Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and related offenses. In 2008, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. (CP) 8-201, alleging that socks he had allegedly worn at the time of the murders that the State introduced into evidence at trial lacked his DNA. The State responded with documentation that the socks were destroyed along with other items seized in the case after Appellant’s conviction had been affirmed on direct appeal. In 2011, the circuit court closed the case. In 2013, Appellant sought to reopen the proceedings pursuant to CP 8-201, alleging that the State had improperly destroyed the socks. The pro bono counsel that had assisted Appellant in the earlier proceedings under CP 8-201 moved to strike their appearance. The circuit court granted counsels’ motion, denied Appellant’s request for new court-appointed counsel, and denied Appellant’s request to conduct further proceedings under CP 8-201. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it (1) granted the motion of Appellant’s pro bono counsel to strike their appearance; (2) declined to appoint new counsel for Appellant; and (3) declined to order relief under CP 8-201. View "Simms v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the constitutionality of a conviction based on a guilty verdict by a jury that was given an advisory only instruction. After a jury trial in 1976, Respondent was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and a related larceny. In 1997, Respondent sought postconviction relief, alleging several claims. The postconviction court denied relief. In 2007, Respondent filed a motion to reopen the petition for postconviction relief, alleging that the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction advising the jury that they were the judges of the law and the facts. The circuit court, citing the Court of Appeals’ recently filed opinion in Unger v. State, ultimately granted the motion. After a hearing the postconviction court granted Respondent postconviction relief and ordered that Respondent was entitled to a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, thus upholding Unger as the law regarding advisory only jury instructions, holding that the postconviction court properly granted Respondent relief in the form of a new trial. View "State v. Waine" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was indigent and whose mental competency was questioned by the court and counsel at several junctures, appeared before a series of judges concerning his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, an assistant public defender. The circuit court advised Defendant about his right to, and the merits of, having counsel, but, upon finding that good cause existed to discharge the assistant public defender, the court treated Defendant’s decision to discharge that counsel as a waiver of counsel, despite Defendant’s clear requests for counsel. Defendant represented himself at trial and was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel for Defendant and in stating that it lacked the authority to appoint counsel for Defendant after finding a meritorious reason to discharge Defendant’s assistant public defender. Remanded for appointment of counsel and a new trial. View "Dykes v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on multiple counts of burglary, theft, and related offenses. Defendant was found to be indigent, and an assistant public defender was assigned to represent him. Before trial, Defendant discharged his attorney. Defendant then filed a motion asking the circuit court to help him obtain “pro bono counsel.” The circuit court denied the motion. Defendant represented himself at trial and was found guilty on twenty-one counts. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by failing to determine and announce on the record that Defendant was knowingly and voluntarily waiving the right to counsel. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) to the extent Defendant asserts that the court’s “waiver inquiry” was deficient because the court did not make an explicit finding on the record that Defendant was acting knowingly and voluntarily by waiving counsel, Defendant failed to preserve the issue by making a contemporaneous objection; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel for Defendant when Defendant lacked good cause for discharging his assigned assistant public defender. View "State v. Westray" on Justia Law

In 2012, Petitioner voluntarily consented to a search of his person in the form of saliva and penile swabs for the purpose of furnishing DNA evidence to the police department to use in the investigation of a rape allegation. The DNA profile created from the extraction of Petitioner’s DNA excluded Defendant as a suspect of the alleged rape. Defendant’s DNA profile was subsequently uploaded to the local DNA database. Later, an automatic search resulted in a match between Defendant’s DNA profile and a DNA profile associated with an unsolved burglary committed in 2008. Based on that DNA evidence, Defendant was charged with burglary and related charges. Defendant moved to suppress the State’s DNA match evidence on the grounds that the subsequent use of his DNA to conduct a comparison search of the DNA databank exceeded the scope of his consent and therefore constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The suppression hearing judge denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, where Defendant’s consent to search was not expressly limited by him, the State, or the law, the Fourth Amendment did not preclude the police from retaining and using Defendant’s DNA profile created from his voluntarily provided DNA sample for additional, unrelated criminal investigations. View "Varriale v. State" on Justia Law

Shyquille Griffin was indicted on charges related to the shooting of Andrew Lindsey. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Griffin pleaded guilty to attempted robbery. The agreement did not mention restitution. Upon sentencing, the State advised the court that Lindsey was seeking $9,700 in restitution. The circuit court concluded that it could not order restitution because it would violate the agreement by adding to the penalty. Invoking Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 11-103(e), Lindsey filed a motion for reconsideration of restitution and request for hearing (“CP 11-103(e) motion”), arguing that the hearing court improperly denied his request for restitution. The circuit court denied the CP 11-103(e) motion. Lindsey appealed. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court had discretion to order restitution as a condition of Griffin’s probation without violating the agreement or Griffin’s double jeopardy rights. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Lindsey’s appeal was untimely because Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 11-103(b) does not permit a crime victim to file an application for leave to appeal the denial of a CP 11-103(e) motion. View "Griffin v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged in a five-count indictment with burglary and related crimes. On the morning of trial, the prosecutor asked the court to amend Count Four from theft of less than $1,000 to theft of at least $1,000 but less than $10,000. The amendment of Count Four substituted felony theft for misdemeanor theft. The court allowed the amendment of the indictment. After a trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of fourth degree burglary, theft of goods having a value of at least $1,000, and theft of good valued under $100. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding (1) the amendment of Count Four of the indictment changed the character of the offense charged, and therefore, the trial court violated Maryland Rule 4-204 in permitting the State, over Petitioner’s objection, to amend the charging document; and (2) that violation was prejudicial per se, entitling Petitioner to a remand for entry of a judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence on the originally charged misdemeanor of theft of property valued at less than $1,000. View "Counts v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Petitioner was convicted of possession of oxycodone with intent to distribute. Petitioner appealed, arguing that he was entitled, by application of the rule established in Riley v. California, decided by the Supreme Court, to suppression of the evidence obtained as the result of the search of his cell phone incident to his lawful arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the officer who searched Petitioner’s cell phone acted in good faith on then-controlling authority in Maryland in searching Petitioner’s cell phone, and therefore, Petitioner was not entitled to have the cell phone data excluded at trial. View "Demby v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion to suppress text messages that the police obtained during the warrantless search of his cell phone incident to his lawful arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly denied Petitioner’s motion to suppress the data obtained from his cell phone, as (1) in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California, officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting searches of data on cell phones; but (2) the police in this case acted in good faith on then-controlling authority in Maryland in searching Petitioner’s cell phone, and therefore, Petitioner was not entitled to suppression of the data obtained from his cell phone. View "Spence v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder. Defendant appealed, arguing that a witness’s placement in protective housing for several months leading up to the murder trial constituted a “benefit” that would compel the trial judge to give a particularized jury instruction - called the “Witness Promised Benefit” instruction - pertaining to the witness’s credibility. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the jury instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that protective housing provided to a witness in a first degree murder case is not the type of “benefit” contemplated by the “Witness Promised Benefit” pattern instruction, and therefore, the trial court did not err in not giving the instruction. View "Preston v. State" on Justia Law