Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On the morning of November 8, 2022, a motor vehicle collision occurred in Gaithersburg, Maryland, in which the petitioner fatally struck two pedestrians. Law enforcement arrived at the scene around 7:30 a.m. and informed the petitioner that he was not free to leave. He was placed in the back of a police cruiser at 7:43 a.m., where he remained for slightly over an hour while officers investigated the incident. A Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) arrived at 8:51 a.m., detected signs of alcohol impairment, and conducted field sobriety tests. The petitioner was formally arrested at 9:13 a.m. and transported to the police station for a breath test at 10:15 a.m., which revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.24. He was indicted on ten counts related to the collision and ultimately convicted on all counts based on an agreed statement of facts.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County denied the petitioner’s motions to suppress evidence, finding that the investigatory detention did not transform into a de facto arrest and that the breath test was conducted within the statutory two-hour window after apprehension, as defined in Willis v. State. The court found that reasonable suspicion existed for the detention, and no forceful tactics were used by officers. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed these rulings, agreeing that the detention was reasonable and that the breath test results were admissible under Maryland law.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that placing an individual in a police cruiser for a reasonable period during a swiftly developing investigation does not per se convert a lawful investigatory detention into a de facto arrest. The Court further held that “apprehension” for purposes of Maryland’s two-hour breath test statute occurred at 8:51 a.m., when police had reasonable suspicion and acted on it; thus, the breath test at 10:15 a.m. was timely and admissible. View "Singh v. State" on Justia Law

Police received a call from a resident in a townhouse community who was personally acquainted with a local police officer, Sergeant Muollo. The caller, who contacted the officer directly on his cell phone rather than through the usual police line, reported that an unfamiliar black sedan with multiple occupants had been parked on her street for an extended period, with cell phones visibly in use inside the car, and expressed her suspicion that the occupants might be engaged in illegal activity, possibly breaking into vehicles. The officer, considering the caller credible due to their longstanding relationship, responded to the location, observed the described car, and, along with backup, blocked the vehicle’s exit. As the officer approached, the car moved slowly forward, which the officer interpreted as an attempt to turn around. He then activated his emergency lights, approached, and detected the odor of marijuana and observed contraband, leading to the arrest of the driver, who was also found in possession of a firearm.In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. The circuit court denied the motion, finding the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the informant’s tip, the general level of crime in the area, and the movement of the vehicle when police approached. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, concluding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion, citing the tip from a known resident, the officer’s corroboration of the car’s presence, and testimony that the area experienced significant crime.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car. The tip provided no basis for suspecting criminal activity beyond the car’s unfamiliarity and presence, and the officer’s corroboration only confirmed innocuous facts. The court further found the testimony about the area being high-crime was insufficiently particularized and not based on information known to the officer at the time of the stop. The judgment was reversed. View "Kopp v. State" on Justia Law

On the morning of November 8, 2022, an individual struck and fatally injured two pedestrians while driving. Police arrived at the scene, determined he was the driver, and informed him he could not leave. He was escorted to the back of a patrol car at approximately 7:43 a.m., where he remained for a little over an hour while officers conducted their investigation, including calling in a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE). At 8:51 a.m., the DRE smelled alcohol on him, conducted sobriety tests, and formally arrested him at 9:13 a.m. A subsequent breath test at 10:15 a.m. revealed a high blood alcohol concentration. He was charged with multiple offenses and ultimately convicted on all counts based on an agreed-upon statement of facts.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County denied his motions to suppress evidence, finding that his detention prior to formal arrest was reasonable and did not amount to a de facto arrest. The court also found that the breath test was conducted within the statutory two-hour window, as he was not “apprehended” for purposes of the statute until the DRE detected alcohol. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed these rulings, holding that his detention was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and that the breath test results were admissible.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts. It held that placing the individual in a patrol car during a rapidly developing investigation did not itself transform a lawful investigatory detention into a de facto arrest. The Court further held that, under Maryland law, an individual is “apprehended” for purposes of the two-hour testing window when police have reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence and act on it. Since this did not occur until 8:51 a.m., the breath test at 10:15 a.m. was timely, and the convictions were affirmed. View "Singh v. State" on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with multiple crimes, including murder, related to a 2016 incident. Before his first trial, the parties agreed to exclude evidence of firearms, ammunition, or marijuana found at the defendant’s residence, as these items were not relevant to the charges. In the first trial, the jury convicted the defendant on some counts and was hung on others, resulting in a mistrial on the unresolved charges. At retrial on the remaining counts, a prosecution witness unexpectedly mentioned the excluded evidence despite the prior agreement. The defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing this reference was improper. The trial court granted the mistrial, and the State did not oppose it.After the second mistrial, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges, contending that Maryland’s common law double jeopardy protections should bar a third prosecution if the State’s reckless conduct caused the mistrial. The defendant argued that the State was reckless in failing to adequately instruct the witness not to mention the excluded evidence and in its questioning. The Circuit Court for Charles County denied the motion, finding the State’s conduct was neither intentional nor reckless. The defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that Maryland common law did not attach double jeopardy protections in these circumstances and, even if it did, the State’s conduct was not reckless.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. Without deciding whether Maryland law bars retrial after a mistrial caused by reckless State conduct, the Court assumed for argument’s sake that such a standard might apply. The Court held that the circuit court’s factual finding—the State did not act recklessly—was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court, allowing the retrial to proceed. View "Santana v. State" on Justia Law

A defendant was initially tried on multiple charges related to a 2016 murder. At the first trial, the parties had agreed to exclude evidence regarding firearms, ammunition, and marijuana found in a search of the defendant’s home, as these items were not relevant. The jury convicted the defendant on some counts but could not reach a verdict on four charges, leading the Circuit Court for Charles County to declare a mistrial on those counts. At the retrial of the remaining charges, a prosecution witness unexpectedly referenced the previously excluded evidence during testimony. The defense objected, moved for a mistrial, and the State did not oppose. The court granted the motion.The defendant later moved to dismiss further prosecution, citing Maryland’s common law prohibition against double jeopardy, and argued that the State’s reckless conduct had prompted the mistrial. The Circuit Court denied the motion, finding that the State’s actions were neither intentional nor reckless. The defendant appealed, but the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that Maryland’s common law double jeopardy protections did not apply since no factual findings had been made on the criminal charges at issue, and even if they did, the State’s conduct was not reckless.The Supreme Court of Maryland assumed, without deciding, that Maryland’s common law double jeopardy rule would bar retrial if a mistrial were caused by the State’s reckless conduct. Reviewing the Circuit Court’s factual finding for clear error, the Supreme Court held that there was competent evidence supporting the lower court’s determination that the State was not reckless. As a result, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court, allowing the prosecution to proceed. View "Santana v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, Montgomery County, Maryland, enacted amendments to its County Code in 2021 and 2022 regulating firearms. The amendments expanded the definition of “place of public assembly,” prohibited the possession of firearms (including “ghost guns”) in or within 100 yards of such places, and removed exceptions for state-issued handgun permit holders. The amendments also imposed new restrictions concerning minors’ access to firearms and regulated ghost guns and their components. The petitioners, two businesses and eight individuals, claimed these provisions were preempted by state law, not a valid local law, and amounted to an unconstitutional taking.After removal to federal court and a partial remand, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County ruled in favor of the challengers, finding the county’s provisions preempted by state law, not a local law, and an unconstitutional taking, and issued declaratory and injunctive relief. The Appellate Court of Maryland remanded for further analysis of preemption and takings issues, particularly concerning the expansion of “place of public assembly.”The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case, holding that new issues may only be properly added by amending the complaint, not through summary judgment motions. The Court determined that Criminal Law § 4-209(b)(1) authorizes charter counties to regulate firearms in limited contexts (with respect to minors, law enforcement, and within 100 yards of certain public places), and that this authority was not abrogated by other state preemption statutes. The Court found Montgomery County’s regulation valid for parks, places of worship, schools, libraries, courthouses, legislative assemblies, recreational and multipurpose exhibition facilities, and polling places, but invalid for hospitals, health centers, long-term care, childcare facilities, government buildings as broadly defined, and generalized gatherings. The Court also clarified the scope of local regulation regarding minors and found no unconstitutional taking occurred. The judgment of the Appellate Court was vacated and remanded with instructions for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Engage Armament v. Montgomery Cnty." on Justia Law

Miguel Angel Santana was charged with several offenses related to a 2016 murder. At his first trial in the Circuit Court for Charles County, a pretrial agreement excluded certain evidence about firearms, ammunition, and marijuana. The jury convicted him on two counts but hung on four others, resulting in a mistrial on those four counts. At the retrial on the remaining counts, a State witness referenced the excluded evidence during testimony, leading Santana’s counsel to move for a mistrial, which the court granted. Before a third trial could begin, Santana moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that Maryland common law should prevent retrial if the State’s reckless conduct caused the mistrial.The Circuit Court for Charles County denied Santana’s motion to dismiss. The court found that the State’s actions did not amount to recklessness, as the prosecutors had prepared the witness for his testimony and did not intend or expect him to reference the excluded evidence. The court concluded that the State's conduct, while unfortunate, was neither intentional nor reckless. Santana appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, holding that Maryland’s common law double jeopardy protections did not apply because no factual findings on the criminal charges had been made and, even if the protections did apply, the circuit court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case to consider whether Maryland’s common law double jeopardy prohibition bars retrial after a mistrial caused by reckless State conduct, and whether the State acted recklessly here. The court assumed, without deciding, that Maryland law could bar retrial for reckless conduct, but held that the circuit court’s finding that the State was not reckless was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court, permitting retrial to proceed. View "Santana v. State" on Justia Law

The Office of the Attorney General of Maryland initiated a criminal investigation into allegations of child sexual abuse and concealment by clergy and staff of the Archdiocese of Baltimore, based on a 2015 directive from the Governor authorizing the investigation and prosecution of “crimes of exploitation.” The Attorney General’s office issued grand jury subpoenas to the Archdiocese, leading to the production of voluminous records. No indictments were returned, but the Attorney General prepared a report naming over 150 individuals, including some accused of abuse and others alleged to have concealed abuse or failed to act. None of the individuals at issue, the Petitioners, were charged with crimes. The Attorney General sought court authorization to publicly disclose their identities, arguing that public accountability necessitated the release.The Circuit Court for Baltimore City found that the Attorney General had constitutional authority to conduct the investigation and prepare the report, and authorized disclosure of Petitioners’ identities, citing a particularized need for transparency and accountability. Petitioners appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in part, agreeing that the Attorney General had investigatory authority and could prepare a report, but held that the Circuit Court should have made individualized findings regarding the need to disclose each Petitioner’s identity, and remanded for further analysis.Upon further review, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed that the Governor’s directive was within constitutional bounds and that the Attorney General’s office had the authority to investigate and report on child sexual abuse within the Archdiocese. However, the Court held that the interest in public accountability does not create a particularized need sufficient to overcome the secrecy of grand jury materials as to uncharged individuals who object. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and directed the Circuit Court to deny the Attorney General’s motion to disclose Petitioners’ identities. View "In Re: Criminal Investn. No. CID 18-2673 Balt. City Circuit Court" on Justia Law

The case arose from a criminal prosecution in which a defendant was charged with murdering his wife, claiming self-defense. During pretrial proceedings, the lead prosecutor, the Anne Arundel County State’s Attorney, conducted witness interviews alone, including one with a witness who relayed that the defendant stated his wife had previously threatened him with a knife—a fact potentially relevant to the defense. The State’s Attorney did not initially disclose this information to defense counsel, resulting in a discovery dispute. At a subsequent hearing, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found a discovery violation and concluded that the State’s Attorney had made herself a likely necessary witness in the case by interviewing witnesses alone. The court disqualified her from acting as prosecutor and imposed a firewall order mandating that she have no further involvement in the case except as a witness, with very limited exceptions.The State appealed these interlocutory orders to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the disqualification order was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because determining whether the State’s Attorney was a necessary witness was not completely separate from the merits of the criminal case. The court did not separately address the firewall order.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland considered whether the disqualification and firewall orders were immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The Supreme Court held that the disqualification order was not immediately appealable because resolving whether the State’s Attorney was a necessary witness was not completely separate from the merits of the prosecution. However, the Supreme Court determined that the firewall order, which barred the State’s Attorney from participating in the case except as a witness, was immediately appealable as it raised important separation of powers concerns and was distinct from the merits. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the firewall order. View "State v. Houston" on Justia Law

Two individuals were separately stopped and searched by law enforcement officers in Maryland in January 2023, prior to the effective date of a new statute, Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) § 1-211. The stops and searches were based solely on the odor of cannabis. Contraband was discovered in both cases, and the individuals were charged with various offenses. Each moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the newly enacted statute, effective July 1, 2023, rendered evidence obtained solely on the basis of cannabis odor inadmissible, even though their searches had occurred before the law took effect.In both cases, the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County and the Circuit Court for Worcester County denied the motions to suppress, ruling that the statute did not apply retroactively because it was not in effect at the time of the searches. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed both decisions, reasoning that the statute created a new substantive right and remedy that only attached to searches occurring on or after its effective date. The Appellate Court relied on its prior decision in Kelly v. State and distinguished these cases from others involving procedural or remedial statutes.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgments of the Appellate Court. The Court held that CP § 1-211’s exclusionary remedy applies only to evidence discovered or obtained in violation of the statute, and no violation can occur before the statute’s effective date. The Court found the statute unambiguous, rejected arguments for retroactive application based on procedural or remedial theories, and emphasized the General Assembly’s clear intent for prospective application. Therefore, the exclusionary remedy in CP § 1-211(c) does not apply to pre-enactment cannabis-related stops or searches, and the evidence was properly admitted. View "Cutchember v. State" on Justia Law