Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained after a Terry frisk because the law enforcement officers did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the facts created reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed and dangerous and that he had committed or was planning to commit a crime. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk Defendant, and therefore, the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the evidence was correctly suppressed. View "Sellman v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of, among other crimes, first-degree murder. As relevant to this appeal, the jury found Defendant not guilty of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon and attempted robbery. Defendant filed a motion to strike, arguing that the felony murder guilty verdict was inconsistent with the acquittals of robbery and attempted robbery. The circuit court denied the motion to strike. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that, by failing to object before the jury was discharged and the verdicts became final, Defendant waived any issue as to the allegedly inconsistent verdicts. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, to preserve the issue of legally inconsistent verdicts for appellate review, a defendant in a criminal trial by jury must object or make known opposition to the allegedly inconsistent verdicts before the verdicts become final and the trial court discharges the jury. View "Givens v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for several drug offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by police officers from his person, alleging that his detention in handcuffs while in a car that he had been driving was searched constituted an unlawful arrest and that the evidence obtained by the officers were the fruits of that arrest. The motion to suppress was denied. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the police officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant and ask him to leave the vehicle based upon their belief that Defendant may have been armed and dangerous; and (2) the use of handcuffs per se does not ordinarily transform a Terry stop into an arrest, and the continued use of handcuffs by the police officers in this case constituted a Terry stop because of an ongoing concern for officer safety. View "Chase v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on several drug-related counts, which resulted in a two-day jury trial. During jury deliberations, the trial court received a jury note stating that the jury was deadlocked on a particular count (Count 1). Arrangements were made to bring Defendant to the courtroom, but Defendant had been transported to a hospital due to a medical emergency. The court summoned the jury foreperson to discuss the deadlock, and in Defendant’s absence, the judge accepted a partial verdict from the jury. Defendant was found guilty on three counts, and the trial court declared a mistrial on Count 1 on the ground of “manifest necessity.” The trial court subsequently ordered a new trial, concluding that it erred in receiving the partial verdict in Defendant’s absence. The judge, however, denied defense counsel’s motion to dismiss Count 1. The Court of Special Appeals reversed as to Count 1, concluding that, due to Defendant’s involuntary absence, manifest necessity did not exist to declare a mistrial as to Count 1, and therefore, retrial was barred by double jeopardy principles. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge erred in declaring a mistrial in Defendant’s involuntary absence without first continuing the case; and (2) double jeopardy barred a retrial of Count 1. View "State v. Hart" on Justia Law

After a deputy sheriff stopped Petitioner for a traffic violation, the officer inserted his head into the passenger side window of Petitioner’s vehicle. The officer detected the odor of marijuana, and Petitioner was placed under arrest. Petitioner filed a motion to suppress, arguing that an unconstitutional search occurred when the officer inserted his head into the passenger window. The circuit court denied Petitioner’s suppression motion. The court then found Petitioner guilty of possession of marijuana. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress because the evidence was unclear regarding the timing of the officer’s detection of the odor of marijuana, and in the absence of a finding that the officer detected the odor of marijuana before he inserted his head into the window, the State failed to satisfy its burden to show that the search was lawful. View "Grant v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor household member and several other sex offenses. Petitioner was sentenced to terms of imprisonment and required to serve supervised probation upon release with the condition that he have no unsupervised contact with minors. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in prohibiting unsupervised contact with his minor son during probation. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in imposing “a reasonable and narrowly-tailored condition of probation” that prohibited unsupervised contact with all minors, including Petitioner’s son. View "Allen v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent, an instructor at a martial arts school, engaged in sexually explicit communications with his student - a fifteen-year-old girl who regularly attended his class. The communications occurred while Respondent and the student were in separate locations, usually their respective homes. The Department of Social Services concluded that Respondent had engaged in child sexual abuse under the Child abuse and Neglect Law. Under the statute, a department of social services may make a finding of indicated child sexual abuse of an individual commits the abuse while the individual has “temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of the child.” An administrative law judge (ALJ) disagreed with the Department’s conclusion, finding that Respondent did not have “care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of” the student when the inappropriate behavior occurred. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence support the ALJ’s determination that Respondent’s out-of-class behavior did not constitute child sexual abuse under the current statutory definition. View "Dep’t of Social Servs. v. B.A." on Justia Law

In 2010, Respondent, a citizen of Ecuador, pled not guilty on an agreed statement of facts and was found guilty of second-degree child abuse. In 2013, Respondent filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise him regarding the immigration consequences he could face as a result of conviction. The coram nobis court denied the petition. The Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that Respondent established that trial counsel did not provide him with the correct “available advice” about the risk of deportation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that trial counsel did not perform in a constitutionally deficient manner in advising Respondent as to the immigration consequences of a conviction for second-degree child abuse. View "State v. Sanmartin Prado" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of neglect of a minor. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty days’ incarceration. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address the questions of whether Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 3-602.1, the criminal neglect of a minor statute, was unconstitutionally vague and whether the evidence was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for criminal child neglect. Remanded with directions to reverse the judgment of the circuit court. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

In 2003, Petitioner entered an Alford plea to second degree rape. Thereafter, Petitioner filed several motions for DNA testing. In 2005, the petition was granted, but the results of the testing yielded inconclusive results. In 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for DNA testing alleging that that testing a piece of underwear and additional material collected on laboratory microscope slides would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. The circuit court denied the petition pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 8-201. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that none of Petitioner’s assertions in his 2015 petition would have produced evidence which would have exculpated him of second degree rape under the standard of section 8-201(c), and therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying the petition. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law