Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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After three separate trials for several criminal offenses, Appellant Benoit Tshiwala was sentenced to an aggregate of seventy years in prison. Appellant subsequently filed an application for review of his sentences, and a three-judge review panel reduced the total period of imprisonment to thirty-nine years. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which was denied. Appellant then instituted the present action by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Md. R. Crim. P. 4-345(a), alleging that the three judges who denied reconsideration were not authorized to rule on the motion. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Tshiwala's claim was not cognizable under a motion to correct an illegal sentence because Tshiwala's claim did not involve an "illegal sentence" within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a). View "Tshiwala v. State" on Justia Law

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In 2007, the house of delegates enacted legislation that proposed a constitutional amendment that would legalize video slot machine gambling in Maryland. During that same session, the state senate initiated companion legislation, an appropriations bill, contingent on the proposed constitutional amendment being ratified by the electorate, pursuant to which the gambling revenue would be appropriated and distributed. Each piece of legislation was passed by the general assembly and signed into law by the governor. Petitioners mounted an attack on both the contingent legislation and the constitutional amendment, arguing (1) the contingent legislation unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the voters, and (2) the ballot question language regarding the constitutional amendment was misleading and deficient. The Supreme Court addressed the first of Petitioners' contentions in Smigiel v. Franchot, in which it held that the legislation was constitutional. In this case, the Court (1) affirmed its holding in Smigiel; and (2) held that, regarding Petitioners' second contention, the ballot question language was sufficient, as it accurately conveyed the effect of the proposed amendment, and was neither misleading nor deficient. View "Stop Slots MD v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, each of whom was arrested for a crime that qualified as a serious offense and requested an attorney to represent him or her at the initial appearance, sought a declaration that they and the class of indigent persons they represented had the right, under the federal and state constitutions and the Public Defender Act, to be represented by the public defender at bail hearings, which were conducted as part of the initial appearance before commissioners at the central booking jail. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, entered a declaratory judgment, and denied Plaintiffs' request for an injunction to enforce the rights declared. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the bail hearing that occurs at the initial appearance before a Commissioner is a stage of the criminal proceeding under the Act; and (2) consequently, if a defendant qualifies for public defender representation, a bail hearing may not occur at the initial appearance unless the defendant has been afforded appointed counsel or waived the right to counsel. View "DeWolfe v. Richmond" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Rodney Moore was convicted of illegal possession of a regulated firearm and sentenced to five years' imprisonment without possibility of parole. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed, holding that the proof of operability of the firearm, as it is defined in Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 5-101(h), is not a prerequisite to a conviction of illegal possession of a regulated firearm under Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 5-133(c), which prohibits a person convicted of a crime of violence or offenses related to the sale and distribution of controlled dangerous substances from possessing a regulated firearm. View "Moore v. State" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Olusegun Ogundipe was charged with multiple crimes stemming from his involvement in an incident in which one man was killed, one man was seriously injured, and one man was assaulted. Following a jury trial in the circuit court, Petitioner was convicted as charged. The court of special appeals affirmed the jury's verdict. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to answer whether there is a duty of the trial court to disclose a signed verdict sheet to a defendant or his counsel before the jury is discharged. The Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in failing to disclose the contents of the verdict sheet used by the jury in its deliberations before dismissing the jury because the jury verdict sheet is not a communication within the meaning of Md. R. Crim. P. 4-326(d), which requires the court to notify and disclose to counsel any jury communication received before responding to the communication. View "Ogundipe v. State" on Justia Law

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Employee filed a complaint against Employer, claiming (1) racial and sex discrimination after Employer required her to undergo an independent medical examination for a gynecological condition, and (2) retaliatory termination of her employment. A jury held for Employee on the issues of sex discrimination and retaliatory termination. Employee was awarded damages and attorney's fees. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Employee's claims were preempted by the Labor-Management Relations Act, and even if they were not, Employee failed to adduce sufficient evidence of her claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the court of special appeals' erred in determining that Employee's retaliation claim was preempted where it was independent of a collective-bargaining agreement; (2) the court of special appeals erred in its analysis of the comparator evidence in the context of Employee's claim of disparate treatment; (3) Employee presented legally sufficient evidence that she was subject to retaliatory treatment. View "Taylor v. Giant of Maryland, LLC" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Gary Smith was convicted at a jury trial of depraved heart second-degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. The principle issue at trial was whether the decedent was murdered or committed suicide. Smith appealed, contending, inter alia, that the trial court erroneously excluded certain defense evidence relating to the decedent's state of mind. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the excluded evidence was too remote and not reliable. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting prosecution evidence of the decedent's 'normal' state of mind but refusing to admit equally relevant defense evidence of the decedent's 'depressed' state of mind. Remanded for a new trial. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Gerald Titus was convicted by a jury of obstructing and hindering a police officer in the performance of his duty, driving under the influence of alcohol per se, driving while impaired by alcohol, and giving a false or fictitious name to a uniformed police officer. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed Petitioner's conviction for obstructing and hindering, holding that the evidence presented by the State at trial with regard to this offense was insufficient to prove the necessary elements beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no evidence at trial to show how Petitioner's conduct actually obstructed or hindered a law enforcement officer in performing his duties. View "Titus v. State" on Justia Law

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Defendant Mario Gutierrez was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence following the shooting death of the victim. At trial, witnesses testified that the incident was related to Defendant's affiliation with a street gang. The trial court permitted testimony of a gang expert who generally described the violent customs of the gang. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) expert testimony about the history, hierarchy, and common practices of a street gang is permissible where fact evidence establishes that the crime charged was gang-related and the probative value of the testimony is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice to the defendant; and (2) the circuit court in this case did not abuse its discretion in permitting the gang expert to testify because ample fact evidence established a connection between the victim's shooting death and the street gang, and although the unfair prejudice of one of expert's statements outweighed its probative value, the error was harmless. View "Gutierrez v. State" on Justia Law

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Petitioner was convicted by a jury of third-degree sexual assault and second-degree sexual assault. The victim was not referred for a sexual assault forensics exam. Before closing arguments, the trial judge gave a scientific evidence instruction instructing the jury that there was no legal requirement that the State utilize any specific investigative technique or scientific test to prove its case. Petitioner challenged the jury instruction on appeal. The court of special appeals affirmed. After the Court of Appeals granted certiorari in this case, it decided Atkins v. State, which stated that the most important consideration in evaluating whether a trial judge abused her discretion in giving a scientific evidence jury instruction was whether the instruction would run afoul of the prohibition against relieving the State of its burden where the the instruction's relation to the reasonable doubt standard was unclear. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on Atkins, no duty instructions are not per se improper, but (2) in the context of the present case, the trial court abused its discretion in giving such a jury instruction. Remanded for a new trial. View "Stabb v. State" on Justia Law