Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

These two consolidated appeals involved two lawsuits, a derivative claim and a direct shareholder action, both arising from a series of stock transactions in two family corporations owned primarily by eight siblings. After the death of one of the sisters, the corporations attempted to repurchase her stock pursuant to the terms of a stock purchase agreement. The sister's estate refused. The corporations filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking enforcement of the agreement. Meanwhile, two siblings, aggrieved by an earlier stock transaction, filed a derivative action, alleging self-dealing and breach of fiduciary duty. The circuit court (1) granted summary judgment in favor of the corporations on the derivative action after deferring to the judgment of a special litigation committee (SLC); and (2) granted summary judgment to the corporation in the declaratory judgment proceeding. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's judgment in the derivative action, holding that the court made an inadequate inquiry into the SLC's independence and the reasonableness of its procedures; and (2) reversed in part the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action, holding that the circuit court erroneously applied res judicata to the issue. View "Boland v. Boland Trane Assocs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an unlicensed subcontractor, filed a complaint against Defendants, licensed contractors, alleging that it was entitled to a judgment in the amount that Defendants agreed to pay for home improvement work that Plaintiff performed as a subcontractor for Defendants. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that contracts made by unlicensed home improvement contractors or subcontractors were illegal. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated the complaint, holding that the Maryland Home Improvement Law, which regulates contracts between contractors and owners, did not bar Respondent from recovering on its subcontract with Petitioner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Maryland Home Improvement Law did not render unenforceable a contract between a home improvement general contractor and an unlicensed subcontractor. View "Stalker Bros. v. Alcoa Concrete Masonry, Inc. " on Justia Law

The Maryland State Retirement System (System) filed a claim against Milliman, an actuary, asserting that Milliman had understated the contributions required to fund three of the State's ten retirement and pension systems because of Milliman's misinterpretation of a particular data code. The Retirement System Procurement Officer determined that Milliman had failed to comply with its contractual duties and awarded damages to the System. On appeal, the State Board of Contract Appeals determined that the actuary had substantially breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the damages. The circuit court affirmed the Board's findings that Milliman breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the award of lost investment earnings but reversed the Board's award of amounts equaling lost contributions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, holding (1) Milliman was liable to the System for repeatedly misinterpreting a data code; (2) the System was not negligent in the development or transmission of data provided to Milliman and, therefore, contributory negligence did not bar the System's recovery; and (3) the circuit court erroneously reduced the Board's damage award representing lost contributions. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment of the circuit court and affirmed the Board's decision. View "Milliman, Inc. v. State Ret. & Pension Sys." on Justia Law

Respondent Annapolis Towne Centre (ATC), the owner and developer of a mixed-use development, entered into an agreement with petitioner Hovnanian Land Investment, a residential developer, under which ATC agreed to sell a portion of the property to Hovnanian for the construction of a residential tower. The contract required certain conditions to be met by ATC prior to the closing and contained a clause stating that any waiver of the contract had to be in writing. Before closing, Hovnanian terminated the agreement, alleging that ATC failed to meet a condition precedent. ATC sought a declaratory judgment, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether ATC had complied with the condition precedent. The circuit court granted ATC's motion for summary judgment on that issue, holding that Hovnanian waived the condition precedent. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that summary judgment was not appropriate because (1) a condition precedent may be waived by a party's conduct, despite a non-waiver clause, but whether Hovnanian's actions amounted to a waiver was a dispute of material fact; and (2) the question of whether ATC strictly fulfilled the condition also involved material questions of fact. Remanded. View "Hovnanian Land Inv. Group, L.L.C. v. Annapolis Towne Centre at Parole, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Bromberg Rosenthal filed a complaint against Coralie Kurstin in district court, seeking a judgment for the balance of fees owed by Kurstin under an employment agreement in which Kurstin hired Bromberg to represent her in her divorce. During pretrial skirmishing, Bromberg issued a deposition subpoena to Kurstin's present counsel. Kurstin's counsel filed a motion to quash the subpoena, asserting the attorney-client privilege, and also filed a motion for a protective order. The district court denied both motions and ruled that the attorney-client privilege had been waived. Kurstin appealed. The court of special appeals dismissed the appeal as premature, concluding that collateral order doctrine precluded the appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the intermediate appellate court correctly concluded that the circuit court's denial of the motion to quash was not immediately appealable because the issue (1) was inextricably intertwined with the merits of the action, and (2) will be reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. View "Kurstin v. Bromberg" on Justia Law

The Board of County Commissioners of Cecil County voted to grant a water services and wastewater franchise to two related companies, after which it approved an agreement providing for the sale and transfer to the companies of county-owned water and wastewater facilities. County residents filed petitions for judicial review of the decisions. The circuit court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment on the issue of its right to award the franchise agreements and ultimately concluded that the Board had a right to sell the county-owned property. The residents appealed, arguing that Md. Code Ann. art. 25, 8(a) prohibits the Board from conveying the property. At issue was whether Md. Code Ann. art. 25, 8(a) prohibited the Board from selling facilities that will continue to provide essential services to county citizens. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Board was not prohibited from entering into the asset purchase agreements at issue. View "Appleton Regional Cmty. Alliance v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Cecil County " on Justia Law

After lobbying for legislation authorizing collective bargaining for its members, the Maryland Transportation Authority Police Lodge #34 of the Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. (FOP) struck a written memorandum agreement with the Maryland Transportation Authority (MTA), in which the MTA agreed to fund a multi-million take-home vehicle (THV) program provided the bills were withdrawn and no collective bargaining legislation covering the MTA was passed that session. When a new governor took office, he declined to continue funding for the THV program. The FOP sued on theories of breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The circuit court granted MTA's motion to dismiss, finding that the agreement was unenforceable and violated the state's collective bargaining laws. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case with instructions to affirm the judgment of the circuit court, holding that because the legislature did not expressly authorize the MTA and its employees to bargain collectively at the time the agreement was executed, the agreement was unenforceable. View "Maryland Transp. Auth. v Maryland Transp. Auth. Police Lodge #34" on Justia Law

Claimant filed a claim against Government Insurance Company ("GEICO") for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage after sustaining serious injuries as a result of a car accident. At issue was whether the coverage provisions of the GEICO policy entitled claimant to underinsured motorist benefits under the policy. The court held that claimant was not entitled to uninsured/underinsured coverage where Exclusion number 4 in the GEICO insurance policy was authorized by section 19-509(f)(1) of the Insurance Article, Maryland Code, 1997, 2006 Repl.Vol., and was applicable to the facts of this case.

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners alleging that petitioners had breached their agreement to pay the "Advisory Fee" that respondent earned while acting as petitioners' broker in the sale of petitioners' real property. At issue was whether the seller of real property was entitled to refuse to pay an agreed upon fee to the broker who represented seller on the ground that the broker was a "dual agent." The court held that it was questionable whether there was any legally sufficient evidence of dual agency; and if there was any evidence, the jury was entitled to decide as a matter of fact that a dual agency did not exist. The court also held that there simply was no evidence of any other material fact that respondent had a duty to disclose but did not. Therefore, the court affirmed the jury award of damages to respondent.

Beka Industries, Inc. ("BEKA") sued the Board of Education of Worcester County ("County Board") alleging claims that arose from a written contract dispute between BEKA and the County Board when BEKA was dissatisfied with the methods and amounts of the County Board's payment for its work. The court considered several issues on appeal and held that a new trial was warranted where the County Board was precluded from presenting evidence on its recoupment claim and BEKA may have been awarded impermissible "delay damages" under the contract. The court also reversed the intermediate appellate court's holding that the County Board's governmental immunity was not waived unless and until BEKA proved that there was a funding mechanism to satisfy a judgment for money damages rendered against the County Board. Accordingly, court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the intermediate appellate court with direction to remand to the circuit court for a new trial.