Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant pled guilty to kidnapping and third-degree sexual offense. Defendant was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Defendant also signed an order of probation, in which he agreed to the condition of obeying the probation agent’s lawful instructions. When Defendant was released under mandatory supervision, he agreed to comply “as directed” by his parole/probation agent with a sexual offender management program, which “may include…polygraph testing[.]” Defendant’s probation agent instructed Defendant to report for a polygraph examination, but Defendant did not report for the polygraph examination. The circuit court subsequently determined that Defendant violated the order of probation. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the probation agent’s instruction to report for a polygraph examination created a more onerous condition of probation that was outside the ambit of the conditions laid down by the sentencing court in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a probation agent’s instruction to comply with a condition of mandatory supervision is consistent with the separation of powers doctrine. View "State v. Callahan" on Justia Law

The State charged Petitioner with several crimes, including violating Maryland’s trademark counterfeiting statute, Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law (CR) 8-611. Petitioner field a motion to dismiss the charges for violating CR 8-611 on the ground that the statute is constitutional. Specifically, Petitioner contended that CR 8-611 is facially overbroad because it criminalizes conduct that the First Amendment protects and is facially void for vagueness because it does not clearly define “intellectual property.” The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, and a jury convicted Petitioner of violating CR 8-611. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that CR 8-611 is not facially overbroad or void for vagueness. View "McCree v. State" on Justia Law

Joseph Payne and Jason Bond were convicted in a joint trial of first degree murder and kidnapping. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a police officer, without the officer having been qualified as an expert witness under Maryland Rule 5-702, regarding his process for determining the communication path of Defendants’ cell phones and his conclusion that two particular cell towers were the most pertinent to the case; and (2) wiretap statements made by Bond but not Payne could not be admitted against Payne as statements by a party opponent. View "State v. Payne" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioners Traimne Allen and Howard Diggs were convicted of attempted first degree murder and related offenses stemming from a home invasion and robbery. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding certain DNA “match” evidence. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the DNA match evidence was properly excluded. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 2-510 prohibits the introduction at trial by a criminal defense of evidence of a DNA match to prove the identity of another individual without first establishing additional confirmatory testing and does not infringe upon a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense. View "Allen v. State" on Justia Law

In 1980, Appellant was convicted of first degree sex offense, kidnapping of a child under sixteen years of age, and assault and battery. In 2011, Appellant filed a pro se motion for new trial, later referred to as a petition for DNA testing, requesting that the State produce certain scientific identification evidence that might contain biological material and that was related to the judgment of conviction. A circuit court judge found that the State had performed a reasonable search for the requested evidence and that the evidence no longer existed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the judge’s findings that the State had performed a reasonable search for the requested evidence and that the evidence was no longer in the possession of the State were not clearly erroneous. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was criminally charged with failing to perform home improvement contracts and acting as a contractor without a license. Three separate home improvement contracts with different residents formed the basis of the charges. The charges were resolved through a plea agreement. As a condition of his probation, Defendant was ordered to pay restitution to each of the three victims. Defendant failed to make the restitution payments, and the district court determined that Defendant violated his probation in each of the three cases. In the meantime, Defendant was charged with obtaining property or services by issuing a bad check. Defendant pleaded guilty to the bad check charge and to the three probation violation charges. In sentencing Defendant, the circuit court conditioned probation in the bad check case on the payment of restitution to the victims in the home improvement cases. The court of special appeals struck the restitution requirement of Defendant’s probation, concluding that the circuit court was without authority to condition probation in such a manner, but otherwise upheld the sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court had authority to condition Defendant’s probation on the bad check conviction on his payment of restitution to the victims of his home improvement fraud. View "State v. Stachowski" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted, contending, among other things, that the trial judge lacked the authority to deny his motion to postpone because only a county administrative judge or that judge’s designee may deny a motion to postpone. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a circuit court judge may deny a motion to postpone in a criminal case; (2) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to postpone to obtain counsel and to review discovery materials; and (3) Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated in this case. View "Howard v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several criminal offenses, including second-degree assault of the intent-to-frighten type against Christine Johnson. The court of special appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for second-degree assault of the intent-to-frighten type because Defendant did not know of Johnson’s presence in the apartment at the time of the assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a defendant can commit second-degree assault of the intent-to-frighten type against a victim of whose presence in particular the defendant does not know; and (2) the evidence to sufficient to support a finding that Defendant knew multiple people were in the apartment. View "Jones v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent was charged with sexual abuse of a minor and related offenses. Prior to trial, Respondent sought, by means of a subpoena duces tecum, access to the victim’s mental health records. The trial court denied Respondent’s request for an in camera review of those records, concluding that Respondent did not sufficiently establish the likelihood that the records sought would provide exculpatory evidence, as required by Goldsmith v. State. Picking up where Goldsmith left off, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a criminal defendant’s trial rights may prevail over a victim’s right to assert a privilege in his or her mental health records; (2) a criminal defendant is entitled to an in camera review of a victim’s mental health records if the defendant can establish a reasonable likelihood that the privileged records contain exculpatory information relevant to the defense; and (3) in this case, Respondent’s proffer did not meet the required threshold, and therefore, he was not entitled to review the victim’s counseling records. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Two years after she was raped, the victim reported her suspicion that Petitioner was the rapist. Petitioner went to the police station for an interview but refused to provide a DNA sample. After Petitioner left the station, the police took swabs of the armrests of the chair in which he had sat and submitted those swabs for DNA analysis. That DNA sample matched DNA collected from the victim’s home on the day of the rape. Petitioner was charged with first-degree rape and related offenses. Petitioner filed a pre-trial motion seeking suppression of the DNA evidence. The suppression court denied the motion, concluding that Petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA evidence left on the chair. The court of special appeals affirmed the denial of the suppression motion. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari but conceded that the police lawfully obtained his genetic material from the armrests of the chair. The issue before the Court of appeals was whether law enforcement’s testing of the identifying loci within that DNA material was a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the DNA testing at issue was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. View "Raynor v. State" on Justia Law