Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent, an instructor at a martial arts school, engaged in sexually explicit communications with his student - a fifteen-year-old girl who regularly attended his class. The communications occurred while Respondent and the student were in separate locations, usually their respective homes. The Department of Social Services concluded that Respondent had engaged in child sexual abuse under the Child abuse and Neglect Law. Under the statute, a department of social services may make a finding of indicated child sexual abuse of an individual commits the abuse while the individual has “temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of the child.” An administrative law judge (ALJ) disagreed with the Department’s conclusion, finding that Respondent did not have “care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of” the student when the inappropriate behavior occurred. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence support the ALJ’s determination that Respondent’s out-of-class behavior did not constitute child sexual abuse under the current statutory definition. View "Dep’t of Social Servs. v. B.A." on Justia Law

In 2010, Respondent, a citizen of Ecuador, pled not guilty on an agreed statement of facts and was found guilty of second-degree child abuse. In 2013, Respondent filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise him regarding the immigration consequences he could face as a result of conviction. The coram nobis court denied the petition. The Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that Respondent established that trial counsel did not provide him with the correct “available advice” about the risk of deportation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that trial counsel did not perform in a constitutionally deficient manner in advising Respondent as to the immigration consequences of a conviction for second-degree child abuse. View "State v. Sanmartin Prado" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of neglect of a minor. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty days’ incarceration. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address the questions of whether Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 3-602.1, the criminal neglect of a minor statute, was unconstitutionally vague and whether the evidence was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for criminal child neglect. Remanded with directions to reverse the judgment of the circuit court. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

In 2003, Petitioner entered an Alford plea to second degree rape. Thereafter, Petitioner filed several motions for DNA testing. In 2005, the petition was granted, but the results of the testing yielded inconclusive results. In 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for DNA testing alleging that that testing a piece of underwear and additional material collected on laboratory microscope slides would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. The circuit court denied the petition pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 8-201. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that none of Petitioner’s assertions in his 2015 petition would have produced evidence which would have exculpated him of second degree rape under the standard of section 8-201(c), and therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying the petition. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

In cases consolidated for this appeal, defendants were found guilty but not criminally responsible at the time of the commission of the offense and were committed to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. The court granted conditional releases on various occasions but each conditional release was subsequently revoked, resulting in recommitment to DHMH for treatment. The Maryland Court of Appeal held that the Circuit Court erred in determining that the statutory scheme, Criminal Procedure Article 3-114, for granting or revocation of the conditional release of a committed person violated the separation of powers provision found in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court also erred in revoking defendant’s conditional release and ordering his continued commitment for institutional inpatient care and treatment after the ALJ had found that defendant was eligible for conditional release and had recommended the same. The court held that under CP 3-114 the substantial evidence standard applies to a circuit court’s review of an ALJ’s findings of facts and recommendations. View "Stoddard v. State" on Justia Law

Cambridge Police Officer Mothersell stopped petitioner at 1:00 a.m. after observing him speeding and failing to stop at a stop sign. Mothersell – the only witness at the suppression hearing – said that, when he approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he detected a minor odor of alcohol coming from petitioner’s breath and person, even though petitioner was several feet away, in the driver’s seat. Mothersell observed that petitioner’s speech was slurred and hard to understand and that his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Petitioner said that he had been at the Point Break bar. Mothersell had petitioner exit the car so he could perform field sobriety tests, which petitioner did not complete successfully. Petitioner was placed under arrest. A backup officer arrived. Mothersell placed petitioner in the rear seat of his squad car to advise him of his rights, while the backup officer searched petitioner's car and found the cocaine inside the front seat center armrest. Mothersell said that the sole purpose for the search was to locate any “other alcohol, open containers, anything pertaining to the DUI arrest.” The court denied a motion to suppress; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the ensuing conviction. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. In this case there was an articulable basis for suspicion: the arresting officer’s prior experiences of finding open containers inside the passenger compartment. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

On April 12, 2015, Freddie Gray suffered an injury while in police custody; one week later, he died from those injuries. The state charged six Baltimore police officers in connection with Gray’s death. Officer Porter’s trial ended in a mistrial in December 2015. The state has indicated it will retry him and wants to compel him, before his retrial, to provide immunized testimony against the remaining officers. In two cases the trial court granted the motion to compel; in three cases it denied the motion. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the state’s compelling Officer Porter to testify in the trials of his fellow officers, under the grant of use and derivative use immunity, does not violate Porter’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment or the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The trial court lacks the discretion to deny a properly pled motion to compel immunized testimony. Denial of such a motion constitutes a final judgment from which the state can appeal immediately. Porter was the proper party to the appeal because he, not the defendants in the underlying trials, is the party interested in the subject matter of the motion to compel immunized testimony. View "State v. Rice, Nero, Miller; White & Goodson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of two counts of sexual abuse of a minor. After the State rested its case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the only evidence of corpus delicti was derived from Petitioner’s extrajudicial confession and was not corroborated by independent evidence, and therefore, the rule of corroboration was not satisfied. The circuit court denied the motion, finding sufficient corroboration. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a witness’s testimony that he does not remember whether an act occurred does not constitute sufficient corroboration of an extrajudicial confession by the defendant that the act in fact occurred; (2) a criminal defendant’s uncorroborated confession does not constitute sufficient evidence to support a conviction for sexual abuse of a minor; and (3) in this case, the evidence was legally insufficient to warrant a jury verdict. View "Grimm v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent was charged with second-degree assault and drug offenses. Respondent and defense counsel, a public defender, later appeared for a motions hearing, and defense counsel moved for a postponement, indicating that Respondent wished to obtain a postponement to hire private counsel that Respondent had retained in the past. The district court denied the request to postpone the motions hearing and denied Respondent’s request to replace his counsel. A jury subsequently found Respondent guilty. Respondent appealed, arguing that the circuit court failed to comply with Md. Rule 4-215(e) by never asking him why he wished to replace his counsel. The Court of Special Appeals agreed, concluding that defense counsel’s request for a postponement required that the circuit court permit Respondent to explain the reasons for the request and that this requirement was not satisfied at the motions hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Rule 4-215(e) required that the circuit court seek an explanation for the request to discharge counsel from Defendant or ensure that Defendant agreed with the reasons proffered by defense counsel. View "State v. Graves" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of child abuse, second degree rape, third degree sexual offense, and incest. As charged, any of the three sexual offenses could have provided the basis for the child abuse conviction. The court imposed consecutive sentences for rape, third degree sexual offense, and incest, and a suspended sentence for child abuse, for a total of forty years’ incarceration. At issue on appeal was whether all, or only one, of the sexual offenses merge for sentencing purposes with the sentence for child abuse and whether Maryland law permits a remand to afford the trial court the opportunity to consider resentencing on the child abuse conviction. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that Petitioner was entitled to have all three sexual offenses vacated and that the case may be remanded to the trial court for resentencing on Petitioner’s sexual child abuse conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) only the sentence Petitioner received for second degree rape must be vacated, by application of State v. Johnson; and (2) Maryland Rule 8-604(d) authorizes a remand for a new sentence hearing at which the sentencing court has the discretion to resentence Petitioner to a term of active incarceration on the child abuse conviction. View "Twigg v. State" on Justia Law