Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved the adoption of a minor child, Sean, by his stepfather. William, the putative father of Sean, filed an objection to the stepparent adoption one day after the expiration of the thirty-day deadline provided by the show cause order issued by the circuit court. The trial court granted Stepfather's motion to strike William's untimely objection and directed that the adoption proceed as an uncontested matter, noting that William did not allege any circumstance to excuse his failure to timely file his objection. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) William's failure to file a timely objection constituted an irrevocable consent to the adoption of Sean; and (2) the deemed consent statutory scheme of the Maryland Family Law Article and the Maryland Rules does not offend due process. View "In re Adoption of Sean M." on Justia Law

The parties in this case were the parents of a minor child, whose custody they agreed to share when they both lived in Maryland. Mother subsequently moved to Virginia and filed a motion to modify custody. Concurrently, Mother moved to relinquish jurisdiction to Virginia. The circuit court denied Appellee's motions. The circuit court subsequently granted Mother's motion to alter or amend or alternatively to revise judgment and also relinquished jurisdiction to Virginia. Father appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the court was not required to hold a hearing prior to granting Mother's motion seeking to revise the court's dismissal of her action; (2) Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 9.5-207 clearly and unambiguously contemplates that a party or a court, upon motion, will raise the issue of inconvenient forum, even when the jurisdiction of the court is continuing and exclusive, and therefore, the "inconvenient forum" provisions of section 9.5-207 applied to this child custody case; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it found Maryland to be an inconvenient forum for the underlying child custody dispute and therefore relinquished its jurisdiction to Virginia. View "Miller v. Matthias" on Justia Law

Father filed for divorce from Mother. In that proceeding, the parties contested physical and legal custody of their daughters. Prior to the merits hearing, a circuit court judge ordered preparation by court-related personnel a custody investigation report to evaluate the custodial abilities of each parent. The report was completed one week before the merits hearing, and Mother's counsel was able to review the report for only ninety minutes. As a consequence, Mother's attorney moved to exclude the report. The circuit court denied the motion. The judge then granted a divorce and awarded custody of the children to Father with visitation to Mother. The court of special appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court's unwritten policy that limits counsel of record in child custody proceedings to viewing custody investigation reports only in person in the clerk's office during normal business hours was viable. Without affirming or reversing, the Court of Appeals remanded for supplementation of the record as to the full contours of the relevant policy. View "Sumpter v. Sumpter" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a man who claimed to be the father of a child conceived while the mother was married to another man, but born after the mother and her husband divorced, had an unconditional right to genetic testing to determine whether he was the biological father. The circuit court denied Respondent's request for paternity testing after applying the best interest of the child standard employed in two cases from the Court of Appeals, Kamp v. Department of Human Services and Monroe v. Monroe. The court of special appeals reversed, finding that pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-1002(c), Respondent was entitled to a blood test. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the circuit court did not err by considering the best interests of the subject child when rejecting the requested blood testing. View "Mulligan v. Corbett" on Justia Law

Respondents in this case were an instructional aid and teacher employed by the public school system. Petitioner, the Department of Human Resources, received reports accusing Respondents of committing child abuse and later issued a finding of "child physical abuse - unsubstantiated." As a result, neither Respondent was named as the alleged abuser, but Respondents' names were entered into the central registry of child abuse investigations. Respondents requested an appeal regarding the decision of 'unsubstantiated' child physical abuse, but the Department denied the requests. Respondents subsequently filed mandamus actions, which the circuit court dismissed. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Department failed to interpret Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-706.1(c) properly, and that individuals who are investigated by a local department, with a resultant finding of "unsubstantiated," have a right to appeal regardless of any additional findings of actual responsibility. View "Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs." on Justia Law

Appellant and Appellee were two women validly married in California. The parties later agreed to separate, and Appellant filed a divorce complaint in Maryland. The circuit court denied the requested relief, explaining in its written order that the marriage was not valid pursuant to Maryland law and was contrary to the public policy of Maryland. The parties filed timely appeals. The Supreme Court noted that, under the principles of comity applied in the State, Maryland courts will withhold recognition of a valid foreign marriage only if that marriage is "repugnant" to State public policy. The Court reversed the circuit court, holding (1) no viable decision by the Court had deemed a valid foreign marriage to be "repugnant," despite being void or punishable as a misdemeanor or more serious crime were it performed in Maryland; and (2) therefore, a valid out-of-state same-sex marriage should be treated by Maryland courts as worthy of divorce, according to the applicable statutes, reported cases, and court rules of the State. Remanded with direction to grant a final divorce to the parties. View "Port v. Cowan" on Justia Law

Johnette Cosby requested an administrative hearing to challenge a determination by the Department of Social Services that she was responsible for "indicated child neglect." Prior to the hearing, Cosby's son was adjudicated to be a Child in Need of Assistance based on the same allegations of neglect presented in the administrative action. As a result, the administrative law judge granted the Department's motion to dismiss Cosby's administrative appeal based on collateral estoppel. Cosby filed a petition for judicial review, arguing that amendments to Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-706.1 precluded application of the common law defense of collateral estoppel. The circuit court reinstated Cosby's administrative appeal, but the court of special appeals reversed that determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 5-706.1 was not amended so as to preclude the common law defense of collateral estoppel when the elements are otherwise satisfied, and therefore, the dismissal of the administrative appeal was proper. View "Cosby v. Dep't of Human Res." on Justia Law

Peter Toland, a Maryland resident, filed a complaint to establish custody of his daughter, Erika, who lived with her maternal grandmother, Akiko Futagi, in Japan. The mother of Erika, having previously been awarded custody by a Japanese court, died in 2007. A Japanese decree issued thereafter, and without notice to Toland, appointed Futagi as the guardian of Erika. Toland subsequently amended his complaint and alleged that Maryland was the appropriate forum to determine custody under the Maryland Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The circuit court dismissed Toland's complaint, concluding (1) the Japanese guardianship decree did not constitute a violation of Toland's due process rights; and (2) Japan was the home state of Erika under the Act because Erika had lived exclusively in Japan for her entire life. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's dismissal of Toland's complaint did not violate his due process rights, as they were not implicated by the Japanese decree; and (2) the circuit court properly applied the Act to conclude that it should not exercise jurisdiction over Toland's complaint to establish custody, as the child had no connection with Maryland, and Japan had not declined custody jurisdiction. View "Toland v. Futagi" on Justia Law

In this custody modification proceeding, Joanna Davis was ordered by the circuit court to pay her ex-husband, Michael Petito, $30,773 in attorneys' fees and costs because the trial court determined she was in a better financial position than Petito due to Davis having received pro bono representation by the Sexual Assault Legal Institute (SALI), whereas Petito had accumulated over $70,000 in legal fees as a result of retaining private counsel. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the court's consideration that Davis was represented on a pro bono basis in order to award attorneys' fees to Petito, who had retained counsel, was erroneous under Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 12-103. Remanded. View "Davis v. Petito" on Justia Law

In the circuit court, Appellant, a law firm, filed a motion to intervene in the case of Julie Zorzit v. John Zorzit (Appellee), seeking to recover counsel fees that it earned while representing Julie. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion and entered a judgment of absolute divorce and for ancillary relief. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari to address the issue of whether the law firm had the right to intervene in the domestic relations case in order to recover counsel fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that because the circuit court was authorized by Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 7-107(f) to enter judgment in favor of Appellant and against Appellee, Md. R. Civ. P. 2-214(a)(2) provided Appellant with the right to intervene in the domestic relations proceeding involving Appellee and Appellant's former client, the "nonmonied" spouse. View "Tydings & Rosenberg, LLP v. Zorzit" on Justia Law