Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Maryland lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner to commit him to the Department of Health and that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) required Petitioner's return to Ohio to serve the remainder of his sentence there.After commencing a sentence in Ohio for felony assault, Petitioner requested a transfer under the IAD to Maryland where a murder charge was pending against him. Petitioner pled guilty in Maryland to second degree murder. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict of "not criminally responsible." The State asserted that the IAD required that Petitioner first return to Ohio to finish his sentence. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition seeking to remain in Maryland, but the circuit court denied relief. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the the plain language of the IAD, Maryland had custody of Petitioner only for the purpose of resolving the pending murder charge and thus did not have jurisdiction to commit him to the Department; and (2) article VI(b) of the IAD did not prevent Petitioner's return to Ohio. View "Aleman v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the bifurcated hybrid trial procedure split between two factfinders is not permitted under Maryland Rule 4-253(c) and is inconsistent with this Court's holding in Carter v. State, 824 A.2d 123 (Md. 2003).Petitioner filed a motion to bifurcate counts of possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person and ammunition counts from the remaining counts in an indictment. Petitioner suggested that some counts be decided by a jury and that the trial judge determine his guilt as to other counts in a singular hybrid judge/jury trial. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner was subsequently found guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a hybrid judge/jury trial in which the judge determines the defendant's guilt with respect to the charge of possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person and the jury determines guilt as to the remaining charges is not permitted under Rule 4-253(c); but (2) Rule 4-253(c) permits a Joshua-style bifurcated criminal jury trial, under which the bifurcation of possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts from other charges is allowed if a defendant's guilt as to all of the charges is determined by the same factfinder. See United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1992). View "Hemming v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals holding that a police-initiated procedure resulting in the identification of Defendant was not governed by constitutional criminal procedure law concerning out-of-court identifications made by an eyewitness, holding that the identification of Defendant was a "confirmatory identification" not subject to constitutional scrutiny.Shortly after a murder, investigating detectives focused on Defendant as the suspected killer. The detectives were aware that the murder victim's current girlfriend, Jennifer McKay, knew Defendant and until recently had been in an intimate relationship with him. When interviewing McKay at the police station the detectives asked her to review camera footage captured with a surveillance camera mounted on a building adjacent to the apartment where the murder occurred. McKay did so and determined that a person depicted on the footage looked like Defendant. Defendant moved to suppress McKay's identification of him, arguing that the identification was obtained during an impermissible suggestive process. The circuit court granted the suppression motion. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the identification at issue in this case did not implicate the constitutionally-based identification law paradigm. View "Greene v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon and other crimes, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting social media evidence because there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) for a reasonable juror to find that Facebook profiles belonged to Defendant and to Defendant's alleged accomplice.During trial, a detective testified that Defendant unfriended his accomplice on Facebook the day after the attempted armed robbery, in which the accomplice was fatally shot. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable juror to find that the Facebook profile belonged to him and that he used his profile to unfriend the profile purportedly belonging to his accomplice. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the trial court to allow the Facebook-related evidence to be presented to the jury. View "Sample v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court granting Petitioner's motion to correct an illegal sentence after Petitioner's earlier filed petition for credit had been granted and his commitment record was adjusted to reflect credit for time served, holding that the trial court did not impose an inherently illegal sentence because the failure to award credit is not an illegality that lies within the sentence itself.In his motion to correct an illegal sentence Petitioner argued that the amendment to his commitment record applying the appropriate credits for time served was of no legal force in the absence of a hearing. Thus, Petitioner argued, his original sentence was still in effect, and that sentence constituted an illegal sentence. The trial judge found that the original sentence was indeed illegal and that the later amendment was insufficient to correct the illegal sentence because the required hearing was not held. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in granting the motion to correct an illegal sentence because it was not the appropriate mechanism for challenging the failure to award credit against a sentence. View "Bratt v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment denying the petitions for writs of actual innocence filed by David Faulkner and Jonathan Smith under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc, 8-301, holding that new trials were warranted for both Smith and Faulkner.More than a dozen years after Adeline Wilford was murdered and the case had gone cold, the Maryland State Police reopened the investigation and charged Faulkner and Smith with burglary, murder and related offenses. Both Smith and Faulkner were convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Several years later, Smith and Faulkner filed petitions for writs of actual evidence, contending that, if newly discovered evidence had been provided to their juries, there was a substantial or significant possibility that the juries would have reached different results. The lower courts denied relief. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered new trials for both petitioners, holding that, in light of the newly discovered evidence discussed in this opinion, Smith and Faulkner were entitled to new trials. View "Faulkner v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction for, among other charges, unlawful possession of a regulated firearm by a person who had previously been convicted of a predicate offense, holding the indictment provided Defendant with sufficient notice of the crime charged in that count and adequately described the specific conduct on which that charge was based.While the relevant count of the indictment accurately stated information about a prior conviction that prohibited Defendant from possessing a firearm, it inaccurately referred to that conviction as a crime of violence. The error went unnoticed in the circuit court. On appeal, Defendant argued that the additional language in the firearms count meant that he was not charged with a crime and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate that count. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the firearm count charged a cognizable crime and showed the jurisdiction of the trial court; and (2) to the extent the drafting error in the indictment could be a basis for objection, Defendant waived any objection by failing to raise it below. View "Shannon v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of second-degree murder, holding that non-mutually admissible evidence was admitted at trial, prejudicing Defendant, and the seizure of a cell phone from Defendant's person exceeded the parameters of the Fourth Amendment and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.Defendant was tried in the circuit court along with a co-defendant for murder. Both defendants were convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that his trial should have been severed from that of his co-defendant since a substantial amount of the evidence against the co-defendant was not admissible against him. Defendant further argued that the trial court erred in failing to suppress a cell phone that was seized from his pocket. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that (1) the trials should have been severed because the joint trial unfairly prejudiced Defendant, and the resulting prejudice could not be cured; and (2) in the absence of a valid search and seizure warrant for the search of Defendant's person or an applicable exception to the warrant requirement, the seizure of the cell phone was unlawful. View "State v. Zadeh" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the ruling of the circuit court denying both Appellant's request for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPPA) and his petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that Appellant was not entitled to the relief he sought.The circuit court found Appellant guilty to two counts of second-degree assault and determined that he was "not criminally responsible" (NCR). Appellant later filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief under the UPPA, arguing that his NCR plea was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea and was invalid because he did not understand the nature of the charges. He also filed a petition for writ of error corm nobis seeking to vacate the NCR judgment. The circuit court denied relief as to both petitions. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not eligible for relief under the plain language of the UPPA; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to coram nobis relief because he did not suffer significant collateral consequences. View "Peterson v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the order of the circuit court declaring that Defendant, who pled guilty to sex trafficking, was not required to register as a Tier II Sex Offender on the ground that the victim's age had not been proven, holding that the circuit court properly granted declaratory judgment in favor of Defendant.At issue was whether a person like Defendant, who was convicted of human trafficking under Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law (CR) 11-303(a), was required to register as a Tier II Sex Offender where the victim's age was not established during the guilty plea proceeding. The Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a determination of the victim's age. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) CR 11-303(a) is an offense whose elements do not require proof of the victim's age; (2) where no proof of the victim's age was established at the plea proceeding, Defendant was not required to register as a Tier II Sex Offender; and (3) the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services lacks the authority to make a factual determination as to the victim's age for purposes of determining whether registration as a Tier II Sex Offender is required. View "Rogers v. State" on Justia Law