Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of child sexual abuse, third-degree sex offense, and second-degree sex offense. Defendant appealed, asserting that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress a recorded telephone conversation with the victim during which Defendant made multiple incriminating statements. The Court of Special Appeals upheld the circuit court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the victim, a West Virginia resident, was sufficiently supervised by a Maryland law enforcement officer so as to make the recording a permissible interception under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. (CP) 10-402(c)(2). CP 10-402(c)(2) provides an exception to the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act’s general prohibition on the interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the taped telephone call between the victim and Defendant because the victim was not acting “under the supervision of an investigative or law enforcement officer” as required by CP 10-402(c)(2) where the officer simply set up the recording equipment, instructed the victim on how handle the equipment, and gave the victim the equipment to conduct the recording on his own in West Virginia. View "Seal v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree assault, second-degree assault, and the weapon charge. The circuit court imposed a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years for the first-degree assault conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in considering during sentencing his decision not to plead guilty. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding (1) Defendant failed to preserve his argument for appellate review; and (2) the circuit court did not err at the sentencing proceeding, as there was no indication that the circuit court was influenced by the the fact that Defendant had declined to plead guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that the circuit court might have been motivated during sentencing by the impermissible consideration of Defendant’s decision not to plead guilty. View "Sharp v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. While there was no dispute that Defendant shot the victim, his defense was that he acted in self-defense and did not intend to hit anyone. During jury deliberations, the trial judge gave a supplemental jury instruction on transferred intent after the jury asked, “We are confused on the term ‘intent.’ Does it mean to kill a person or the specific person. Can you please clarify? Thank you.” The jury convicted Defendant of the charges. Defendant appealed, arguing that the supplemental instruction on transferred intent was not generated by the evidence and introduced an entirely new theory of the case that was prejudicial to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in giving the supplemental instruction because the evidence generated the instruction, and the instruction did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. Bircher" on Justia Law

After a joint jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of second degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. The court of special appeals affirmed. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the prosecutor’s response to an allegation of racial and gender discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory challenge did not satisfy the requirement of Batson v. Kentucky that the State provide a specific explanation for each challenged strike which is racially, and with respect to gender, neutral. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecutor’s explanation for striking the juror at issue, in addition to lacking the requisite specificity, violated Batson because the explanation was neither race- nor gender-neutral. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ray-Simmons v. State" on Justia Law

Defendants were indicted for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, and possession of a firearm with a nexus to drug trafficking. Defendants moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not sufficiently connect them to the drugs and firearm because there were multiple people in the apartment where the incriminating evidence was discovered. The trial court denied the motions, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all four counts with respect to both Defendants. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the State failed to prove that Defendants had possession of the cocaine and handgun. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish that Defendants had joint constructive possession of the drugs and handgun found in the apartment. View "State v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether an order granting a petition for writ of actual innocence constitutes a final judgment such that the State can appeal it directly. Petitioner here filed a petition for writ of actual innocence in the circuit court. The circuit court granted Petitioner a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The State filed a notice of appeal. Petitioner moved to dismiss, citing the State’s limited statutory authority to appeal. The Court of Special Appeals denied Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the State can appeal an order granting a petition for writ of actual innocence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State does not have the right to appeal a circuit court decision granting a writ of actual innocence under Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 8-301. View "Seward v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a third degree sexual offense. Defendant was sentenced to one year incarceration and was required to register as a sex offender. Six years later, Defendant petitioned for a writ of actual innocence, alleging newly discovered evidence. The circuit court denied the petition on the merits. The intermediate appellate court affirmed, holding that a writ of actual innocence does not apply to a guilty plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a person who has pled guilty may not later avail himself or herself of the relief afforded by a petition for a writ of actual innocence. View "Yonga v. State" on Justia Law

American Sedan Services, Inc. is a commercial transportation service that has a permit from Maryland Aviation Administration (MAA) to provide ground transportation services at the Baltimore Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI). Vadim Roshchin, who was employed as a driver by American Sedan, was picking up passengers at BWI without displaying the permit as required by an MAA regulation when Maryland Transportation Authority (MdTA) police arrested him and impounded the American Sedan. Roshchin and American Sedan sued MAA, MdTA, the MdTA police, and the State, alleging, among other claims, false arrest and false imprisonment. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State on all counts. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that there was no legal justification for the arrest of Roshchin. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the regulation requiring commercial transportation services to display permits was not required to be posted at the airport as a prerequisite to its enforcement; and (2) there was legal justification for the arrest, as nothing in the MAA regulation or the Transportation Article deprives a police officer of the general authority to arrest an individual who commits a misdemeanor in the presence of the officer. View "State v. Roshchin" on Justia Law

Mother took her child to health providers on several occasions after complained that her father had hurt her. The child also exhibited vaginal redness. The Department of Human Resources notified Mother that it found her responsible for indicated child abuse mental injury. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) affirmed the Department’s finding of indicated child abuse mental injury and found that Mother could be placed on the central registry maintained by the Department. The circuit court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding, in relevant part, that the ALJ did not err by failing to include scienter as an element of indicated child abuse mental injury. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that a parent can only be identified on a central registry as responsible for child abuse if the parent intended to injure the child or acted with reckless disregard of the child’s welfare. View "McClanahan v. Washington County Dep’t of Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

Defendants Matthew Meyer and Helen Rivera were placed on probationary terms and, as a special condition of probation, prohibited from operating a motor vehicle. The circuit court denied Meyer’s motion to correct and illegal sentence, concluding that Meyer’s sentence was not illegal. In Rivera’s case, the court of special appeals held that Rivera’s no-driving condition of probation violated the separation of powers doctrine. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals in both cases. The Court consolidated the cases to address the common questions of law and fact and held (1) Sheppard v. State, which prohibits a court from restricting a defendant’s driving privileges as a condition of probation under certain circumstances, was wrongly decided and is thus overruled; and (2) in Meyer, the circuit court properly denied the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, and in Rivera, the court of appeals’ judgment holding that the no-driving condition of probation violated the separation of powers doctrine is reversed. View "Meyer v. State" on Justia Law