Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of first-degree rape and other offenses, holding that the trial court did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights by allowing the technical review of a report analyzing DNA evidence to testify about the results of that analysis without requiring the primary author of the report to be available for cross-examination.In 2008, an unidentified assailant sexually assaulted a nineteen-year-old woman in her apartment. Forensic evidence was collected from the woman's body and from her apartment, and forensic scientists generated a DNA profile from the evidence for an "unknown male #1." Nine years later, the FBI's Combined DNA Index System produced Defendant as a match for "unknown male #1." Defendant was subsequently convicted with several offenses relating to the sexual assault. Thomas Hebert was the primary author of two reports that analyzed and/or compared DNA evidence relevant to this case. The State did not call Hebert as a witness and instead offered the testimony of two other Forensic Services Division analysts in Hebert's stead. The court of special appeals reversed the convictions, concluding that the trial court violated Defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant's constitutional rights were not violated under the circumstances of this case. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions of numerous criminal offenses related to a drunk driving incident that resulted in the death of a cyclist, holding that Defendant's challenge to the jury selection method in this case was unavailing.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge impermissibly excluded numerous groups of people from his jury without making specific findings of bias or other cause, in violation of his right to an impartial jury. The court of special appeals affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was no indication in the record that any cognizable group was excluded from the jury as a result of the method of jury selection used in this case. View "Kidder v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals dismissed this appeal of the court of special appeals' denial of an application for leave to appeal in a postconviction proceeding, holding that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. (CJ) 12-202.Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder and other crimes. Nearly ten years after Petitioner was sentenced, he filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. The postconviction court denied the petition. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal, which the court of special appeals denied without explanation. Petitioner then petitioned the Court of Appeals for writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that CJ 12-202 is not precluded by article IV, section 14A of the Maryland Constitution. View "Mahai v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree murder and related charges, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the criminal pattern jury instruction on flight.Defendant was prosecuted for shooting Eric Tate, III and immediately fleeing the scene. At trial, Defendant disputed both that he was the shooter and that he was the person who fled the scene. The trial judge provided the jury with the pattern instruction on flight, and the jury convicted Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in giving the flight instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a trial judge generally should not give a flight instruction where the sole contested issue at trial is the defendant's identity as the fleeing offender; and (2) because the evidence adduced at trial generated the flight instruction and because Defendant did not make the necessary unequivocal statement to the court narrowing the case solely to his identity as the fleeing assailant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the flight instruction. View "Wright v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming Petitioner's convictions and the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioner's motion to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court pursuant to Md. Code Crim. Proc. 4-202, holding that the circuit court did not properly consider Petitioner's amenability to treatment in a juvenile institution, program, or facility.Petitioner was charged with several crimes that he committed when he was sixteen that were beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. After the circuit court denied Petitioner's motion to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court Petitioner entered a conditional guilty plea. The court of special appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the matter for a new hearing on Petitioner's motion to transfer, holding that it was evident from the circuit court's remarks that it did not properly consider amenability. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of murder and attempted murder, holding that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda and that the circuit court correctly determined that a jury instruction on duress was unwarranted.Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress his confession to a law enforcement officer. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Miranda had been complied with and that Defendant's confession was voluntary. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda, his confession was voluntary, and his circumstances did not render his waiver of rights involuntary; and (2) the circuit court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on duress because the instruction was unwarranted. View "Madrid v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for armed robbery, robbery and other crimes, holding that accepting a jury as ultimately empaneled does not waive any prior objection to the trial court's refusal to propound voir dire questions.Prior to the commencement of the jury trial in this case, defense counsel submitted several voir dire questions to be posed to the venire. When the trial court declined to pose a proposed question defense counsel objected, but the objection was overruled. At the conclusion of jury selection, the court asked whether either party objected to the jury as empaneled. Defense counsel responded, "no." After Defendant was convicted, he appealed, arguing that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to ask the proposed question. The court of special appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) objections relating to a trial court's determination not to ask a proffered voir dire question are not waived by later acceptance, without qualification, of the jury as empaneled; and (2) Defendant did not waive his objection to the trial court's decision not to ask the proffered voir dire question at issue by accepting the jury as empaneled without repeating his prior objection. View "State v. Ablonczy" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's motion to reinstate her appeal and her motion to reconsider that denial, holding that the circuit court incorrectly applied the "good cause" standard when it denied Appellant's motion to reinstate her appeal.Appellant was convicted for failing to send her child to school. Appellant appealed, and the circuit court scheduled the case for a trial de novo. Thereafter, the COVID-19 pandemic required the circuit court to postpone several criminal cases on its docket, including Appellant's appeal for a trial de novo. During a status hearing which Defendant was unable to attend, the circuit court dismissed Appellant's appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the undisputed facts in the record, the circuit court would abuse its discretion if it did not reinstate the appeal. View "Tengeres v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, under the unique circumstance of the late Joseph Kopera's deception of Maryland's courts and defendants for decades in a number of criminal cases in which he testified as an expert in the field of firearms ballistics, due diligence did not require defense counsel to unearth Kopera's fraud prior to 2007.In 2007, an attorney working for the innocence project discovered that Kopera gave perjured testimony in hundreds of criminal trials concerning his credentials. Ronnie Hunt later filed a second amended petition for writ of actual innocence, arguing that had Kopera's fake credentials been known, it was reasonably probable that the outcome of his trial would have been different. The circuit court denied the petition on the ground that Kopera's false testimony concerning his credentials was not newly discovered evidence. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) in this and all similarly situated cases tried prior to the discovery of Kopera's fraud, due diligence did not require defense counsel to unearth the charade prior to 2007; and (2) remand was required for the trial court to determine whether Hunt could establish a substantial possibility that, had Kopera's false testimony been known at the time of his trial, the result of Hunt's trial may have been different. View "Hunt v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the court of special appeals did not err in holding that the placement and use of a GPS tracking device was legal.In investigating suspected drug distribution activities Harford County Narcotics Task Force applied for and received an "application for court order" to install a GPS tracking device on Defendant's vehicle. The Task Force detectives subsequently applied for a received a search warrant for Defendant's vehicle and suspected residence. After the search warranted was executed, Defendant was indicted on drug-related charges. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the GPS tracking of his vehicle was unconstitutional. The circuit court held that the search warrant lacked probable cause but that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea. The court of appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the use of the GPS tracking device was legal because the GPS order satisfied the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement; (2) the issuing judge had substantial evidence for finding probable cause; and (3) the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied in this case. View "Whittington v. State" on Justia Law