Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was found guilty of armed robbery and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony and sentenced to concurrent sentences of 25 years' imprisonment without the possibility of parole for armed robbery, and 5 years without the possibility of parole for the handgun violation. Petitioner sought review of the sentence by a three-judge panel pursuant to Maryland Code 8-102, 8-105 of the Criminal Procedure Article and the panel unanimously increased the sentence originally imposed to 45 years of executed time. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgments of conviction and sentenced petitioner to a total of 40 years of executed time. At issue was what was the "sentence previously imposed" when the judge's sentence was increased by a three-judge sentence review. The court held that, in that instance, the sentence imposed by the three-judge panel was the "sentence previously imposed" for purposes of Maryland Code 12-702(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals and petitioner's 40-year sentence.

Plaintiff, born in September 1983, filed a five-count complaint against defendant, her grandfather, in September 2008 alleging that he raped her on two separate occasions, the first of which occurred when she was either six or seven-years-old and the second incident when she was eight-years-old. At issue was whether section 5-117 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article could be properly applied retroactively to permit a claim that arose before the effective date of section 5-117 and which was barred by the prior statute of limitations. The court held that, assuming arguendo application of section 5-117 to plaintiff's claims represented a retrospective application of the statute, section 5-117 was a procedural and remedial statute, and, accordingly, it could be given such retrospective application to claims that were not-yet barred by the previously-applicable three-year statute of limitations period as of the extended period's effective date on October 1st, 2003.

Petitioners attempted to vacate their escape convictions where they were sentenced to terms of imprisonment with a deferred, or "springing," start date and the sentencing judge informed them that if they stayed out of further legal trouble during that time, they could return to court before the start date and have their sentences vacated; where petitioners did not return to court and later failed to report on the respective start dates; and where petitioners were charged and pled guilty to second degree escape. At issue was whether a conviction and/or sentence for second degree escape was legally valid if it was predicated on the failure to obey a court order to report to a place of confinement where that court order was legally invalid. The court held that petitioner's failure to report for imprisonment was sufficient to support their escape convictions. The court also held that the subsequent ruling in Montgomery v. State allowed petitioners to challenge, in the appropriate venue, the validity of their "springing" sentences but did not, however, allow them to engage in self-help. The court further held that Maryland law had clearly foreclosed, as a defense to escape, a challenge to the validity of the underlying conviction or sentence.

As a result of an agreement reached during a post-conviction proceeding in the circuit court, the post-conviction court granted defendant a "re-sentencing" hearing before the judge who had imposed the sentence from which defendant was seeking post-conviction relief. At the request of the post-conviction court, defendant's counsel submitted a proposed order that the post-conviction court modified. At the re-sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge rejected defendant's request to impose the agreed upon sentence. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The court held that if a plea agreement reached during a post-conviction proceeding resulted in relief in the form of defendant's right to a belated motion for modification of sentence hearing before the judge who imposed the sentences that defendant was serving, the sentencing judge was not "bound" by that agreement. The court also held that when a post-conviction court granted defendant only the right to file a belated motion for modification of sentence, unless the judge who imposed the sentence was unavailable to decide the motion, the motion for modification must be presented to the judge who imposed the sentence. The court further held that if a sentencing judge breached a plea agreement by imposing a sentence that exceeded the sentence for which the defendant bargained and upon which defendant relied in pleading guilty, that sentence was "illegal," and could be corrected "at any time" pursuant to Md. Rule 4-345(a). Accordingly the court held that the sentence at defendant's re-sentencing hearing was not "illegal" and affirmed defendant's sentence.

Petitioner filed for a writ of certiorari where she was convicted of first degree murder and related offenses, including use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. At issue was whether the suppression court correctly concluded that petitioner was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when she made her first two statements to police and, regardless, to the the extent any error occurred, was it harmless in light of petitioner's later statements made after she was advised of and waived her rights under Miranda? Also at issue was whether the court should refuse to disturb the decision to decline review for plain error of the trial court's answers to two notes from the jury. The court held that petitioner was not entitled to suppression of the statement that she made to a police officer at the scene of the shooting. The court also held that the state should have been prohibited from introducing into evidence during its case-in-chief the statements petitioner subsequently gave to two other police officers where the statements were the product of a custodial interrogation that did not comply with Miranda. Accordingly, the second issue was moot.

Petitioner filed a writ of certiorari where he was convicted of second degree murder of an intended victim, second degree murder of an unintended victim, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime against the intended victim, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime against the unintended victim. At issue was whether the doctrine of transferred intent applied where both the intended victim and the unintended victim were killed. Also at issue was whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on a lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter as to the unintended victim where the court instructed the jury on second degree depraved heart murder. The court held that the doctrine of transferred intent was fully applicable where both the intended victim and unintended victim were killed and that the court's conclusion was entirely consistent with the holding in Poe v. State. Accordingly, the court also held that petitioner was not entitled to jury instructions on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter as to the unintended victim.

Petitioner appealed convictions related to a shooting death where he contended that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting several printed pages from petitioner's girlfriend's MySpace profile. The state did not question the girlfriend about the pages allegedly printed from her MySpace account but, instead, attempted to authenticate the pages as belonging to her through testimony of the lead investigator in the case. At issue was whether the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the MySpace evidence and whether electronically stored information printed from a social networking website could be properly authenticated. The court held that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the MySpace evidence where the picture of the girlfriend, coupled with her birth date and location, were not sufficient "distinctive characteristics" on a MySpace profile to authenticate its printout given the prospect that someone other than she could have created the site and posted the comment at issue. The court also held that possible avenues to properly authenticate a profile or posting printed from a social networking site might include asking the purported creator if she indeed created the profile and if she added the posting in question, searching the computer of the person who allegedly created the profile and examine the computer's internet history and hard drive, and obtaining information directly from the social networking site.

The State of Maryland challenged the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals' decision to vacate respondent's guilty pleas where the voir dire did not show that the plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered into. At issue was whether the line of cases beginning with State v. Priet, involving Maryland Rule 4-242(c) and knowing and voluntary guilty pleas, was affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Bradshaw v. Stumpf. The court held that a trial court, in ensuring that a guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and entered intelligently, relying on nothing more than a presumption that "in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of... what he is being asked to admit" ran contrary to Rule 4-242's requirement that there be an adequate examination "on the record in open court." Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment to vacate respondent's guilty plea where he provided no evidence tending to show that his plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.

Respondent Emanuel Tejada was convicted by a jury on two counts of attempted murder, armed robbery, and related offenses. Respondent and a co-defendant were scheduled to stand trial in Montgomery County. The trial was expected to last seven days. The jury selection process began with 60 prospective jurors. Midway through the exercise of peremptory challenges, the court noted that it would ârun out of jurorsâ before the process was complete. Jury selection could not continue because the jury commissioner could not procure additional jurors to keep to the trial schedule. Defense counsel suggested the parties start over with the selection process the next day when more jurors would be available to them. While the court and counsel discussed what to do about jury selection, co-defendantâs counsel (not Respondentâs counsel) raised an objection on the selection process. Eventually a jury was empanelled, and it convicted Respondent of the charges against him. Respondent appealed the judgments of conviction, contending that the bifurcated jury selection process denied him the right to an informed and comparative rejection of prospective jurors. The State opted not to challenge the trial courtâs judgment, but argued that Respondent failed to preserve his objection for appellate review. The Court of Special Appeals held that Respondent did preserve his objection to the jury selection process, and that the trial court erred in bifurcating the jury selection process. It vacated the convictions and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court did not err in finding the issue preserved for review, and its decision granting Respondent a new trial.

Petitioner Dwayne Peaks was convicted of multiple offenses following a jury trial in circuit court. Petitioner argued that the trial judge did not make an adequate determination of Petitionerâs competency to stand trial under state law. Defense counsel first raised the issue of Petitionerâs competency following his arraignment. The court then ordered an evaluation. The court found that Petitioner was competent to stand trial, but elected to reconsider the matter. A second evaluation was never completed because the case was transferred to another trial judge. Neither party raised the competency issue with the new judge. After advising Petitioner of his rights and plea negotiations, voir dire began. During this process, Petitioner requested to discharge his attorney because he believed the attorney was not adequately representing him. Petitioner sought to continue pro se. The trial judge allowed Petitioner to discharge his attorney. Petitioner became unruly during the remainder of voir dire, and was escorted from the courtroom several times. Voir dire was concluded without Petitioner or defense counsel. The court proceeded with trial, and eventually convicted Petitioner in absentia. Petitioner appealed his conviction through counsel from the Office of the Public Defender, alleging the trial court erred by not performing the second competency evaluation. The Supreme Court held that in light of the circumstances, even though Petitionerâs trial had already commenced, the trial judge did not violate state law by not conducting the second evaluation. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.