Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal concerned a dispute over ownership of parking spaces situated between The Falls Homeowners Association (“The Falls”) and Falls Garden Condominium Association (“Falls Garden”). The Falls and Falls Garden executed a letter of intent in settlement of litigation. After problems arose between the parties, The Falls filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement to implement the letter of intent. The circuit court judge granted The Falls’s motion. The court ordered The Falls to prepare a settlement agreement and a release of all claims and ordered Falls Garden to execute the settlement agreement. On appeal, Falls Garden argued that the Letter of Intent was not binding because the parties did not intend to be bound and because the letter did not contain all material terms. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded, holding (1) the letter of intent was an enforceable contract to which the parties intended to be bound; and (2) because the letter of intent was unambiguous and constituted an enforceable contract, the trial judge did not err in failing to hold a plenary hearing on the merits of the motion to enforce settlement agreement. View "Falls Garden Condo. Ass’n v. Falls Homeowners Ass’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a young lawyer associate, filed a complaint against Defendants, his former Virginia-based law firm employer and its principal, claiming a violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”) and seeking $1,974 in unpaid wages, treble damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. The trial judge concluded that the employment contract was a “Virginia” contract, and therefore, Plaintiff could not bring a suit in Maryland under the MWPCL. The circuit court reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s MWPCL claim. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mere fact that the parties in this case entered into a “Virginia” employment contract did not prohibit maintenance of Plaintiff’s claims under the MWPCL. Remanded. View "Cunningham v. Feinberg" on Justia Law

After Respondent’s employment with a corporation was terminated, she sued the corporation and her sibling business partner, alleging that she was terminated without cause in violation of her employment agreement. The written agreement contained a for-cause provision but no definite term of employment. The trial judge found a breach of the employment agreement, concluding that the agreement transformed what had previously been an “at-will relationship” to a “lifetime contract,” and therefore, Respondent could only be terminated for cause, death, or disability. The court of special appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the contract was a for-cause contract of continuous duration rather than a lifetime contract, obviating the need for “special consideration.” The corporation appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the employment agreement was not at-will employment nor an oral lifetime employment contract that has been consistently rejected by Maryland courts, but this type of contract was “continuous for-cause” employment. View "Spacesaver Sys., Inc. v. Adam" on Justia Law

Buyer purchased property located within a homeowners association. Buyer, who already owned other lots within the association, later canceled the contract with Sellers because he had not received mandatory disclosures from Sellers pursuant to the Maryland Homeowners Association Act, which requires that notice be given to "a member of the public who intends to occupy or rent the lot for residential purposes." Sellers sued Buyer for breach of contract, contending that Buyer was not a "member of the public" under the statute because Buyer, as a property owner in the association, already had access to the homeowners association policies and thus did not require disclosures making him aware of the relevant applicable rules and policies. The circuit court granted Buyer's motion to dismiss, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Buyer was a "member of the public" for purposes of the statute; but (2) the circuit court erred in granting Buyer's motion to dismiss because Sellers presented a justiciable issue of equitable estoppel based on Buyer's affirmative refusal to receive the requirement documents and information proffered to him by Sellers.View "Lipitz v. Hurwitz" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Montgomery County Council adopted Resolution No. 17-149 (Resolution), which “changed” three contract provisions for fiscal year 2012 in the pre-existing collectively-bargained agreement (CBA) with members of the County’s police force. Specifically, the Resolution changed certain employment benefits of the CBA. The Fraternal Order of the Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35 filed suit against the County and the Council, challenging the legality of the Council’s actions in adopting the Resolution and the actions of the Council and the County in implementing the changes in the resolution. The circuit court declared that the Council’s actions were permissible under the Police Labor Relations Act (PLRA), the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the CBA. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its authority under the PLRA in deciding not to fund fully - and thereby, to change - certain benefits in the CBA, where the changes were fiscal in nature and the County Executive and the FOP did not submit a re-negotiated agreement to the Council. View "Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the State Center Project, a $1.5 billion redevelopment project intended to revitalize property owned by the State in Baltimore. In 2005, the State issued a public request for qualifications to solicit a master developer for the project. The State Center, LLC was chosen as the master developer. The Maryland Department of General Services (“DGS”), the Maryland Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) and the State Center, LLC negotiated for the Project, entering a series of agreements between 2007 and 2010 to complete the Project in a timely manner. In 2010, Plaintiffs, property owners in downtown Baltimore and taxpayers, filed suit against the DGS, MDOT, and the State Center and its subsidiaries, seeking a declaratory judgment that the formative contracts for the Project were void and seeking an injunction to halt the Project. The trial court voided the formative contracts, concluding that they violated the State Procurement Law. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded with directions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, holding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of laches due to an unreasonable delay in bringing their claims, causing prejudice to the defendants. View "State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Ember Buckley was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Harvey Betts when the vehicle was involved in an accident. Buckley, who sustained injuries in the accident, settled with GEICO, Betts’ insurer, for the full policy limits and signed a full release of all claims against Betts and a hold harmless agreement in favor of GEICO. Buckley then attempted to recover for the remainder of her outstanding medical bills under her uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) policy with The Brethren Mutual Insurance Company (“Brethren”), which denied coverage. Buckley filed suit, alleging breach of contract and seeking the policy limit in compensatory damages. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Brethren, concluding that the release was a general release, and thus released all entities from future claims, regardless of whether they were a party to the release. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the general release did not prejudice Buckley’s claim against Brethren. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the broad, all-inclusive language of the release must be read with an eye toward the parties’ overall intent; and (2) that the court of special appeals correctly held that the release did not waive Buckley’s UM claim against Brethren. View "Brethren Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buckley" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute over the paving of a parking lot located on park land leased to a restaurant. A formal agreement between the restaurant and a community organization restricted the paving of the property, and the restriction was incorporated in administrative zoning orders. Still, the lot was paved. Baltimore County was, in this case, landlord of the property, code enforcer, and final administrative adjudicator of disputes arising under local land use laws. As administrative adjudicator, the County forbade the paving. As landlord, the County directed its tenant, Oregon, LLC, to pave the lot. As code enforcer, it refrained from taking action in response to the apparent violation of a final administrative order issued by the Board of Appeals. Plaintiffs brought suit against the County and Oregon seeking declaratory and mandamus relief. The circuit court ruled against Plaintiffs. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals largely affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) Plaintiffs need not initiate an administrative proceeding to pursue enforcement of the Board’s orders; (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment with respect to the mandamus counts of the complaint; and (3) the circuit court has authority to issue a declaratory judgment as to whether the Board’s orders were violated. Remanded. View "Falls Road Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Baltimore County" on Justia Law

A holding company, whose subsidiaries owned power-generating facilities, filed a complaint against multiple insurers regarding the terms of liability policies the company purchased in the 1970s and 1980s. At issue in this case was whether New York or Pennsylvania law applied to the interpretation of the policies. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the holding company, determining that Pennsylvania law governed the interpretation of the policies. One of the insurers, TIG Insurance Company (“TIG”), appealed. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the insurance contracts were made in Pennsylvania, and therefore, Pennsylvania law applied to the policies at issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed and adopted the opinion of the court of special appeals with the exception of the court’s discussion addressing TIG’s argument that the place of countersigning a policy determines the applicable state law because that argument was not preserved for appeal. View "TIG Ins. Co. v. Monongahela Power Co." on Justia Law

Wife and Husband married in 2003. In 2005 and 2008, Wife and Husband executed marital settlement agreements. In 2009, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, alleging that the separation agreements were voidable at his demand. In support of his demand, Husband argued that the attorney, who earlier assisted the Wife in obtaining permanent resident status and in the United States and largely served as scrivener to the settlement agreements, violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to obtain Husband’s informed consent to her representation of Wife in connection with the two settlement agreements. The circuit court held that the separation agreements were not voidable and entered a judgment of absolute divorce in which the separation agreements were incorporated. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that sufficient grounds to render the agreements voidable were not present in this case. View "Li v. Lee" on Justia Law