Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of transporting a handgun in a motor vehicle. A police officer found the handgun in a vehicle he suspected Petitioner had been using a short time earlier for "hacking," which is the provision of taxi services without a license. The police officer located the vehicle by pressing a car remote he had seized, along with a set of car keys, while frisking Petitioner. Before trial, Petitioner moved to suppress the car keys and remote on the ground that the officer seized those items from Petitioner's pants pocket by exceeding the proper scope of a lawful Terry frisk. Petitioner then argued the handgun must be suppressed as the tainted fruit of the earlier seizure of the keys and remote. The circuit court denied Petitioner's motion to suppress the physical evidence. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the officer violated Minnesota v. Dickerson by seizing the keys and car remote without the incriminating character of those items being "immediately apparent." The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that, by application of the plain feel doctrine, the officer lawfully seized the keys and remote he touched while frisking Petitioner, and therefore, the seizure of the items in dispute was lawful. View "McCracken v. State" on Justia Law

Here the trial judge denied a defense motion for judgment of acquittal on three charges against Defendant. The district court then terminated the prosecution of those charges for a purely procedural reason - non-compliance with the rule on service of process - that the court made clear was unrelated to guilt or innocence. The court, however, recorded its action on the docket sheet as "not guilty," a label that denoted an acquittal. This case raised the question whether the protection against double jeopardy precluded the State from pursuing an appeal of that decision. The circuit court held that, in these circumstances, the trial court's action was tantamount to a preliminary motion to dismiss and that the State could therefore appeal the trial court's decision concerning service of process. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a mis-labeled dismissal of charges for a purely procedural reason unrelated to guilt or innocence does not trigger the protection against double jeopardy. View "Kendall v. State" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial, Respondent was convicted of theft for cashing a counterfeit check and not returning the money in violation of Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 7-104(d). Respondent appealed the conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction because the State did not prove that she obtained control over the proceeds of the check knowing the money was delivered by mistake. The court of special appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 7-104(d) applies to someone who obtains property knowing that the property is lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake and has a concurrent, or later formed, intent to steal it; (2) the statute, however, does not apply to someone who obtains property not knowing at that time that the property is lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered; and (3) therefore, the requirements of section 7-104(d) are not met when there is no evidence upon which the factfinder reasonably could find, or when, as here, the judge at a bench trial expressly finds that the State failed to prove the defendant knew at the time she obtained the property that it had been delivered under a mistake. View "State v. Weems" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with one count of sexually abusing a minor, two counts of second degree rape, and six counts of second degree sexual offense. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress statements he had made to police, arguing that he had not been given Miranda warnings at the time he arrived at the police station. The circuit court agreed and suppressed the statements. The court of special appeals reversed, determining that Petitioner was not in custody at the time he gave the statements at issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a belief held by a suspect that police may have probable cause to arrest him or her is not sufficient to render the individual in custody for Miranda purposes; and (2) the motion to suppress Petitioner's statements should have been denied because, given the totality of the circumstances, Petitioner was not in custody at the time he made the statements. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

A stray bullet, fired at a fleeing drug buyer, killed an innocent bystander. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second-degree felony murder, distribution of marijuana, and related offenses in connection with the death of that bystander and the failed drug transaction that preceded it. The court of special appeals affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court of special appeals did not err in (1) determining that the trial judge's error in admitting hearsay evidence that Petitioner admitted committing the shooting was harmless; (2) adopting the res gestae theory of second-degree felony murder in affirming that conviction; and (3) declining to exercise plain error review of a jury instruction. View "Yates v. State" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Petitioner of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. The court of special appeals affirmed, reasoning that a witness's prior consistent statements are admissible even if the witness had multiple motives to fabricate, so long as the witness made the statements before any one of the motivates to fabricate. Alternatively, the court held that the witness's prior consistent statements were admissible as rehabilitative evidence under Maryland Rule 5-616(c). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prior consistent statements were not admissible under Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b) because they were made after the declarant had an expressed or implied motive to fabricate the statements, and the alleged motives were presented as such at trial before the trial judge made a determination as to the statements' admissibility; and (2) the prior consistent statements were inadmissible as hearsay and were neither relevant nor admissible under Rule 5-616(c) to rehabilitate a witness. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent was convicted by a jury of second-degree depraved heart murder. Respondent appealed his conviction to the court of special appeals, where he argued, inter alia, that the trial court's failure to disclose to him a communication between a juror and the judge's secretary violated Maryland Rule 4-326(d), requiring reversal of his conviction. The intermediate appellate court agreed and reversed the conviction, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error when it failed to disclose, in accordance with Rule 4-326(d), the communication, and in remanding the case for a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court's failure to disclose the subject communication to counsel was error, and because it prejudiced Respondent, this error required reversal of Respondent's conviction. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

Petitioner was tried before a jury in the circuit court and convicted of four counts of attempted armed robbery, four counts of conspiracy to commit those offenses, and related crimes. The court of special appeals concluded that the four conspiracy convictions should merge, leaving but one such conviction, and rejected Petitioner's remaining contentions, holding (1) the instructions satisfied the constitutional requirement that the jury be advised of the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged crimes, and (2) fundamental fairness did not require merger of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. Petitioner sought review of the latter two holdings of the court of special appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing its jury instructions; and (2) because the convictions targeted two different crimes, fundamental fairness did not require merger of Petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery with his attempted armed robbery convictions. View "Carroll v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of distributing and possessing a controlled dangerous substance. The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel sued Petitioner during the representation for unpaid legal fees. The postconviction court granted Petitioner a new trial, reasoning that counsel had a conflict of interest in representing Petitioner. The court of appeals reversed after applying the general test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. At issue on appeal was whether the exception to Strickland's general rule applied in this case. The exception, set forth in Cuyler v. Sullivan, states that the defendant is excused from proving the prejudice prong of the Strickland test upon a showing that counsel was burdened by an "actual conflict of interest." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this case entailed a conflict of interest governed by the Sullivan rubric; and (2) Petitioner was entitled under the Sullivan rule to the benefit of the presumption of prejudice only if he could show the conflict of interest was "actual" in the sense that it had an adverse effect upon counsel's performance. Remanded. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

After having been convicted on an agreed-upon statement of the facts of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun illegally and of being in possession of a handgun after conviction of a disqualifying offense, Defendant appealed. Before any action was taken by the court of special appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the use by police of a Taser that fired two metal darts in the back of Defendant affected a Terry stop or Defendant's arrest. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the use of a Taser in this case converted what otherwise may have been a Terry stop into a de facto arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes, and there did not exist sufficient probable cause to arrest Defendant; and (2) Defendant's statement to the police that he had a gun in his pocket and the gun recovered from him should have been suppressed. Remanded for a new trial. View "Reid v. State" on Justia Law