Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Education Law
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In the Matter of Antavis Chavis, the Supreme Court of Maryland ruled that a bar applicant diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) had met his burden to prove that he had a "disability" under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and that the testing accommodation he requested—50% additional time to take the Uniform Bar Examination (UBE)—was warranted. The court adopted a two-step test to determine whether a bar examination test accommodation request should be granted. First, the court must determine if the applicant meets the ADA definition of "disability." Second, the court must determine if the test accommodation requested by the applicant is "reasonable, consistent with the nature and purpose of the examination and necessitated by the applicant’s disability." The court observed that under the ADA and related federal regulations, the definition of disability should be broadly construed and that evidence of past test accommodations must be given considerable weight. The court sustained the applicant’s exceptions to the denial of his test accommodation request by the State Board of Law Examiners (SBLE), reversed the denial, and remanded the matter to the SBLE with instruction to grant the applicant’s test accommodation request. View "In the Matter of Antavis Chavis" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Jacob Bennett was not barred from serving on the Harford County Council because of his employment as a schoolteacher by the Harford County Board of Education, thus reversing the contrary order and declaratory judgment of the circuit court.After Bennett was elected to the Council in the November 2022 general election a dispute arose between Bennett and Harford County concerning whether he was precluded from serving simultaneously as a member of the Council and as an employee of the Board by either section 207 of the Harford County Charter or the common law doctrine of incompatible positions. The circuit court ruled in favor of the County on the basis that the Board should be treated as a County for purposes of Charter 207. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither Charter 207 nor the doctrine of incompatible positions barred Bennett from simultaneously serving as a member of the Council and an employee of the Board. View "Bennett v. Harford County" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this case involving violent peer conflicts between adolescents in middle school, holding that the circuit court erred.Plaintiffs filed a five-count complaint against several school defendants and the Board of Education for Dorchester County, alleging violations of their daughter's state constitutional right to due process and other causes of action stemming from their daughter's bullying by other students. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Act does not preempt CJ § 5-518, and Plaintiffs' negligence claims against the individual school employees were not preempted by federal law; (2) the educational malpractice doctrine does not apply to Plaintiffs' negligent supervision claims; and (3) material disputes of fact precluded the entry of summary judgment. View "Gambrill v. Bd. of Education of Dorchester County" on Justia Law

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In this appeal concerning whether a school board was liable for a judgment against its employee when the board was dismissed from the case prior to trial the Court of Appeals held that, under Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-518, even if a board is entitled to substantive dismissal from a case the plaintiffs are required to maintain the board as a party or request that the board be brought back into the case to indemnify an employee.As a matter of trial strategy in a case against the Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners, counsel for Plaintiffs decided to not appeal the dismissal, via summary judgment, of the Board from the case and to avoid joinder of the Board under after the conclusion of the trial. After the trial, Plaintiffs filed motions to enforce the judgments, arguing that the Board was obligated to satisfy the judgments pursuant to section 5-518. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motions. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in order to force a county school board to indemnify a judgment against a county board employee, the mandatory joinder requirement under section 5-518 requires that a county board be joined as a party throughout the entire litigation. View "Neal v. Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a charter school located in Frederick, Maryland, and Respondent, the Frederick County Board of Education (Local Board), disputed whether the Local Board’s annual funding allocation to Petitioner in its first year of operation satisfied Md. Code Ann. Educ. 9-109. Specifically, Petitioner argued that the Local Board’s decision to withhold a proportional share of transportation funds was incorrect. The State Board of Education disagreed and upheld the Local Board’s decision to withhold transportation funding from Petitioner’s annual funding allocation. The circuit court and court of special appeals upheld the State Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the State Board’s decision to deny transportation funds to Petitioner was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. View "Frederick Classical Charter School, Inc. v. Frederick County Board of Education" on Justia Law

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The Maryland Dream Act seeks to exempt certain students from paying out-of-state tuition rates at higher education institutions in Maryland. Following the enactment of the Act, MDPetitions.com petitioned to refer the Act to Maryland's 2012 general election ballot. The State Board of Elections certified the petition for referendum. In response to the Board's certification, Appellants, representing a group of individuals supporting the Act, challenged its referability and sought to remove the Act from consideration on the November 2012 ballot. The trial court entered summary judgment against Appellants, finding that the Act was a proper subject for referendum. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act was not a law "making any appropriation for maintaining the state government" within the meaning of Md. Const. art. XVI, 2, and therefore was not exempt from referendum. View "Doe v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

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For some years, the Board of Education of Baltimore County belonged to a governmental group purchasing consortium, which competitively bid a roofing services contract on behalf of its members. The Board relied on that contact to fulfill its needs for roofing repair services. Appellant Building Materials Corporation of America, a nationwide manufacturer of roofing materials, questioned the Board's authority for that practice under the pertinent statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when viewed in the context of the entire education law and regulations promulgated under that law, the competitive bidding statute did not bar the Board from using its membership in an intergovernmental purchasing consortium for the procurement of roofing repair services. View "Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. v. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

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The mother of a kindergarten student, who suffered a serious allergic reaction after consuming peanut butter given to her under her school's free lunch program, brought suit against the State and its agents (collectively, Defendants), alleging that the State's obligations under the National School Lunch Act (NSLA) imposed upon Defendants a statutory duty of care to ensure that children with food allergies are not served lunches containing allergens. The trial court granted the State Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the NSLA simply establishes a subsidized lunch program to benefit children at participating schools and does not impose a specific statutory duty of care towards children with food allergies. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the NSLA does not impose a statutory duty on the State Defendants to exercise a greater degree of care for students with food allergies than the general level of care the State Defendants exercise for all students in public schools. Because Petitioner could not maintain a suit in negligence, the complaint was properly dismissed. View "Pace v. State" on Justia Law