Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and related charges. Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police during an interrogation at the police department. The circuit court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress statements Defendant made to a police officer before the officer advised Defendant of his Miranda rights. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the suppression court had incorrectly determined that, from the outset of the interrogation, Defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda for the entirety of the interrogation that preceded Miranda warnings, and therefore, the circuit court properly suppressed Defendant’s statements made to the police. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Petitioner appealed, inter alia, the denial of his motion to suppress the statements he made to police officers during his interrogation, arguing that they were obtained in violation of his Miranda right to counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge violated Maryland Rule 4-326(D)(2) by communicating an ex parte answer to a juror’s question without disclosing it to the defendant or any lawyer, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Petitioner did not invoke his Miranda right to counsel by demanding to see a lawyer from his holding cell before being interrogated, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress the statements he made to detectives during his interrogation. View "Gupta v. State" on Justia Law

Ian Schlakman and Frank Richardson (Appellees) filed suit challenging the decisions of the Baltimore City Board of Elections to certify Dan Sparaco as an eligible candidate and the State Board of Elections to include him as a candidate for the District Twelve seat on the 2016 General Election ballot. The court held that the temporary restraining order the Circuit Court granted was in error because Appellees’ state court challenges to the Boards’ actions were untimely and are barred by laches; Appellees have not explained this delay, or explained why they did not institute a parallel action in the Circuit Court within the statutorily-mandated time limits; where the federal court dismissed Appellees’ action because Appellee’s counsel was not admitted to practice before that court, the savings provision under Maryland Rule 2-101(b) did not apply to toll Appellees’ obligation to file in the appropriate circuit court, as instructed by ELEC. LAW 12-202(b)(1); and Appellees have not demonstrated any basis for relief on the merits under any theory of action or avenue for relief. The court explained that the plain language of ELEC. LAW 5-703(d)(1) does not require candidates to submit the required filings until the first Monday in August preceding the General Election. In this case, the City Board’s certification of Mr. Sparaco as a qualified candidate, and the State Board’s listing of his candidacy, complied with the provisions of the Election Law Article. Accordingly, the court vacated the temporary restraining order and remanded. View "Lamone v. Schlakman" on Justia Law

Through Chapter 35 of the 2016 Laws of Maryland, the General Assembly amended Md. Code Ann., Educ. 3-110(b), which governs the School Board Nominating Commission of Anne Arundel County, to eliminate the ability of the Governor to appoint members to the Nominating Commission. The amendment changed the Nominating Commission to a body that is comprised of members who are appointed by various specific entities other than the Governor. Four of the five gubernatorial appointees filed suit contending that the General Assembly unconstitutionally removed them from their positions as members of the Nominating Commission. The circuit court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction against implementation and enforcement of Chapter 35, concluding that Chapter 35 violates Article II, Section 15 of the Maryland Constitution and Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in issuing the preliminary injunction because Chapter 35 is not unconstitutional but, rather, restructures or reconstitutes the Nominating Commission. View "State v. Falcon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and other offenses. Defendant appealed his conviction of attempted second-degree murder, challenging the trial judge’s finding that defense counsel’s explanations for striking jurors were a pretext for racial discrimination. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the trial judge’s finding that defense counsel’s peremptory challenges were a pretext for racial discrimination was clearly erroneous; and (2) the evidence was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt specific intent for the crime of attempted second-degree murder. Remanded for a new trial as to all remaining counts except for the count charging attempted second-degree murder. View "Spencer v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant filed a pro se petition for postconviction DNA testing of a broom and dust pan pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. (CP) 8-201. The postconviction court dismissed the petition, concluding that Appellant did not have standing to file a petition under CP 8-201(b) because he was not convicted of a crime of violence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a defendant convicted of conspiracy to commit murder is not eligible to file a petition for postconviction DNA testing under CP 8-201(b); and (2) the postconviction DNA testing statute does not violate due process or equal protection rights under the United States Constitution or the Maryland Declaration of Rights. View "Washington v. State" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) granted Petitioner’s application for vanity license plates bearing the word “MIERDA.” The MVA later rescinded the plates according to a State regulation authorizing the recall of vanity plates containing profanities or obscenities, as “mierda” translates into English as “shit.” The Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), the circuit court, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the characters on a vanity license plate represent private speech in a nonpublic forum, which requires government speech restrictions thereof to be reasonable and viewpoint neutral; (2) Maryland’s regulation prohibiting profanities, epithets, or obscenities satisfies this standard; and (3) the MVA acted reasonably, viewpoint-neutrally, in accordance with the regulation, and based on substantial evidence in acting to recall Petitioner’s vanity plates. View "Mitchell v. Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration" on Justia Law

The Maryland Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari in this case to decide whether the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (“UPPA”) granted the Court of Special Appeals the authority to reopen a postconviction proceeding if doing so was “in the interests of justice.” The Supreme Court "easily" concluded that the UPPA did not. However, the Court of Special Appeals was statutorily authorized to review a circuit court's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, and could remand the matter back to the circuit court with instruction to award appropriate relief if the circuit court abused that discretion. In 1978, Respondent James Leslie Adams-Bey, Jr., was convicted by a jury of first degree rape and related offenses, for which he was sentenced to life plus ten years of incarceration. Respondent petitioned unsuccessfully for postconviction relief in 2010. In 2012, Respondent moved pro se to reopen his postconviction proceedings on the ground that jurors at his criminal trial were given advisory-only instructions in violation of his constitutional rights to due process. Respondent argued that those instructions were unconstitutional because the jury was not instructed to follow the court’s explanation of the law and the court did not inform the jury of the binding nature of its instructions on the State’s burden of proof or the presumption of innocence. The circuit court denied Respondent’s motion without a hearing. On appeal of that denial, Respondent argued the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his motion to reopen. The Court of Special Appeals granted Respondent's application, and addressed the merits of his appeal, and reversed the circuit court's denial. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Special Appeals, finding it correctly concluded that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Respondent's motion to reopen. View "Maryland v. Adams-Bey" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained after a Terry frisk because the law enforcement officers did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the facts created reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed and dangerous and that he had committed or was planning to commit a crime. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk Defendant, and therefore, the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the evidence was correctly suppressed. View "Sellman v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for several drug offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by police officers from his person, alleging that his detention in handcuffs while in a car that he had been driving was searched constituted an unlawful arrest and that the evidence obtained by the officers were the fruits of that arrest. The motion to suppress was denied. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the police officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant and ask him to leave the vehicle based upon their belief that Defendant may have been armed and dangerous; and (2) the use of handcuffs per se does not ordinarily transform a Terry stop into an arrest, and the continued use of handcuffs by the police officers in this case constituted a Terry stop because of an ongoing concern for officer safety. View "Chase v. State" on Justia Law