Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In cases consolidated for this appeal, defendants were found guilty but not criminally responsible at the time of the commission of the offense and were committed to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. The court granted conditional releases on various occasions but each conditional release was subsequently revoked, resulting in recommitment to DHMH for treatment. The Maryland Court of Appeal held that the Circuit Court erred in determining that the statutory scheme, Criminal Procedure Article 3-114, for granting or revocation of the conditional release of a committed person violated the separation of powers provision found in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court also erred in revoking defendant’s conditional release and ordering his continued commitment for institutional inpatient care and treatment after the ALJ had found that defendant was eligible for conditional release and had recommended the same. The court held that under CP 3-114 the substantial evidence standard applies to a circuit court’s review of an ALJ’s findings of facts and recommendations. View "Stoddard v. State" on Justia Law

Cambridge Police Officer Mothersell stopped petitioner at 1:00 a.m. after observing him speeding and failing to stop at a stop sign. Mothersell – the only witness at the suppression hearing – said that, when he approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he detected a minor odor of alcohol coming from petitioner’s breath and person, even though petitioner was several feet away, in the driver’s seat. Mothersell observed that petitioner’s speech was slurred and hard to understand and that his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Petitioner said that he had been at the Point Break bar. Mothersell had petitioner exit the car so he could perform field sobriety tests, which petitioner did not complete successfully. Petitioner was placed under arrest. A backup officer arrived. Mothersell placed petitioner in the rear seat of his squad car to advise him of his rights, while the backup officer searched petitioner's car and found the cocaine inside the front seat center armrest. Mothersell said that the sole purpose for the search was to locate any “other alcohol, open containers, anything pertaining to the DUI arrest.” The court denied a motion to suppress; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the ensuing conviction. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. In this case there was an articulable basis for suspicion: the arresting officer’s prior experiences of finding open containers inside the passenger compartment. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

On April 12, 2015, Freddie Gray suffered an injury while in police custody; one week later, he died from those injuries. The state charged six Baltimore police officers in connection with Gray’s death. Officer Porter’s trial ended in a mistrial in December 2015. The state has indicated it will retry him and wants to compel him, before his retrial, to provide immunized testimony against the remaining officers. In two cases the trial court granted the motion to compel; in three cases it denied the motion. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the state’s compelling Officer Porter to testify in the trials of his fellow officers, under the grant of use and derivative use immunity, does not violate Porter’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment or the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The trial court lacks the discretion to deny a properly pled motion to compel immunized testimony. Denial of such a motion constitutes a final judgment from which the state can appeal immediately. Porter was the proper party to the appeal because he, not the defendants in the underlying trials, is the party interested in the subject matter of the motion to compel immunized testimony. View "State v. Rice, Nero, Miller; White & Goodson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of two counts of sexual abuse of a minor. After the State rested its case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the only evidence of corpus delicti was derived from Petitioner’s extrajudicial confession and was not corroborated by independent evidence, and therefore, the rule of corroboration was not satisfied. The circuit court denied the motion, finding sufficient corroboration. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a witness’s testimony that he does not remember whether an act occurred does not constitute sufficient corroboration of an extrajudicial confession by the defendant that the act in fact occurred; (2) a criminal defendant’s uncorroborated confession does not constitute sufficient evidence to support a conviction for sexual abuse of a minor; and (3) in this case, the evidence was legally insufficient to warrant a jury verdict. View "Grimm v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent was charged with second-degree assault and drug offenses. Respondent and defense counsel, a public defender, later appeared for a motions hearing, and defense counsel moved for a postponement, indicating that Respondent wished to obtain a postponement to hire private counsel that Respondent had retained in the past. The district court denied the request to postpone the motions hearing and denied Respondent’s request to replace his counsel. A jury subsequently found Respondent guilty. Respondent appealed, arguing that the circuit court failed to comply with Md. Rule 4-215(e) by never asking him why he wished to replace his counsel. The Court of Special Appeals agreed, concluding that defense counsel’s request for a postponement required that the circuit court permit Respondent to explain the reasons for the request and that this requirement was not satisfied at the motions hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Rule 4-215(e) required that the circuit court seek an explanation for the request to discharge counsel from Defendant or ensure that Defendant agreed with the reasons proffered by defense counsel. View "State v. Graves" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of child abuse, second degree rape, third degree sexual offense, and incest. As charged, any of the three sexual offenses could have provided the basis for the child abuse conviction. The court imposed consecutive sentences for rape, third degree sexual offense, and incest, and a suspended sentence for child abuse, for a total of forty years’ incarceration. At issue on appeal was whether all, or only one, of the sexual offenses merge for sentencing purposes with the sentence for child abuse and whether Maryland law permits a remand to afford the trial court the opportunity to consider resentencing on the child abuse conviction. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that Petitioner was entitled to have all three sexual offenses vacated and that the case may be remanded to the trial court for resentencing on Petitioner’s sexual child abuse conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) only the sentence Petitioner received for second degree rape must be vacated, by application of State v. Johnson; and (2) Maryland Rule 8-604(d) authorizes a remand for a new sentence hearing at which the sentencing court has the discretion to resentence Petitioner to a term of active incarceration on the child abuse conviction. View "Twigg v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of child sexual abuse, third-degree sex offense, and second-degree sex offense. Defendant appealed, asserting that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress a recorded telephone conversation with the victim during which Defendant made multiple incriminating statements. The Court of Special Appeals upheld the circuit court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the victim, a West Virginia resident, was sufficiently supervised by a Maryland law enforcement officer so as to make the recording a permissible interception under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. (CP) 10-402(c)(2). CP 10-402(c)(2) provides an exception to the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act’s general prohibition on the interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the taped telephone call between the victim and Defendant because the victim was not acting “under the supervision of an investigative or law enforcement officer” as required by CP 10-402(c)(2) where the officer simply set up the recording equipment, instructed the victim on how handle the equipment, and gave the victim the equipment to conduct the recording on his own in West Virginia. View "Seal v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree assault, second-degree assault, and the weapon charge. The circuit court imposed a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years for the first-degree assault conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in considering during sentencing his decision not to plead guilty. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding (1) Defendant failed to preserve his argument for appellate review; and (2) the circuit court did not err at the sentencing proceeding, as there was no indication that the circuit court was influenced by the the fact that Defendant had declined to plead guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that the circuit court might have been motivated during sentencing by the impermissible consideration of Defendant’s decision not to plead guilty. View "Sharp v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. While there was no dispute that Defendant shot the victim, his defense was that he acted in self-defense and did not intend to hit anyone. During jury deliberations, the trial judge gave a supplemental jury instruction on transferred intent after the jury asked, “We are confused on the term ‘intent.’ Does it mean to kill a person or the specific person. Can you please clarify? Thank you.” The jury convicted Defendant of the charges. Defendant appealed, arguing that the supplemental instruction on transferred intent was not generated by the evidence and introduced an entirely new theory of the case that was prejudicial to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in giving the supplemental instruction because the evidence generated the instruction, and the instruction did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. Bircher" on Justia Law

After a joint jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of second degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. The court of special appeals affirmed. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the prosecutor’s response to an allegation of racial and gender discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory challenge did not satisfy the requirement of Batson v. Kentucky that the State provide a specific explanation for each challenged strike which is racially, and with respect to gender, neutral. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecutor’s explanation for striking the juror at issue, in addition to lacking the requisite specificity, violated Batson because the explanation was neither race- nor gender-neutral. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ray-Simmons v. State" on Justia Law