Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Michael McCloud applied for a handgun permit but was denied because in 2006 he had been convicted in the District of Columbia of attempting to carry a pistol without a license. In denying Petitioner's application, the state police relied on the Maryland attorney general's opinion advising that an out-of-state conviction can disqualify an applicant from obtaining a handgun permit. The permit denial was reversed by the state police's handgun permit review board, which held that the opinion did not apply to Petitioner's situation. The denial was reinstated by the circuit court. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the court of special appeals did not err in adopting the views expressed in the attorney general's opinion to determine what constitutes a disqualifying crime; (2) accordingly, Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 5-101(g)(3) and 5-133(b)(1), which define a disqualifying crime, include out-of-state convictions; and (3) when determining whether such a conviction is a disqualifying crime, an agency must look to the maximum penalty for the equivalent offense in Maryland. View "McCloud v. Handgun Permit Review Bd." on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Petitioner McKenzie Nicolas was convicted of resisting arrest and second degree assault stemming from a confrontation with two officers at Petitioner's home. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a jury note with no date or time stamp found in the appellate record does not establish that the trial court received the jury communication in order to trigger the requirements of Md. Rule 4-326(d); but (2) the court of special appeals erred in holding that Petitioner's convictions for second degree assault do not merge into his conviction for resisting arrest for sentencing purposes where the record is ambiguous as to whether the jury convicted Petitioner of second degree assault based on acts different than those underlying his conviction for resisting arrest. Remanded. View "Nicolas v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ocie Black was convicted of child sexual abuse, second degree sex abuse, and third degree sex abuse and sentenced to thirty-two years incarceration. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in failing to disclose a jury note to him and his trial counsel. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a jury note with no date or time stamp found in the appellate record does not establish that the trial court received the jury communication at issue in order to trigger the requirements of Md. Rule 4-326(d), which governs communications between a jury and the trial court; and (2) therefore, the trial court's responsibilities under the rule were never triggered. View "Black v. State" on Justia Law

Montgomery County law enforcement officers, situated at a "listening post" in Montgomery County, and operating under an ex pare order issued by a judge of the county circuit court under the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, intercepted a mobile phone communication from a target mobile phone, caller, and receiver located in Virginia. As a result of the intercepted communication, the police seized from the caller, Tyrone Davis, controlled dangerous substances when he returned to his Maryland residence. Davis moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the wiretap order did not authorize interception of the extraterritorial communication. The hearing judge denied Davis's motion to suppress, citing federal case law defining the location of an "interception" as where the mobile communication was first intercepted or redirected and where it was first heard by law enforcement officers. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed after adopting the federal standard for determining the proper jurisdiction and scope for an ex parte wiretap order, holding that as long as the "listening post" where an officer first hears the intercepted communications is within the geographical jurisdiction of the court issuing the order, the interception is proper under the Maryland statute. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

While incarcerated, Petitioner Daniel Genies masturbated in sight of a female correctional officer, while smiling and making eye contact with her, despite her orders to stop. Genies was subsequently charged with committing the common law offense of indecent exposure and violating Md. Code Ann. Corr. Servs. 8-803, which prohibits an inmate with intent to harass a correctional officer from indecently exposing private parts of the inmate's body in the officer's presence. A jury acquitted Genies of the statutory offense but convicted him of the common law offense. The court of special appeals affirmed. Genies appealed, arguing that the statutory, specific intent crime preempted the field, with respect to indecent exposure by an inmate to a correctional officer, and thus the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charge of common law indecent exposure. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in failing to dismiss the common law charge because section 8-803 was intended to serve as a discrete offense, supplementing rather than supplanting the common law, so both prevailed; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Genies's motion for a new trial without a hearing. View "Genies v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner Muhammad Abdul-Maleek was convicted in the district court of theft. Petitioner exercised his right to appeal and was afforded a de novo trial by jury in the circuit court. The jury likewise convicted Petitioner of left, and the circuit court imposed a more severe sentence than that imposed by the district court. Petitioner appealed, asserting that the circuit court impermissibly based his sentence on the fact that he exercised his right to appeal and receive a de novo jury trial. The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence, holding that Petitioner was entitled to resentencing because the court's comments at sentencing could cause a reasonable person to conclude that the sentence was based in part on Petitioner's exercise of his right to a de novo trial on appeal. Remanded for resentencing. View "Abdul-Maleek v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Alonzo King was arrested in 2009 on first- and second-degree assault charges. Pursuant to the Maryland DNA Collection Act, King's DNA was collected, analyzed, and entered into Maryland's DNA database. King was convicted on the second-degree assault charge but, pending his trial on that charge, his DNA profile generated a match to a DNA sample collected from a sexual assault forensic examination conducted on the victim of an unsolved 2003 rape. This hit provided the sole probable cause for a subsequent grant jury indictment of King for the rape. A later-obtained search warrant ordered collection from King of an additional reference DNA sample, which also matched the DNA profile from the 2003 rape. King was subsequently convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the portions of the DNA Act authorizing collection of a DNA sample from a mere arrestee were unconstitutional as applied to King, as the State had no probable cause or individualized suspicion supporting obtention of the DNA sample collection for King's first- and second-degree assault charges. View "King v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Reginald Stringfellow was convicted of possessing a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. Stringfellow appealed, arguing that his objection to a voir dire question proposed by the prosecutor and given by the trial judge during jury selection prejudiced the jurors against him by imputing his guilt, devaluing fingerprint evidence, and lowering the State's burden of proof. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether Stringfellow's unsuccessful objection to the question went to the composition of the jury, which would have resulted in his objection being waived for the purposes of appellate review because he accepted the jury chosen pursuant to the questioning, or whether the nature of his objection was incidental to the composition of the jury, which, notwithstanding Stringfellow's acceptance of the jury, would have preserved his objection for appellate consideration. The Court held that Stringfellow's objection went to the composition of the jury, and thus, Stringfellow waived any future opportunity to complain on appeal about the objected-to question and its potential effect. In addition, even assuming the objection was not waived, the asking of the question was harmless error. View "State v. Stringfellow" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ricky Washington was convicted by a jury of first degree rape and related offenses. Petitioner appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court had abused its discretion in declining to ask during voir dire of the jury panel whether any prospective juror would be more likely to believe a witness solely by virtue of the witness having served in the military or being employed by the military. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) only certain questions are mandatory during voir dire of a jury panel if they are directly related to the facts and circumstances of the case; (2) based on the circumstances of this case, Petitioner's proposed question was not mandatory, and thus, it was within the discretion of the trial court whether to pose the question to the jury trial; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's request to ask the question. View "Washington v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner Curtis Alston was convicted of first degree murder and related offenses and sentenced to life in prison without parole for first degree murder and lesser terms for the other offenses. Later, the postconviction trial court vacated Alston's convictions and sentences and granted him a new trial. Forty-four days after the entry of the final judgment in the postconviction case, the State filed a motion to reconsider. The court did reconsider its earlier judgment and denied Alston's petition for postconviction relief, thereby re-imposing Alston's original convictions and sentences. Alston then commenced the present case by filing a motion to correct illegal sentences, claiming he was entitled to relief under Md. R. 4-345(a), which provides that a court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the postconviction trial court's re-imposition of Alston's original sentences, after having vacated those sentences and having ordered a new trial, was unlawful; and (2) the court's illegal action was cognizable under Rule 4-345(a). Remanded to correct the imposition of the illegal convictions and sentences. View "Alston v. State" on Justia Law