Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1995, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. In 2006, the Supreme Court determined in Clemons v. State that, under the Frye-Reed standard, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA) evidence was not generally accepted by the scientific community. Within a few years of his conviction, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, arguing that the admission of “unreliable” CBLA evidence during his trial in the form of testimony from Agent Ernest Peele of the Federal Bureau of Investigation constituted a due process violation and that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance for failing adequately to cross-examine Agent Peele. The circuit judge denied relief, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed Petitioner’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that Petitioner’s attorneys rendered ineffective assistance when they failed to investigate a report Peele co-authored in 1991 that presaged the flaws in CBLA evidence and to challenge the State’s scientific evidence on cross-examination at trial. View "Kulbicki v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count each of first degree rape, second degree rape, second degree assault, and false imprisonment. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it excluded from evidence a police report that contained a prior allegedly inconsistent statement of the complaining witness; (2) even if the trial court erred in failing to strike testimony of an expert forensic nurse, the error was harmless; and (3) under the facts of this case, Petitioner’s conviction for false imprisonment should be merged into his conviction for first degree rape. Remanded. View "Brooks v. State" on Justia Law

In Doe I, the Supreme Court held that the retroactive application of the provisions in the Maryland sex offender registration statute that the Court deemed punitive violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the Maryland Declaration of Rights. At issue in this appeal was whether sex offenders’ federal obligations require them independently to register and whether circuit courts have the authority to order the State to remove sex offender registration information from federal databases. The Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding the registration obligations placed directly on individuals by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, circuit courts have the authority to compel the State to remove sex offender registration information from Maryland’s sex offender registry when the inclusion of such information is unconstitutional as established in Doe I. View "Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of murder in the first degree. The case proceeded to trial. During the jury’s deliberations and at 5 p.m. on the Friday before a three-holiday weekend, the foreperson of the jury submitted a note to the trial judge claiming that a fellow juror stated that she was willing to change her original position of voting “not guilty” if she could go home and not return to the courthouse. One-half of an hour later, the judge reminded the jurors of their proper duties. The following Tuesday, the jury found Defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge should have granted a mistrial based on the allegations in the note. The court of special appeals disagreed with Defendant and affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial judge, in dealing with the note, (1) did not abuse her discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial and in refusing to give a modified Allen instruction; and (2) did not violate Maryland Rule 4-326(d) by recessing for the long weekend after giving additional instructions to the jurors. View "Nash v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Ghana who arrived in the United States four years prior to his conviction, was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, second degree rape, and third degree sexual offense. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying him an interpreter for his criminal trial. The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) appellate review of a trial court’s decision whether to appoint an interpreter is a process in which the reviewing court must first determine whether the trial judge’s factual findings were clearly erroneous and then, if the findings were not clearly erroneous, consider whether the trial judge abused her discretion in making the determination regarding whether to appoint an interpreter; and (2) in this case, after applying the relevant standard, the trial judge acted within his discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for an interpreter. View "Kusi v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second degree assault in two cases. Petitioner, who was incarcerated at a correctional facility, appealed both convictions but was not transported to court on the date he was scheduled to appear for his appeals. Based solely on secondhand information from an unidentified source indicating that Petitioner refused to be transported, the circuit court dismissed Petitioner's appeals. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion to reinstate his appeal, indicating that he had not refused to be transported to court. The trial judge denied the motion. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner's motion to reinstate his appeal under the circumstances of this case. View "Mobuary v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. According to the State's theory of the case, Defendant was a hit man for the Black Guerilla Family gang (BGF) and was ordered by his gang boss to kill the victim. During trial, several witnesses testified that the murder was related to Defendant's affiliation with the BGF. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a "gang expert" to opine as to the nature of gangs in general, the BGF specifically, and the import of Defendant's tattoos towards establishing that he was a member of a gang, as the probative value of the expert's testimony was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and this error was not harmless.View "Burris v. State" on Justia Law

In separate cases, several defendants were arrested and detained. The initial appearance documents indicated that the defendants were in the country illegally or had an Immigration and Customers Enforcement (ICE) detainer filed against them. Appellant, Big Louie Bail Bonds, reviewed the initial appearance documents and posted bail bonds for the defendants. After the bail bonds were posted, the defendants were taken into federal custody by the ICE and deported. Because the defendants failed to appear for trial, the trial court forfeited the bail bonds. The circuit court denied Appellant's amended petitions to strike the forfeitures, determining that the posted bail bonds were properly forfeited because Appellant knew, or should have known, that the defendants were subject to deportation when it posted the bonds. At issue on appeal was Maryland Rule 2-417(i), which provides that the decision to strike a forfeiture is conditioned upon a showing by the defendant of "reasonable grounds" for the defendant's nonappearance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the act of deportation constitutes reasonable grounds under Rule 4-217(i)(2). View "Big Louie Bail Bonds, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a homicide detective with the Baltimore City Police Department, was involved in an incident with the Baltimore City Police, which resulted in Petitioner being charged with seven violations of four administrative rules. A hearing board found Petitioner guilty of two of the charges. Petitioner sought judicial review, alleging that his hearing was unfair because the Department failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in violation of section 3-104(n)(ii) of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”). The circuit court reversed the Police Commissioner’s final order imposing the hearing board’s recommended sanction because the Department failed to disclose the information. The intermediate appellate court reversed, determining that because the information would not have tended to exonerate Petitioner of the administrative charges, it did not fall within the definition of “exculpatory.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Legislature did not intend to import Brady v. Maryland and its progeny into the administrative LEOBR process by including the term “exculpatory” in section 3-104(n). View "Ellsworth v. Baltimore Police Dep’t" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were charged with criminal offenses, and both defendants waived their right to a jury trial. After bench trials, Defendants were found guilty and sentenced. Each defendant appealed, challenging the trial court’s acceptance of his jury trial waiver. Relevant to this consolidated appeal, the courts of special appeals held that the trial courts sufficiently satisfied the announcement requirement under Md. Rule 4-246(b). The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) so long as a trial judge determines that a jury trial waiver is made both “knowingly” and “voluntarily,” or uses synonyms that represent the same concepts, the court will have complied fully with Rule 4-246(b); (2) in both cases under review, the trial judges failed to comply with Rule 4-246(b); and (3) to the extent that Valonis v. State could be read to hold that a trial judge’s alleged noncompliance with Rule 4-246(b) is reviewable by the appellate courts despite the failure to object at trial, that interpretation is disavowed. Remanded for new trials. View "Nalls v. State" on Justia Law