Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was terminated from her position as the Clerk-Treasurer of the Town of Hurlock two and one-half years after she entered into a written employment agreement with the Mayor-elect. Under the employment agreement, Petitioner was to serve a four-year term. Petitioner brought this action against Respondent, the Town, alleging breach of contract and seeking damages and other relief. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the four-year term of employment in the agreement was inconsistent with the Town Charter and therefore ineffective. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the language of the Town Charter means that an official like the Clerk-Treasurer is an at-will employee; and (2) the Mayor and Council of Hurlock lacked authority under the Town Charter to enter into an agreement conferring a fixed term of employment in this case. View "Clough v. Mayor & Council of Hurlock" on Justia Law

Community College of Baltimore County (CCBC) entered into an agreement with Patient First Corporation, a medical provider, under which student medical technicians gained experience doing blood draws at Patient First. In the agreement, CCBC agreed to indemnify Patient First for any liability that Patient First might occur, including attorneys’ fees, arising from a negligent act or omission of a student. As a result of an incident involving a failed blood draw by a student, Patient First was sued. The parties in the suit reached a settlement agreement. CCBC challenged its obligation to indemnify Patient First for the settlement payment and attorneys’ fees, asserting that the liability arose from the Patient First’s own negligence. The circuit court ruled that Patient First was entitled to indemnification. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that Patient First bore its burden of proving its entitlement to indemnification and that CCBC did not bear its burden of proving, as an affirmative defense, that Patient First was itself negligent and that the liability arose from that negligence; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the requested attorneys’ fee award was reasonable. Remanded. View "Bd. of Trs., Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore County v. Patient First Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners purchased and financed an automobile from Respondent. Petitioners averred that Respondent failed properly to disclose the vehicle’s history. At issue in this case was the extent to which multiple documents executed on the same day during the course of the purchase and financing could be read together as constituting the entire agreement between the parties. The issue arose in the context of whether Petitioners’ claims against Respondent were subject to a mandatory arbitration provision in the Buyer’s Order, which set forth the purchase price. A Retail Installment Sales Contract (RISC), which contained the financing terms of the purchase, did not include an agreement to arbitrate. The circuit court granted Respondent’s motion to compel arbitration, thus disagreeing with Petitioners that the language of the Buyer’s Order was superseded by the RISC. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, for the purposes of the instant case, the Buyer’s Order may be construed together with the RISC as evincing the entire agreement between the parties. View "Ford v. Antwerpen Motorcars Ltd." on Justia Law

Blackstone International, Ltd. was insured by Insurers for commercial general liability insurance. The policy included coverage for personal advertising injury liability. Blackstone was sued for breach of contract, among other causes of action, after disputes arose regarding a joint business venture to market and sell lighting products. Blackstone requested coverage and litigation defense under the personal and advertising injury provisions of the policy. Insurers filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a judgment that they had no duty to defend the claims because the complaint did not allege that Blackstone had engaged in advertising, that the plaintiff had suffered an advertising injury, or that there was any causal connection between the plaintiff’s claimed damages and any advertising conducted by Blackstone. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Insurers. The intermediate appellate court reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Insurer had no duty to defend Blackstone where Blackstone did not show an advertising injury suffered by the plaintiff. View "Md. Cas. Co. v. Blackwell Int'l Ltd." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute over ownership of parking spaces situated between The Falls Homeowners Association (“The Falls”) and Falls Garden Condominium Association (“Falls Garden”). The Falls and Falls Garden executed a letter of intent in settlement of litigation. After problems arose between the parties, The Falls filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement to implement the letter of intent. The circuit court judge granted The Falls’s motion. The court ordered The Falls to prepare a settlement agreement and a release of all claims and ordered Falls Garden to execute the settlement agreement. On appeal, Falls Garden argued that the Letter of Intent was not binding because the parties did not intend to be bound and because the letter did not contain all material terms. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded, holding (1) the letter of intent was an enforceable contract to which the parties intended to be bound; and (2) because the letter of intent was unambiguous and constituted an enforceable contract, the trial judge did not err in failing to hold a plenary hearing on the merits of the motion to enforce settlement agreement. View "Falls Garden Condo. Ass’n v. Falls Homeowners Ass’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a young lawyer associate, filed a complaint against Defendants, his former Virginia-based law firm employer and its principal, claiming a violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”) and seeking $1,974 in unpaid wages, treble damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. The trial judge concluded that the employment contract was a “Virginia” contract, and therefore, Plaintiff could not bring a suit in Maryland under the MWPCL. The circuit court reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s MWPCL claim. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mere fact that the parties in this case entered into a “Virginia” employment contract did not prohibit maintenance of Plaintiff’s claims under the MWPCL. Remanded. View "Cunningham v. Feinberg" on Justia Law

After Respondent’s employment with a corporation was terminated, she sued the corporation and her sibling business partner, alleging that she was terminated without cause in violation of her employment agreement. The written agreement contained a for-cause provision but no definite term of employment. The trial judge found a breach of the employment agreement, concluding that the agreement transformed what had previously been an “at-will relationship” to a “lifetime contract,” and therefore, Respondent could only be terminated for cause, death, or disability. The court of special appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the contract was a for-cause contract of continuous duration rather than a lifetime contract, obviating the need for “special consideration.” The corporation appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the employment agreement was not at-will employment nor an oral lifetime employment contract that has been consistently rejected by Maryland courts, but this type of contract was “continuous for-cause” employment. View "Spacesaver Sys., Inc. v. Adam" on Justia Law

Buyer purchased property located within a homeowners association. Buyer, who already owned other lots within the association, later canceled the contract with Sellers because he had not received mandatory disclosures from Sellers pursuant to the Maryland Homeowners Association Act, which requires that notice be given to "a member of the public who intends to occupy or rent the lot for residential purposes." Sellers sued Buyer for breach of contract, contending that Buyer was not a "member of the public" under the statute because Buyer, as a property owner in the association, already had access to the homeowners association policies and thus did not require disclosures making him aware of the relevant applicable rules and policies. The circuit court granted Buyer's motion to dismiss, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Buyer was a "member of the public" for purposes of the statute; but (2) the circuit court erred in granting Buyer's motion to dismiss because Sellers presented a justiciable issue of equitable estoppel based on Buyer's affirmative refusal to receive the requirement documents and information proffered to him by Sellers.View "Lipitz v. Hurwitz" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Montgomery County Council adopted Resolution No. 17-149 (Resolution), which “changed” three contract provisions for fiscal year 2012 in the pre-existing collectively-bargained agreement (CBA) with members of the County’s police force. Specifically, the Resolution changed certain employment benefits of the CBA. The Fraternal Order of the Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35 filed suit against the County and the Council, challenging the legality of the Council’s actions in adopting the Resolution and the actions of the Council and the County in implementing the changes in the resolution. The circuit court declared that the Council’s actions were permissible under the Police Labor Relations Act (PLRA), the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the CBA. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its authority under the PLRA in deciding not to fund fully - and thereby, to change - certain benefits in the CBA, where the changes were fiscal in nature and the County Executive and the FOP did not submit a re-negotiated agreement to the Council. View "Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the State Center Project, a $1.5 billion redevelopment project intended to revitalize property owned by the State in Baltimore. In 2005, the State issued a public request for qualifications to solicit a master developer for the project. The State Center, LLC was chosen as the master developer. The Maryland Department of General Services (“DGS”), the Maryland Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) and the State Center, LLC negotiated for the Project, entering a series of agreements between 2007 and 2010 to complete the Project in a timely manner. In 2010, Plaintiffs, property owners in downtown Baltimore and taxpayers, filed suit against the DGS, MDOT, and the State Center and its subsidiaries, seeking a declaratory judgment that the formative contracts for the Project were void and seeking an injunction to halt the Project. The trial court voided the formative contracts, concluding that they violated the State Procurement Law. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded with directions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, holding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of laches due to an unreasonable delay in bringing their claims, causing prejudice to the defendants. View "State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law