Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of five counts of theft by deception and two counts of conspiracy to commit theft by deception. The convictions arose from various construction and remodeling contracts Defendant entered into in a two-year period with several homeowners. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence concerning Defendant’s intent to deprive the homeowners of their property was insufficient to sustain a conviction for theft by deception. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable inference that Defendant had the specific intent to deprive each homeowner of their property by deception. View "State v. Manion" on Justia Law

In 2002, Petitioner was found guilty but not criminally responsible of robbery and use of a handgun in commission of a felony or a crime of violence. In 2006, the circuit court released Petitioner conditionally. In 2009, Petitioner was re-committed to inpatient medical treatment. In 2010, the circuit court released Petitioner conditionally for the remaining duration of the 2006 order. In 2011, five days before Petitioner’s conditional release was to expire, the Department filed an application seeking to extend the terms of the conditional release for an additional four years. The next month, the circuit court granted the Department’s application. Petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend, asserting that the circuit court’s jurisdiction over him ended at the expiration of the 2006 order of conditional release, and therefore, the order extending his conditional release was invalid. The circuit court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court retained jurisdiction for a reasonable time to decide the timely-filed application to extend the 2006 order of conditional release; and (2) the circuit court did not delay for an unreasonable time before ruling on the State’s application for an extension on Petitioner’s conditional release. View "Harrison-Solomon v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of, among other charges, attempted first-degree murder, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and two convictions for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding (1) the circuit court correctly sentenced Defendant to separate consecutive sentences for the two convictions for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and (2) the sentence was not illegal even where the sentencing court was required to impose a minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment but only imposed a one-year sentence in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) imposition of separate consecutive sentences for two convictions of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence or any felony is permissible where a defendant uses one handgun to commit two separate crimes of violence or felonies against one victim in one criminal action; and (2) this case should be remanded for re-sentencing because the trial court did not impose a sentence that was consistent with Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 4-204. View "Garner v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, kidnapping, and robbery, among other crimes. The circuit court court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for felony murder, a term of twenty years concurrent for kidnapping, and a term of ten years concurrent for robbery. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the sentences for the convictions for kidnapping and robbery, concluding that the rule of lenity required merger for sentencing purposes of those convictions with the felony murder conviction because it was unclear which felony was the predicate felony for the felony murder conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed insofar as the Court of Special Appeals vacated the sentence for robbery and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) a conviction for only one predicate felony merges for sentencing purposes with the felony murder conviction, and applying the rule of lenity does not result in merger of additional convictions for predicate felonies; (2) the predicate felony with the greatest maximum sentences merges for sentencing purposes with the felony murder conviction, and the defendant may be separately sentenced for any remaining predicate felonies; and (3) because the kidnapping offense carries the greater maximum sentence, that conviction merges for sentencing purposes with the felony murder conviction, and the sentence for robbery shall remain as imposed by the circuit court. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in a seventeen-count indictment with crimes stemming from an incident in which Defendant allegedly shot at Travis Green. Defendant filed a motion to suppress Green’s identification of him, arguing that the identification was blighted by an impermissibly suggestive photographic array as a result of the elongated appearance of the other men in four of the six photographs presented to Green. The trial judge denied the motion. During trial, the trial judge admitted the recorded statement of Elmer Duffy, a witness to the shooting who was later murdered, about seeing Defendant shoot Green, even though another man had been charged for Duffy’s murder. After a trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder and other crimes and sentenced to life imprisonment plus ten years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the elongation of the face and torso of four of the photographs did not render the photo array impermissibly suggestive; (2) the Court’s jurisprudence provides suitable means to assay an extrajudicial eyewitness identification; and (3) Duffy’s statement was properly admitted under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-901 and Maryland Rule 5-805(b)(5)(B) because there was substantial evidence connecting Defendant to Duffy’s killing. View "Smiley v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with and convicted of possession of a regulated firearm by a person with a disqualifying drug conviction. The statute under which Appellant was convicted carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years incarceration. Following his sentencing under that statute, Appellant appealed, arguing that his sentence was illegal because, on the same facts, he could have been charged and convicted under a different statute that carries a more lenient sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State’s Attorney had discretion to charge Appellant with a violation of either statute at issue in this case, and the decision was not subject to judicial oversight as to whether the statute carrying the mandatory minimum sentence or the statute with the more lenient penalty should have been charged; and (2) there was no need to apply the rule of lenity in these circumstances because there was no unresolvable ambiguity in the statute in question. View "Oglesby v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to kidnapping and third-degree sexual offense. Defendant was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Defendant also signed an order of probation, in which he agreed to the condition of obeying the probation agent’s lawful instructions. When Defendant was released under mandatory supervision, he agreed to comply “as directed” by his parole/probation agent with a sexual offender management program, which “may include…polygraph testing[.]” Defendant’s probation agent instructed Defendant to report for a polygraph examination, but Defendant did not report for the polygraph examination. The circuit court subsequently determined that Defendant violated the order of probation. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the probation agent’s instruction to report for a polygraph examination created a more onerous condition of probation that was outside the ambit of the conditions laid down by the sentencing court in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a probation agent’s instruction to comply with a condition of mandatory supervision is consistent with the separation of powers doctrine. View "State v. Callahan" on Justia Law

The State charged Petitioner with several crimes, including violating Maryland’s trademark counterfeiting statute, Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law (CR) 8-611. Petitioner field a motion to dismiss the charges for violating CR 8-611 on the ground that the statute is constitutional. Specifically, Petitioner contended that CR 8-611 is facially overbroad because it criminalizes conduct that the First Amendment protects and is facially void for vagueness because it does not clearly define “intellectual property.” The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, and a jury convicted Petitioner of violating CR 8-611. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that CR 8-611 is not facially overbroad or void for vagueness. View "McCree v. State" on Justia Law

Joseph Payne and Jason Bond were convicted in a joint trial of first degree murder and kidnapping. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a police officer, without the officer having been qualified as an expert witness under Maryland Rule 5-702, regarding his process for determining the communication path of Defendants’ cell phones and his conclusion that two particular cell towers were the most pertinent to the case; and (2) wiretap statements made by Bond but not Payne could not be admitted against Payne as statements by a party opponent. View "State v. Payne" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioners Traimne Allen and Howard Diggs were convicted of attempted first degree murder and related offenses stemming from a home invasion and robbery. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding certain DNA “match” evidence. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the DNA match evidence was properly excluded. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 2-510 prohibits the introduction at trial by a criminal defense of evidence of a DNA match to prove the identity of another individual without first establishing additional confirmatory testing and does not infringe upon a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense. View "Allen v. State" on Justia Law