Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In two cases before the Workers’ Compensation Commission, the Commission concluded that under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-806, the amount owed to the Subsequent Injury Fund (SIF) by the employers in these cases - the Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) and Baltimore County - is 6.5 percent of the Commission’s award of compensation prior to the deduction of any statutory offset. The circuit courts affirmed the decisions of the Commission. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The MTA and the County each filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them in this opinion to address the question of whether the SIF assessment under section 9-806 should be calculated based on the amount of an award prior to the statutory offsets granted by Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-610 and 9-503(e). The Court answered the question in the affirmative and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. View "Injured Workers' Ins. Fund v. Subsequent Injury Fund" on Justia Law

Maryland Underground Damage Prevention Authority cited Reliable Contracting Company for violating Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Cos. 12-101, under which advance notice must be given to the one-call system of certain types of excavation, and imposed a civil monetary penalty. Reliable Contracting petitioned for judicial review, asserting that the Authority’s enabling statute conferred judicial power on a non-judicial body in violation of separation of powers principles. Reliable Contracting also contended that the statute failed to provide adequate guidance to the Authority for the assessment of such penalties. The circuit court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded, holding (1) the Authority is an administrative agency in the executive branch of State government that exercises quasi-judicial powers subject to judicial review, and therefore, its enabling law is not contrary to the State Constitution’s Judicial Vesting Clause or Separation of Powers Clause; and (2) because the Authority is an administrative agency, Md. Code Ann. State Gov't 10-1001 provides guidelines for the exercise of its discretion in assessing civil penalties. View "Reliable Contracting Co. v. Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Auth." on Justia Law

In 2012, the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) adopted new procedures regarding the application process for surgical abortion facilities, including the requirement that individuals and other entities obtain a license from the Secretary of DHMH before establishing or operating such a facility. In 2013, Petitioner, pursuant to the Public Information Act, requested the records of all applications submitted for a license under these regulations. DHMH responded by providing copies of the applications but with certain information redacted. DMHM filed a petition seeking judicial confirmation for its continued denial of the information. The circuit court granted the petition, indicating that DHMH’s decision to redact was made on the basis of public safety concerns for those individuals who proposed to operate the facilities. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that redaction and denial of the relevant information in this case was necessary to protect the public interest from a substantial injury. View "Glenn v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law

Respondent was stopped for failure to securely fasten a registration plate and was arrested after a police officer observed signs of impairment. Respondent agreed to take an alcohol concentration test, which he passed, but Respondent refused to take a blood test for drugs or controlled dangerous substances. The officer subsequently confiscated Respondent’s driver’s license and served an order of suspension on Respondent. An administrative law judge determined that Respondent violated Md. Code Ann., Transp. (“TR”) 16-205.1 by refusing to take the drug test and ordered that Respondent’s driver’s license be suspended. The circuit court reversed, holding that, once Respondent passed the alcohol concentration test, he was not required to submit to a blood test to avoid suspension. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) under TR 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3), a law enforcement officer with reasonable grounds to suspect that a driver was driving while impaired by drugs may request that the driver take both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test; and (2) the driver is subject to an automatic license suspension for refusing to take the drug test. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gonce" on Justia Law

A local public school superintendent decided to terminate a school nurse, who was a “noncertificated” employee. The school nurse challenged her termination by way of a grievance process set forth in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the school board and a union. The superintendent denied the grievance, asserting that the termination was an illegal subject of collective bargaining. The union, on behalf of the school nurse, made a demand for arbitration. The school board filed a motion for injunctive relief seeking to enjoin the arbitration. The Maryland State Board of Education (State Board) and the Public School Labor Relations Board (PSLRB) both issued opinions in the matter. The circuit court affirmed the decision of the State Board, which concluded that the binding arbitration provision of the CBA was illegal, and reversed the decision of the PSLRB, which came to the opposite conclusion. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the PSLRB was the entity with the jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the termination of a noncertificated employee is a proper subject of binding arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. View "Bd. of Educ. v. Howard County Educ. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Dustin R., who was born in 1992, has lived in a foster home since 1995. Guardianship was granted to the Department of Social Services. Dustin is medically fragile and has special needs. In 2010, Dustin began to seek the provision of services for himself after age twenty-one. In 2013, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) consented to co-commitment. The parties, however, continued to debate Dustin’s request that services continue after his twenty-first birthday after the guardianship terminates. The juvenile court ordered DHMH to continue to provide services to Dustin after the age of twenty-one. DHMH appealed. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the juvenile court’s order was not a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court’s order is appealable as an interlocutory order granting an injunction; (2) the juvenile court had jurisdiction and statutory authority to order DHMH to enter into a plan to obtain “life-sustaining services” for Dustin to continue after he reached age twenty-one; and (3) the juvenile court did not violate the separation of powers in the instant case. View "In re Adoption/Guardianship of Dustin R." on Justia Law

Appellees’ farm was condemned by the Board of Education for the purpose of building a school. On Appellees’ behalf, the Board paid the State agricultural land transfer tax and the County farmland transfer tax. Appellees requested from the County a refund of a portion of the County farmland transfer tax, arguing that the County, in calculating the County farmland transfer tax, was incorrect in concluding that the twenty-five percent State surcharge was not part of the combined transfer tax. The County denied the request for a refund. The Tax Court affirmed, concluding that the State surcharge was to be collected in addition to the State agricultural land transfer tax and the County farmland transfer tax. The circuit court reversed. The Court of Special Appeals certified the case to the Court of Appeals to answer a question of law. The Court of Appeals answered (1) the agricultural land transfer tax, as set forth in Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 13-407(a)(2) and (3), includes the State surcharge imposed under Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 13-303(d), and the State surcharge must be calculated into the tax ceiling on a county’s agricultural land transfer tax; and (2) therefore, Appellees were entitled to a refund in the amount of the overcharge of the County farmland transfer tax. View "Montgomery County v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Respondent lived in his home for nearly ten years before razing the existing house in order to build a new house on the lot. Respondent benefitted from the application of the homestead tax credit with respect to increases in the value of the prior structure while he lived in it. The new construction increased the value of the property by approximately $500,000. The tax assessor, while retaining Respondent’s existing credit, included the full value of the renovation in the value to be taxed. The Maryland Tax Court affirmed the assessor’s interpretation. The circuit court reversed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the “taxable assessment” used to compute the homestead tax credit under Md. Code Tax-Property (TP) 9-105 should include the value of renovations when a homeowner razes and rebuilds a home. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals and circuit court affirmed the decision of the tax court, holding that, when a homeowner razes and rebuilds a home, the homeowner may retain existing homestead tax credit if the homeowner satisfies certain criteria and the tax credit computation for the property with the rebuilt house is to be done in accordance with TP 9-105(c)(5) and TP 9-105(e)(1). View "Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. Andrecs" on Justia Law

Zimmer Development Company wished to construct on a parcel of property in Prince George’s County a small retail center and filed a proposed Comprehensive Design Plan (CDP) and Specific Design Plan (SDP) for the development of the property. The Planning Board approved the CDP and SDP subject to conditions. The District Council elected to review the approval and remanded the CDP and SDP to the Planning Board to consider specific areas of concern. On remand, the Planning Board again approved the CDP and SDP. The District Council elected again to review the Board’s revised decision and, after oral arguments, denied the CDP and SDP. The circuit court reversed and remanded to the District Council with directions to approve the CDP and SDP as approved by the Planning Board. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the District council was authorized to reverse the Planning Board’s decision regarding the CDP and SDP only if it was not supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal otherwise; (2) the District Council’s ultimate consideration of the Planning Board’s approvals was limited to the issues remanded to the Planning Board; and (3) the circuit court’s order reversing the decision of the District Council denying the CPD and SDP was appropriate. View "County Council of Prince George's County v. Zimmer Dev. Co." on Justia Law

Respondent filed a complaint against a sergeant of the Maryland State Police that was “sustained.” Respondent subsequently sought records of the internal investigation conducted by the State Police in response to her complaint, but the State Police denied the request. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Maryland Public Information Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State Police, concluding that the records were mandatorily exempt from disclosure as “personnel records.” The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment, concluding that the circuit court erred in failing to require the State Police to create an index of the withheld documents and, in addition, by not conducting an in camera review of the documents to determine whether the documents could be redacted. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded to the circuit court for the entry of a declaratory judgment, holding that the internal affairs records of an investigation into the conduct of a specifically identified state trooper is a “personnel record” under the Act, and, in this case, not capable sufficiently of redaction were disclosure necessary. View "Dep’t of State Police v. Dashiell" on Justia Law