Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

For some years, the Board of Education of Baltimore County belonged to a governmental group purchasing consortium, which competitively bid a roofing services contract on behalf of its members. The Board relied on that contact to fulfill its needs for roofing repair services. Appellant Building Materials Corporation of America, a nationwide manufacturer of roofing materials, questioned the Board's authority for that practice under the pertinent statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when viewed in the context of the entire education law and regulations promulgated under that law, the competitive bidding statute did not bar the Board from using its membership in an intergovernmental purchasing consortium for the procurement of roofing repair services. View "Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. v. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

This case involved a claim by a former professional football player (the athlete) for benefits under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act based on an injury during pre-game warm-up at the employer's stadium in Maryland. The employment agreement contained a forum selection clause providing, inter alia, that claims for workers' compensation benefits should be governed by Virginia law and that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission should have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve such claims. The Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission decided that it could properly exercise jurisdiction over the athlete's claim, that the athlete had sustained an accidental injury arising out of the course of his employment, and that the athlete's disability was causally related to his accidental injury. The circuit court upheld the decision. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the forum selection clause in the employment contract was ineffective to divest the Commission of the ability to exercise jurisdiction; and (2) injuries occurring while playing and practicing professional football are accidental injuries and thus compensable under the Act. View "Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa" on Justia Law

In the recent decision in Bates v. Cohn, the Court of Appeals reiterated that a borrower challenging a foreclosure action must ordinarily assert known and ripe defenses to the conduct of the foreclosure sale in advance of the sale. After the sale, the borrower is ordinarily limited to raising procedural irregulatories in the conduct of the sale, although the Court left open the possibility that a borrower could assert a post-sale exception that the deed of trust was itself the product of fraud. This case arose out of the foreclosure of a deed of trust for the residence of Darnella and Charles Thomas by Jeffrey Nadel and others. In apparent hope of fitting their post-sale exceptions within the question left open in Bates, the Thomases alleged certain defects in the chain of title of the note evidencing their debt and characterized them as a "fraud on the judicial system." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the alleged defects did not establish that the Thomases' deed of trust was the product of fraud. View "Thomas v. Nadel" on Justia Law

Dr. Shailendra Kumar sued Dr. Anand Dhanda, alleging breach of contract and breach of a covenant not to compete. The contract at issue provided for disputes to be initially addressed through mandatory, non-binding arbitration. Dhanda filed a motion to dismiss the action, asserting that the suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Kumar opposed dismissal, arguing that the complaint was timely because his cause of action had either not accrued or that limitations was tolled until the completion of arbitration. The trial court dismissed the action as time-barred, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while non-binding arbitration may have been a condition precedent to litigation, it neither affected the accrual of the underlying breach of contract claims, nor otherwise tolled the statute of limitations applicable to maintaining an action in court. View "Kumar v. Dhanda" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a pair of adult children, sued Griffith Energy Services, an energy company that spilled heating oil in Petitioners' parents' home, and its attorneys for fraud and negligent supervision. Petitioners' parents (Parents) had previously sued Griffith and won a judgment after a jury trial. The circuit court dismissed Petitioners' lawsuit, holding, inter alia, that Petitioners' claims were barred by res judicata. The court of special appeals affirmed, reaching only the res judicata issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners were in privity with Parents, and (2) thus, the intermediate appellate court did not err in holding that Petitioners' claim was barred by res judicata. View "Cochran v. Griffith Energy Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1999, the Baltimore City Council enacted an urban renewal plan (Plan) to renew a portion of Baltimore City. A five-block area located in the renewal area was the subject of protracted litigation between 120 West Fayette, LLLP and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. The current iteration of the litigation focused on a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the City and the Maryland Historical Trust relating to the treatment of historic properties in connection with the Plan. The MOA required the City to submit redevelopment plans to the Trust for approval. After the Trust's director provided conditional approval of a fifth set of plans 120 West Fayette (Appellant) filed a complaint seeking a declaration of rights interpreting the terms of the MOA. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that Appellant was neither a party to, nor an intended beneficiary of, the MOA, and therefore, Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant, at best an incidental beneficiary to the MOA, could not file a suit requesting declaratory judgment that interprets and enforces an agreement to which it had no part. View "120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Lynne Swartzbaugh purchased motor vehicle insurance with Encompass Insurance Company. The policy named Lynne, her husband, and their daughter Kelly (Petitioners) as drivers. Lynne executed a waiver of higher uninsured motorist (UM) coverage on the standard Maryland Insurance Administration form. Immediately beneath the signature line below the waiver appeared the legend: "Signature of First Named Insured." By its terms, consistent with Maryland law, the waiver remained in effect until withdrawn, and the waiver was never withdrawn. Later, Kelly was injured in an accident involving an under-insured driver. Kelly was unable to collect further damages from Encompass under that policy's UM coverage. Petitioners sought a declaration that the waiver was ineffective because Lynne was not in fact the "first named insured" on the policy. The circuit court ruled that the waiver signed by Lynne was valid and enforceable. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in the context of a motor vehicle insurance policy, the phrase "first named insured" refers to a person insured under the policy and specifically named in the policy who acts on behalf of the other insured parties and is designated as "first named insured" in the policy documents. View "Swartzbaugh v. Encompass Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the judicial sale of a condominium owned by Petitioner and conducted by two court-appointed trustees that were employed by a law firm (collectively, Respondents). Following the sale, Petitioner filed a complaint, alleging breach of fiduciary duty involving actual fraud and breach of fiduciary duty involving constructive fraud by the trustees and alleging vicarious liability by the law firm. The trial judge granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that Respondents were entitled to qualified judicial immunity for their actions in connection with the sale. The court of special appeals (1) reversed with regard to Petitioner's allegations of actual fraud, and (2) affirmed with regard to the other causes of action on grounds of qualified judicial immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Respondents were not entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and the concept of qualified public official immunity was inapplicable to the circumstances of this case. View "D'Aoust v. Diamond" on Justia Law

The claims in these consolidated cases were largely identical in that they shared similar allegations of violations of the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law (SMLL), the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (CPA), and common law breach of contract. Appellees in these cases were mortgage companies, who were assignees of the original lenders, and Appellants were individual borrowers. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissals of each of the cases by the circuit courts, holding (1) the SMLL does not restrict a lender to a single loan origination fee, as long as the aggregate fees charged and collected do not exceed the statutory maximum; (2) Appellees were not required by the SMLL to provide borrowers, who did not intend to use the proceeds of their secondary mortgage loans for commercial purposes, a disclosure form designed expressly to advise commercial borrowers only under the SMLL; and (3) certain Appellants failed to support sufficiently their allegations of breach of contract, CPA violations, and claims in accounting with specific facts. View "Polek v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank" on Justia Law

After Hospital declined to renew the privileges of Physician due to repeated complaints about Physician, Physician sued for damages. Hospital claimed immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA). The circuit court granted summary judgment to Hospital, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to answer whether in the context of a summary judgment proceeding, the presumption of HCQIA immunity is rebutted upon the showing of material facts in dispute regarding the physician's reporting of substandard medical care and attempts to improve the quality of the care in the hospital system. The Court affirmed, holding (1) evidence of retaliation will not prevent summary judgment on HCQIA immunity unless it can permit a rational trier of fact to conclude that (i) the defendant failed to comply with the standards for immunity set forth in 42 U.S.C. 11112(a), or (ii) the action was not a "professional review action" under 42 U.S.C. 11151(9); and (2) in this instance, Physician did not produce evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that Hospital failed to satisfy the standards for immunity set forth in HCQIA, and therefore, summary judgment was warranted. View "Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health Sys." on Justia Law