Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
Kulbicki v. State
In 1995, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. In 2006, the Supreme Court determined in Clemons v. State that, under the Frye-Reed standard, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA) evidence was not generally accepted by the scientific community. Within a few years of his conviction, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, arguing that the admission of “unreliable” CBLA evidence during his trial in the form of testimony from Agent Ernest Peele of the Federal Bureau of Investigation constituted a due process violation and that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance for failing adequately to cross-examine Agent Peele. The circuit judge denied relief, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed Petitioner’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that Petitioner’s attorneys rendered ineffective assistance when they failed to investigate a report Peele co-authored in 1991 that presaged the flaws in CBLA evidence and to challenge the State’s scientific evidence on cross-examination at trial. View "Kulbicki v. State" on Justia Law
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. DCW Dutchship
In 2000, DCW Dutchship Island, LLC (DCW), a corporation wholly owned by Daryl Wagner, purchased the Little Island in the Magothy River. At that time, the Island measured approximately 1.92 acres in area and was improved by a single-family house and related structures built in the 1920s. Wagner demolished the house and built a new one. In November 2004, the County authorities discovered the construction activities on the Island and notified DCW of numerous violations. In December, DCW sought variances from the unobserved requirements of the Critical Area Law for each of the structures and improvements on the Island. DCW sought also an amendment to the critical area buffer map, which prohibited most development activity within 100 feet of the shoreline. A County Administrative Hearing Officer heard the evidence for and against the requests for variances. The Magothy River Association (MRA) appeared at the variance hearings to oppose DCW’s requests. The Hearing Officer granted some of the variances. Wagner administratively appealed the denials, and the MRA, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation (CBF), and the Maryland Critical Area Commission for the Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays appealed the decision to grant the variances, all to the County Board of Appeals. At the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals (the “Board”) hearing, Wagner moved to dismiss MRA and CBF as parties to the administrative proceedings. The Board ultimately concluded that CBF did not have standing to appeal the granted variances because it did not participate in the hearing before the Administrative Hearing Officer (“AHO”). After 24 evenings of hearings on the subject, the Board revised the decision of the AHO to include certain conditions on the variances.The Maryland Critical Area Commission for the Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays (the Commission), MRA, CBF, and Wagner all sought judicial review of the Board’s decision at the Circuit Court. In addition, CBF filed a Motion for Summary Judgment limited to the issue of whether the Board improperly excluded CBF from the variance portion of the proceedings. The court denied all motions relevant to the variance matter. The Circuit Court then affirmed the decision of the Board. The Commission and CBF appealed the Circuit Court’s decision to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the Critical Area Act applied to the variance proceedings, that the Board erred in refusing to allow CBF to participate as a party in the administrative process, and that the Board did not base its decision on substantial evidence in the record. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the Circuit Court. MRA and CBF then petitioned the Court of Appeals for certiorari. The issues this case presented for the Court's review were: (1) whether CBF had standing to participate in the variance proceedings before the Board of Appeals on the grounds that MRA, which advocated the same position, had standing; (2) whether AACC 3-1-104(a) violated the Express Powers Act, thus making the Board’s denial of standing to CBF on the basis of it erroneous; (3) whether the Board of Appeals violated its own rules when it held that CBF could not cross-examine witnesses, resulting in CBF being denied due process; and (4) whether the Board of Appeals erred in granting Wagner after-the-fact variances. The Court answered the first three questions in the negative and the fourth in the affirmative, but only in part.
View "Chesapeake Bay Found. v. DCW Dutchship" on Justia Law
Dehn Motor Sales v. Schultz
Plaintiff, the owner and operator of a used car business, filed an action against two Baltimore City police officers, claiming that the two officers, along with several other officers, had entered private property without a warrant or court order and towed Plaintiff’s vehicles. Plaintiff alleged that the warrantless towing of the vehicles without a prior hearing violated the Maryland Declaration of Rights as well as 42 U.S.C. 1983. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the State constitutional claims were barred by the Local Government Tort Claims Act and that, in regard to the federal constitutional claims, the two officers had qualified immunity because they were acting pursuant to various provisions of the Baltimore City Code. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s state law claims were barred by the Local Government Tort Claims Act and that the two officers were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims. View "Dehn Motor Sales v. Schultz" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Injury Law
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe
In Doe I, the Supreme Court held that the retroactive application of the provisions in the Maryland sex offender registration statute that the Court deemed punitive violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the Maryland Declaration of Rights. At issue in this appeal was whether sex offenders’ federal obligations require them independently to register and whether circuit courts have the authority to order the State to remove sex offender registration information from federal databases. The Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding the registration obligations placed directly on individuals by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, circuit courts have the authority to compel the State to remove sex offender registration information from Maryland’s sex offender registry when the inclusion of such information is unconstitutional as established in Doe I. View "Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Makowski v. Mayor & City of Baltimore
Appellant owned property located within the heart of a planned development. The City of Baltimore sought to condemn the property. When the City and Appellant were unable to agree upon a price to be paid for the property, the City filed a petition for condemnation. Prior to trial, the City filed a petition for immediate possession and title, alleging that immediate possession of the property was necessary. Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that Appellant was a “hold-out,” which justified a “quick-take” condemnation of the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the facts of this case justified a “quick-take” condemnation action. View "Makowski v. Mayor & City of Baltimore" on Justia Law
Burris v. State
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. According to the State's theory of the case, Defendant was a hit man for the Black Guerilla Family gang (BGF) and was ordered by his gang boss to kill the victim. During trial, several witnesses testified that the murder was related to Defendant's affiliation with the BGF. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a "gang expert" to opine as to the nature of gangs in general, the BGF specifically, and the import of Defendant's tattoos towards establishing that he was a member of a gang, as the probative value of the expert's testimony was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and this error was not harmless.View "Burris v. State" on Justia Law
Nalls v. State
Defendants in this case were charged with criminal offenses, and both defendants waived their right to a jury trial. After bench trials, Defendants were found guilty and sentenced. Each defendant appealed, challenging the trial court’s acceptance of his jury trial waiver. Relevant to this consolidated appeal, the courts of special appeals held that the trial courts sufficiently satisfied the announcement requirement under Md. Rule 4-246(b). The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) so long as a trial judge determines that a jury trial waiver is made both “knowingly” and “voluntarily,” or uses synonyms that represent the same concepts, the court will have complied fully with Rule 4-246(b); (2) in both cases under review, the trial judges failed to comply with Rule 4-246(b); and (3) to the extent that Valonis v. State could be read to hold that a trial judge’s alleged noncompliance with Rule 4-246(b) is reviewable by the appellate courts despite the failure to object at trial, that interpretation is disavowed. Remanded for new trials. View "Nalls v. State" on Justia Law
Morgan v. State
Petitioner was charged with two counts each of possession of cocaine and distribution of cocaine. On the day of trial, Petitioner waived his right to a jury. Petitioner then pled not guilty as to one of the distribution charges. After a plea colloquy, the trial court found the plea to be “knowing and voluntary.” Petitioner was found guilty of distribution of cocaine after a bench trial. Petitioner appealed, contesting the validity of the court’s acceptance of his jury trial waiver. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s announcement after the plea colloquy that Petitioner’s actions were “knowing and voluntary” was sufficient to establish that the judge analyzed the disposition and appearance of Petitioner in order to determine Petitioner’s actual understanding and voluntariness for both the jury waiver and the plea. View "Morgan v. State" on Justia Law
Szwed v. State
After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of first, third, and fourth degree burglary, theft under $1000, and malicious destruction of property having a value of less than $500. Defendant appealed, challenging the trial judge’s acceptance of his jury trial waiver. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial judge sufficiently satisfied the announcement requirement under Md. Rule 4-246(b). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) because the trial judge’s announcement did not state that Defendant’s jury trial waiver was both knowing and voluntary, the judge did not comply with Rule 4-246(b); and (2) the appropriate sanction for the judge’s noncompliance with Rule 4-246 was reversal. View "Szwed v. State" on Justia Law
Fuster v. State
After a jury trial, Petitioner, a dentist, was convicted of various sexual crimes against a minor patient. In the circuit court, while self-represented, Petitioner filed a petition for DNA testing, requesting that the clothes the victim wore on the day of her rape be tested. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed, arguing that, under Maryland Rule 4-707(b), he was entitled to appointed counsel at the hearing on the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Rule 4-707(b) does not entitle an indigent petitioner to be appointed counsel for the purposes of a petition under Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 8-201; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in not considering whether to appoint counsel for Defendant for purposes of the petition under section 8-201; and (3) the circuit court applied the correct standard in ruling on the petition under section 8-201. View "Fuster v. State" on Justia Law