Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Father filed a complaint for absolute divorce from Mother and sought sole physical and legal custody of the parties' two children. Before the merits hearing on Father's divorce petition, the circuit court ordered that a custody investigation report (the Report) be completed. Counsel's access to the Report was limited by the "Policy Regarding Distribution of Court Ordered Evaluative Reports" (the Policy), which the trial court relied upon to prevent Mother's counsel from receiving a copy of the Report. The trial court subsequently granted Father's petition for divorce and awarded him sole legal and physical custody of the children. Mother appealed, arguing that the Policy afforded her inadequate procedural protection. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by applying the Policy to procedural matters that required the court to exercise its discretion, and this error presumptively prejudiced Mother. Remanded. View "Sumpter v. Sumpter" on Justia Law

Ryan W. entered the care of the Department of Social Services at age nine as a child in need of services (CINA) and was placed in foster care. After Ryan's parents died, the Department was appointed by the Social Security Administration (SSA) as Ryan's representative payee for Old Age and Survivor's Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits to which Ryan was entitled. The Department received Ryan's benefit payments and applied them to partially reimburse itself for the current cost of Ryan's foster care. The circuit court determined that the Department violated Ryan's due process and equal protection rights by failing to notify him before applying his OASDI benefits toward the current costs incurred by the Department on his behalf. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a local department of social services, acting in the capacity as an institutional representative payee appointed by the SSA, has discretion to apply a CINA foster child's OASDI benefits to reimburse the Department for its costs incurred for the child's current maintenance; but (2) the department must provide notice to the child that the department applied to the SSA and received such benefits on the child's behalf. View "In re Ryan W." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed in the Orphans' Court a petition to obtain legal guardianship of Tracy, her nephew. At the time of the filing of the petition, Tracy's mother (Mother) was deceased and Tracy was living with Petitioner. Also, no legal proceedings had occurred seeking to terminate Tracy's father's (Father) parental rights, nor was Tracy entitled to any disposition from Mother's estate. The court dismissed the petition on the ground that the Orphans' Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Orphans' Court lacks jurisdiction over petitions for guardianship of the person where at least one of the natural parents is alive, parental rights have not been terminated, and no testamentary appointment has been made. View "In re Adoption/Guardianship of Tracy K." on Justia Law

Child spent twenty-seven months in foster care without progress by his parents toward reunification and without consistently active involvement by other relatives. The juvenile court subsequently decided to pursue a plan of adoption by non-relatives. The court's order, which changed the permanency plan to adoption, triggered the filing of a termination of parental rights petition. Mother succeeded on her appeal of the plan change but not on her motion to stay the termination case. Consequently, by the time the court of special appeals ruled in Mother's favor on the plan change, Mother's parental rights had been terminated. At issue on appeal was whether the juvenile court erred in terminating Mother's parental rights while her appeal of the permanency plan change was pending. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) whether to stay a termination of parental rights case is within the juvenile court's discretion, and in this case, the court did not abuse its discretion because a stay would not have been in Child's best interests; and (2) the court did not err when it took into account Child's attachment to his foster parents in terminating parental rights. View "In re Adoption/Guardianship of Jayden G." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a domestic altercation between Husband and Wife. Wife filed a petition for protection from domestic violence against Husband. The district court issued a final protective order against Husband. Prior to the expiration of the protective order, Wife filed a motion to extend the order. Two days after the expiration of the protective order, the district court scheduled a hearing on the motion. After the hearing, the district court extended the protective order. The circuit court affirmed, reasoning that, as long as a motion to extend a protective order is filed during the term of the order, that protective order may be extended even if a hearing on the motion is held after the protective order has expired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 4-507(a) does not permit a court to extend an expired protective order even when the motion to extend the order was timely filed during the term of the order. View "La Valle v. La Valle" on Justia Law

After various reports of neglect by their mother, the juvenile court determined two sisters to be children in need of assistance (CINA) and placed them in foster care pending implementation of a plan for their permanent placement. After the girls had been in foster care for nearly a year, the court of special appeals reversed the CINA designation of the younger sister and the foster care placement of both girls due to the insufficiency of the juvenile court's factual findings. The juvenile court subsequently again determined the younger sister was a CINA. The juvenile court then again took up the matter of deciding on a plan for the girls' permanent placement. In so doing, the court considered the girls' positive experiences with their foster parent and their mother's failure to cooperate with court orders and social workers. As a result, the court approved a change of the permanency plan from reunification with the mother to adoption for both girls. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court, in deciding to approve a permanency plan of adoption, properly regarded all the relevant circumstances and facts before it in reaching a decision that was in the children's best interests. View "In re Ashley S." on Justia Law

This case involved the adoption of a minor child, Sean, by his stepfather. William, the putative father of Sean, filed an objection to the stepparent adoption one day after the expiration of the thirty-day deadline provided by the show cause order issued by the circuit court. The trial court granted Stepfather's motion to strike William's untimely objection and directed that the adoption proceed as an uncontested matter, noting that William did not allege any circumstance to excuse his failure to timely file his objection. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) William's failure to file a timely objection constituted an irrevocable consent to the adoption of Sean; and (2) the deemed consent statutory scheme of the Maryland Family Law Article and the Maryland Rules does not offend due process. View "In re Adoption of Sean M." on Justia Law

The parties in this case were the parents of a minor child, whose custody they agreed to share when they both lived in Maryland. Mother subsequently moved to Virginia and filed a motion to modify custody. Concurrently, Mother moved to relinquish jurisdiction to Virginia. The circuit court denied Appellee's motions. The circuit court subsequently granted Mother's motion to alter or amend or alternatively to revise judgment and also relinquished jurisdiction to Virginia. Father appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the court was not required to hold a hearing prior to granting Mother's motion seeking to revise the court's dismissal of her action; (2) Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 9.5-207 clearly and unambiguously contemplates that a party or a court, upon motion, will raise the issue of inconvenient forum, even when the jurisdiction of the court is continuing and exclusive, and therefore, the "inconvenient forum" provisions of section 9.5-207 applied to this child custody case; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it found Maryland to be an inconvenient forum for the underlying child custody dispute and therefore relinquished its jurisdiction to Virginia. View "Miller v. Matthias" on Justia Law

Father filed for divorce from Mother. In that proceeding, the parties contested physical and legal custody of their daughters. Prior to the merits hearing, a circuit court judge ordered preparation by court-related personnel a custody investigation report to evaluate the custodial abilities of each parent. The report was completed one week before the merits hearing, and Mother's counsel was able to review the report for only ninety minutes. As a consequence, Mother's attorney moved to exclude the report. The circuit court denied the motion. The judge then granted a divorce and awarded custody of the children to Father with visitation to Mother. The court of special appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court's unwritten policy that limits counsel of record in child custody proceedings to viewing custody investigation reports only in person in the clerk's office during normal business hours was viable. Without affirming or reversing, the Court of Appeals remanded for supplementation of the record as to the full contours of the relevant policy. View "Sumpter v. Sumpter" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a man who claimed to be the father of a child conceived while the mother was married to another man, but born after the mother and her husband divorced, had an unconditional right to genetic testing to determine whether he was the biological father. The circuit court denied Respondent's request for paternity testing after applying the best interest of the child standard employed in two cases from the Court of Appeals, Kamp v. Department of Human Services and Monroe v. Monroe. The court of special appeals reversed, finding that pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-1002(c), Respondent was entitled to a blood test. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the circuit court did not err by considering the best interests of the subject child when rejecting the requested blood testing. View "Mulligan v. Corbett" on Justia Law