Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A clinical review panel authorized the forced medication of Petitioner, a resident of a facility operated by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. An administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed. Petitioner sought judicial review, arguing that, on its face, Md. Code Ann. Health-Gen. (HG) 10-708(g) violates the Maryland Declaration of Rights by permitting forced medication without a showing that an individual is dangerous to himself or others. The circuit court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) HG 10-708(g) is not unconstitutional on its face; but (2) the authorization for involuntary medication may only be constitutionally carried out when an overriding justification exists. View "Allmond v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law

In 2010, Respondent, a citizen of Ecuador, pled not guilty on an agreed statement of facts and was found guilty of second-degree child abuse. In 2013, Respondent filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise him regarding the immigration consequences he could face as a result of conviction. The coram nobis court denied the petition. The Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that Respondent established that trial counsel did not provide him with the correct “available advice” about the risk of deportation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that trial counsel did not perform in a constitutionally deficient manner in advising Respondent as to the immigration consequences of a conviction for second-degree child abuse. View "State v. Sanmartin Prado" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of neglect of a minor. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty days’ incarceration. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address the questions of whether Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 3-602.1, the criminal neglect of a minor statute, was unconstitutionally vague and whether the evidence was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for criminal child neglect. Remanded with directions to reverse the judgment of the circuit court. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

The Advice of Rights form assists law enforcement officers with making the advisements that are required by Md. Code, Transp. 16-205.1,2, (the implied consent, administrative per se law), which provides a basis for the automatic suspension of the licenses of drivers who refuse to submit to testing for alcohol and drugs. Seenath, a holder of a commercial driver’s license, argued that the Advice form violated due process under the U.S. Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights because it does not advise that a holder of a commercial driver’s license who drives a non-commercial motor vehicle and fails an alcohol concentration test is ineligible for a “restrictive license,” which allows a driver to drive only for certain purposes, for example, in the course of employment. The Motor Vehicle Administration asked the Maryland Court of Appeal: “Does the standard Advice of Rights form (DR-15) provide the necessary information to a driver who holds a commercial driver’s license of the consequences of submitting to a test of blood alcohol content if the driver’s results are 0.08 or more?” That court responded “yes,” and held that the form is not misleading as to the eligibility for a restrictive license of a holder of a commercial driver’s license and comports with due process. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seenath" on Justia Law

Cambridge Police Officer Mothersell stopped petitioner at 1:00 a.m. after observing him speeding and failing to stop at a stop sign. Mothersell – the only witness at the suppression hearing – said that, when he approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he detected a minor odor of alcohol coming from petitioner’s breath and person, even though petitioner was several feet away, in the driver’s seat. Mothersell observed that petitioner’s speech was slurred and hard to understand and that his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Petitioner said that he had been at the Point Break bar. Mothersell had petitioner exit the car so he could perform field sobriety tests, which petitioner did not complete successfully. Petitioner was placed under arrest. A backup officer arrived. Mothersell placed petitioner in the rear seat of his squad car to advise him of his rights, while the backup officer searched petitioner's car and found the cocaine inside the front seat center armrest. Mothersell said that the sole purpose for the search was to locate any “other alcohol, open containers, anything pertaining to the DUI arrest.” The court denied a motion to suppress; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the ensuing conviction. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. In this case there was an articulable basis for suspicion: the arresting officer’s prior experiences of finding open containers inside the passenger compartment. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

On April 12, 2015, Freddie Gray suffered an injury while in police custody; one week later, he died from those injuries. The state charged six Baltimore police officers in connection with Gray’s death. Officer Porter’s trial ended in a mistrial in December 2015. The state has indicated it will retry him and wants to compel him, before his retrial, to provide immunized testimony against the remaining officers. In two cases the trial court granted the motion to compel; in three cases it denied the motion. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the state’s compelling Officer Porter to testify in the trials of his fellow officers, under the grant of use and derivative use immunity, does not violate Porter’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment or the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The trial court lacks the discretion to deny a properly pled motion to compel immunized testimony. Denial of such a motion constitutes a final judgment from which the state can appeal immediately. Porter was the proper party to the appeal because he, not the defendants in the underlying trials, is the party interested in the subject matter of the motion to compel immunized testimony. View "State v. Rice, Nero, Miller; White & Goodson" on Justia Law

Maryland Underground Damage Prevention Authority cited Reliable Contracting Company for violating Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Cos. 12-101, under which advance notice must be given to the one-call system of certain types of excavation, and imposed a civil monetary penalty. Reliable Contracting petitioned for judicial review, asserting that the Authority’s enabling statute conferred judicial power on a non-judicial body in violation of separation of powers principles. Reliable Contracting also contended that the statute failed to provide adequate guidance to the Authority for the assessment of such penalties. The circuit court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded, holding (1) the Authority is an administrative agency in the executive branch of State government that exercises quasi-judicial powers subject to judicial review, and therefore, its enabling law is not contrary to the State Constitution’s Judicial Vesting Clause or Separation of Powers Clause; and (2) because the Authority is an administrative agency, Md. Code Ann. State Gov't 10-1001 provides guidelines for the exercise of its discretion in assessing civil penalties. View "Reliable Contracting Co. v. Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Auth." on Justia Law

The complaint in this case was brought both individually and as a class action. Plaintiffs, a police union and others, asserted that Montgomery County, a charter county, was not authorized to use its fiscal and human resources to urge approval of a law enacted by the County Council that limited bargaining rights and that had been petitioned to referendum. The circuit court concluded that the government speech doctrine does not constitute an affirmative authority for government to advocate and spend money on political campaigns. The Court of Special Appeals, however, concluded that the County had inherent power to use properly appropriated funds for a governmental purpose and that advocacy on the non-partisan ballot measure was a governmental purpose. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that a charter county is authorized to use its resources to encourage the electorate of the County to support or opposed a measure that may have a significant impact on the operations of the County government. View "Fraternal Order of Police v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

After a joint jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of second degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. The court of special appeals affirmed. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the prosecutor’s response to an allegation of racial and gender discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory challenge did not satisfy the requirement of Batson v. Kentucky that the State provide a specific explanation for each challenged strike which is racially, and with respect to gender, neutral. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecutor’s explanation for striking the juror at issue, in addition to lacking the requisite specificity, violated Batson because the explanation was neither race- nor gender-neutral. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ray-Simmons v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner operated a lake-front recreational campground on her property in Caroline County. The lake was contaminated allegedly by run-off from failed septic systems serving homes and businesses in the Town of Goldsboro. Unable to operate the campground because of the pollution to the lake, Petitioner lost the property through foreclosure. Petitioner filed a complaint for Caroline County against the State and several of its entities, alleging inverse condemnation against all Respondents and trespass against the Town. The circuit court dismissed the complaint as to all Respondents. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded, concluding that the court of special appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of Petitioner’s causes of action for negligence, trespass, and inverse condemnation on the grounds of limitations. On remand, the court of special appeals concluded that the circuit court properly dismissed the State and its agencies but erred in dismissing the three claims against the Town. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that Petitioner adequately alleged a facial claim for inverse condemnation against all Respondents and that a claim for inverse condemnation is not covered by the notice provisions of either the Local Government Tort Claims Act or the Maryland Tort Claims Act. View "Litz v. Dep’t of Env’t" on Justia Law