Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals held that, under the merger rule articulated in State v. Lancaster, 631 A.2d 453 (Md. 1993), offenses and their sentences merge for purposes of sentencing, and therefore, Defendant's convictions for fourth-degree sexual offense and second-degree assault merge, leaving the only permissible punishment the sentence for fourth-degree sexual offense.Defendant was convicted of second-degree assault and fourth-degree sexual offense and sentenced to ten years' incarceration for the assault count and one year for the sexual offense charge, to run consecutively. The court of special appeals reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court for resentencing, holding that the convictions merged. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the offenses of second-degree assault and fourth-degree sexual offense and their sentences merge; and (2) there is no reason to overturn Lancaster. View "State v. Frazier" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals remanded this case, without affirming or reversing, to the court of special appeals with instruction to explain the basis of its order reversing the circuit court's judgment denying postconviction relief and remanding and granting permission for the filing of a belated motion for modification of sentence, holding the Court was unable to determine the basis underlying the court of special appeals' order.Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Defendant later petitioned for postconviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied postconviction relief. The court of special appeals summarily reversed and remanded with instruction to permit Defendant to file a belated motion for modification of sentence. At issue on appeal was whether trial counsel's failure to timely file a motion for modification of sentence pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(e) constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court remanded the case without reaching the merits, holding that the order of the court of special appeals was unclear and the case must be remanded for clarification. View "State v. Day" on Justia Law

In this criminal case in which Defendant was charged with various drunk driving offenses the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trail court denying Defendant's motions in limine to exclude field sobriety tests and a breath test from the evidence, holding that, in giving advice of rights, law enforcement officers must use methods that reasonably convey the warnings and rights in the implied consent statute.Police officers found Defendant asleep at the wheel of his truck and brought him to the station after he failed several field sobriety tests. An officer read in English an "Advice of Rights" form, commonly referred to as a DR-15 form, to Defendant, who spoke Spanish. Defendant signed the DR-15, agreeing to take a breath test, and failed the test. Defendant moved to exclude the tests, arguing that he did not understand the field sobriety test instructions or the advice of rights because he did not understand English. The trial court denied the motions, and Defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial at which the breath test evidence must be suppressed, holding that the officer in this case did not use methods that reasonably conveyed the warnings and rights in the implied consent statute. View "Funes v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Maryland lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner to commit him to the Department of Health and that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) required Petitioner's return to Ohio to serve the remainder of his sentence there.After commencing a sentence in Ohio for felony assault, Petitioner requested a transfer under the IAD to Maryland where a murder charge was pending against him. Petitioner pled guilty in Maryland to second degree murder. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict of "not criminally responsible." The State asserted that the IAD required that Petitioner first return to Ohio to finish his sentence. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition seeking to remain in Maryland, but the circuit court denied relief. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the the plain language of the IAD, Maryland had custody of Petitioner only for the purpose of resolving the pending murder charge and thus did not have jurisdiction to commit him to the Department; and (2) article VI(b) of the IAD did not prevent Petitioner's return to Ohio. View "Aleman v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the bifurcated hybrid trial procedure split between two factfinders is not permitted under Maryland Rule 4-253(c) and is inconsistent with this Court's holding in Carter v. State, 824 A.2d 123 (Md. 2003).Petitioner filed a motion to bifurcate counts of possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person and ammunition counts from the remaining counts in an indictment. Petitioner suggested that some counts be decided by a jury and that the trial judge determine his guilt as to other counts in a singular hybrid judge/jury trial. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner was subsequently found guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a hybrid judge/jury trial in which the judge determines the defendant's guilt with respect to the charge of possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person and the jury determines guilt as to the remaining charges is not permitted under Rule 4-253(c); but (2) Rule 4-253(c) permits a Joshua-style bifurcated criminal jury trial, under which the bifurcation of possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts from other charges is allowed if a defendant's guilt as to all of the charges is determined by the same factfinder. See United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1992). View "Hemming v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals holding that a police-initiated procedure resulting in the identification of Defendant was not governed by constitutional criminal procedure law concerning out-of-court identifications made by an eyewitness, holding that the identification of Defendant was a "confirmatory identification" not subject to constitutional scrutiny.Shortly after a murder, investigating detectives focused on Defendant as the suspected killer. The detectives were aware that the murder victim's current girlfriend, Jennifer McKay, knew Defendant and until recently had been in an intimate relationship with him. When interviewing McKay at the police station the detectives asked her to review camera footage captured with a surveillance camera mounted on a building adjacent to the apartment where the murder occurred. McKay did so and determined that a person depicted on the footage looked like Defendant. Defendant moved to suppress McKay's identification of him, arguing that the identification was obtained during an impermissible suggestive process. The circuit court granted the suppression motion. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the identification at issue in this case did not implicate the constitutionally-based identification law paradigm. View "Greene v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon and other crimes, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting social media evidence because there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) for a reasonable juror to find that Facebook profiles belonged to Defendant and to Defendant's alleged accomplice.During trial, a detective testified that Defendant unfriended his accomplice on Facebook the day after the attempted armed robbery, in which the accomplice was fatally shot. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable juror to find that the Facebook profile belonged to him and that he used his profile to unfriend the profile purportedly belonging to his accomplice. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the trial court to allow the Facebook-related evidence to be presented to the jury. View "Sample v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court granting Petitioner's motion to correct an illegal sentence after Petitioner's earlier filed petition for credit had been granted and his commitment record was adjusted to reflect credit for time served, holding that the trial court did not impose an inherently illegal sentence because the failure to award credit is not an illegality that lies within the sentence itself.In his motion to correct an illegal sentence Petitioner argued that the amendment to his commitment record applying the appropriate credits for time served was of no legal force in the absence of a hearing. Thus, Petitioner argued, his original sentence was still in effect, and that sentence constituted an illegal sentence. The trial judge found that the original sentence was indeed illegal and that the later amendment was insufficient to correct the illegal sentence because the required hearing was not held. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in granting the motion to correct an illegal sentence because it was not the appropriate mechanism for challenging the failure to award credit against a sentence. View "Bratt v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment denying the petitions for writs of actual innocence filed by David Faulkner and Jonathan Smith under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc, 8-301, holding that new trials were warranted for both Smith and Faulkner.More than a dozen years after Adeline Wilford was murdered and the case had gone cold, the Maryland State Police reopened the investigation and charged Faulkner and Smith with burglary, murder and related offenses. Both Smith and Faulkner were convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Several years later, Smith and Faulkner filed petitions for writs of actual evidence, contending that, if newly discovered evidence had been provided to their juries, there was a substantial or significant possibility that the juries would have reached different results. The lower courts denied relief. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered new trials for both petitioners, holding that, in light of the newly discovered evidence discussed in this opinion, Smith and Faulkner were entitled to new trials. View "Faulkner v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction for, among other charges, unlawful possession of a regulated firearm by a person who had previously been convicted of a predicate offense, holding the indictment provided Defendant with sufficient notice of the crime charged in that count and adequately described the specific conduct on which that charge was based.While the relevant count of the indictment accurately stated information about a prior conviction that prohibited Defendant from possessing a firearm, it inaccurately referred to that conviction as a crime of violence. The error went unnoticed in the circuit court. On appeal, Defendant argued that the additional language in the firearms count meant that he was not charged with a crime and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate that count. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the firearm count charged a cognizable crime and showed the jurisdiction of the trial court; and (2) to the extent the drafting error in the indictment could be a basis for objection, Defendant waived any objection by failing to raise it below. View "Shannon v. State" on Justia Law