board to vote promptly on Appellee’s long-outstanding application for the wetlands permit following delays resulting from a perceived appearance of impropriety. The circuit court granted the requested relief and ordered the Board to vote promptly on the application. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the circuit court’s order was improper for want of a prior final administrative decision and because mandamus was unavailable under the circumstances. View "Bd. of Pub. Works v. K. Hovnanian's Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC" on Justia Law

The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act creates a presumption that certain disabling medical conditions are occupational diseases suffered in the line of duty and are therefore compensable. The statute caps those benefits, however. The retirement benefits at issue in this case derived in part from an optional retirement program offered by Baltimore County. The program provided that senior employees who opted to remain on the job be compensated with enhanced retirement benefits that could be taken in a lump sum upon retirement or in higher recurring retirement payments. The two retired firefighters in these cases participated in the program and also qualified for workers’ compensation benefits as a result of the special presumption for public safety employees. At issue in these cases was how the lump sum retirement payment was to be included in the formula for capping the retirees’ workers’ compensation benefits. The Court of Appeals rejected the methods proposed both by the retirees and by the County and adopted the approach by the Workers’ Compensation Commission in the Thiergartner case for converting the lump sum portion of the retirement benefits to a weekly figure. View "Baltimore Co. v. Thiergartner" on Justia Law

After voluntarily leaving his job with Employer, Respondent applied for unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (DLLR) denied the claim for benefits, determining that Respondent quit his job without good cause. The hearing examiner upheld the DLLR’s findings. The DLLR Board of Appeals declined to hear Respondent’s appeal, thereby adopting the hearing examiner’s decision as its own decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed a petition for judicial review. Instead of filing an answering memorandum, the DLLR Board requested that the circuit court remand the case back to the Board before the court conducted its review. The circuit court granted the Board’s motion for remand. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed Employer’s appeal, concluding that the remand order was was not a final judgment or otherwise appealable. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the remand order was not a final, appealable judgment. View "Metro Maint. Sys. South, Inc. v. Milburn" on Justia Law

Petitioners owned properties located along Farm Road and a ten-foot right-of-way (collectively, the Farm Road), which provided the only means of access to Petitioners’ properties. Petitioners filed suit in the circuit court against the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (the Commission) and several other defendants, alleging several claims based on the Commission’s refusal to recognize Farm Road and to issue addresses to Petitioners. The circuit court dismissed the action. The Court of Special Appeals upheld the dismissal. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the Court of Special Appeals (1) properly upheld the circuit court’s dismissal of Petitioners’ state constitutional claims for Petitioners’ failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act; (2) properly upheld the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioners’ easement claims for failure to join necessary parties, i.e., adjacent property owners; but (3) erred in determining that Petitioners failed to file their slander of title claim within the statute of limitations. View "Rounds v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n" on Justia Law