Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In cases consolidated for this appeal, defendants were found guilty but not criminally responsible at the time of the commission of the offense and were committed to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. The court granted conditional releases on various occasions but each conditional release was subsequently revoked, resulting in recommitment to DHMH for treatment. The Maryland Court of Appeal held that the Circuit Court erred in determining that the statutory scheme, Criminal Procedure Article 3-114, for granting or revocation of the conditional release of a committed person violated the separation of powers provision found in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court also erred in revoking defendant’s conditional release and ordering his continued commitment for institutional inpatient care and treatment after the ALJ had found that defendant was eligible for conditional release and had recommended the same. The court held that under CP 3-114 the substantial evidence standard applies to a circuit court’s review of an ALJ’s findings of facts and recommendations. View "Stoddard v. State" on Justia Law

The Fangmans sought to represent a class of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 individuals who, from 2009 to 2014, retained Genuine Title for settlement and title services and utilized various lenders for the purchase and/or refinancing of their residences, allegedly as a result of referrals from the lenders. All of the lenders are servicers of federally related mortgage loans. The complaint alleges an illegal kickback scheme and that “sham companies” that were created by Genuine Title to conceal the kickbacks, which were not disclosed on the HUD-1 form. After dismissing most of the federal claims, the federal court certified to the Maryland Court of Appeals the question of law: Does Md. Code , Real Prop. [(1974, 2015 Repl. Vol.) 14-127 imply a private right of action?” The statute prohibits certain consideration in real estate transactions. That court responded “no” and held that RP 14-127 does not contain an express or implied private right of action, as neither its plain language, legislative history, nor legislative purpose demonstrates any intent on the General Assembly’s part to create a private right of action. View "Fangman v. Genuine Title, LLC" on Justia Law

The Consumer Protection Division of Maryland’s Office of the Attorney General (CPD) concluded that Petitioner and his companies engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The CPD issued sanctions, imposed civil penalties, and assessed costs. Thereafter, the Maryland State Board of Plumbing (the Board) opened a complaint against Petitioner alleging that Petitioner had violated the Maryland Plumbing act (MPA). The Board’s case largely consisted of the CPD’s findings and conclusions. The Board, by application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, adopted the findings of fact made by the CPD and concluded that Petitioner violated the MPA. The Board revoked Petitioner’s master plumber license and imposed a civil penalty. The circuit court ruled that the Board properly invoked collateral estoppel in adopting the CPD’s findings of fact. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel is permissible in this State and can be invoked to grant preclusive effect to an administrative order; and (2) Petitioner’s double jeopardy protections were not violated when the Board and the CPD both fined him for the same conduct. View "Garrity v. State Bd. of Plumbing" on Justia Law

A Guy Named Moe, LLC (Moe), a foreign limited liability company doing business in Maryland, and Chipotle Mexican Grill of Colorado, LLC both operate a chain of restaurants. In 2012, Chipotle applied for a special exception to build a restaurant approximately 425 feet from Moe’s Southwest Grill. The City of Annapolis’s Board of Appeals unanimously approved Chipotle’s request. Thereafter, Moe filed a petition for judicial review. The circuit court dismissed Moe’s petition, finding that Moe lacked standing because it was not a taxpayer under Md. Code Ann. Land Use 4-401(a). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the petition was void ab initio because, at the time it was filed, Moe’s had lost its right to do business in Maryland because of its failure to register; and (2) Moe was not "a person aggrieved" for standing purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Moe can Maintain its suit; but (2) Moe was not aggrieved for standing purposes. View "Guy Named Moe, LLC v. Chipotle Mexican Grill of Colorado, LLC" on Justia Law

While living in Maryland, Petitioner opened a personal line of credit and a credit card account with Respondent. Respondent later filed two complaints against Petitioner in a Maryland district court, one for the outstanding balance on the credit card account and the other for the amount owed on the line of credit. At the time of the filings, Petitioner was living and working in Texas. Respondent was awarded default judgments. Respondent subsequently secured two writs of garnishment in the same actions from the district court. The writs were served on the resident agent of Petitioner’s employer. Petitioner moved to quash the writs, arguing that his wages earned solely for work he performed in Texas were not subject to garnishment in Maryland. The district court denied the motions to quash. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court in its continuing and ancillary jurisdiction properly ordered Petitioner’s wages earned in Texas to be subject to garnishment served upon Petitioner’s employer because of the employer’s continuous and systematic business in Maryland. View "Mensah v. MCT Fed. Credit Union" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit against Respondents in the circuit court, alleging tort and contract claims. Petitioner served the opposing parties with its complaint along with a completed Case Information Report (CIR). Petitioner checked the “yes” in the Jury Demand section of the CIR but filed no other pleadings or papers in the case asserting the right to a trial by jury. Defendants moved to confirm a bench trial, arguing that the manner in which the alleged jury demand had been elected by reference was procedurally defective. The motions judge granted the motion, concluding that a completed CIR is neither a “pleading” nor separate “paper” within the meaning of Maryland Rule 2-325(a), and therefore, Petitioner’s right to trial by jury had been waived because Petitioner did not comply with the Rule. The case proceeded to a bench trial, and a final judgment was entered in favor of Respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a CIR, whether served or unserved, does not constitute a separate “paper” within the meaning of Rule 2-325, and therefore, Petitioner’s failure to comply with the Rule resulted in a waiver of the right to a jury trial. View "Lisy Corp. v. McCormick & Co." on Justia Law

Maryland Rule 2-325 provides that a party’s failure to demand a jury trial within fifteen days after service of the last pleading directed to the issue constitutes a waiver of the party's right to a jury trial. If a party files an amended complaint asserting a new substantive issue and demanding a jury trial, the new claim may revive the previously waived jury trial. In this case, Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging two counts (Counts I and II). Plaintiff failed to timely demand a jury trial. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint reasserting Counts I and II and adding a third (Count III). Included with his amended complaint was a jury demand. Counts II and III were subsequently dismissed for failure to state a claim. The circuit court then struck the jury demand. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to a remand for a jury trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s amended complaint, in which he timely demanded a jury trial, added only one new count that was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and that count was an insufficient basis to revive the previously waived jury trial. View "Scarfield v. Muntjan" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs (Plaintiffs) asserted claims against one defendant, and one plaintiff asserted a claim against a second defendant. The circuit court awarded summary judgment for the first defendant against all Plaintiffs, but the decision did not resolve the claim against the co-defendant. Over one year later, the claim as to the co-defendant was voluntarily dismissed by way of a stipulation of dismissal. Plaintiffs subsequently sought to appeal the adverse summary judgment ruling. At issue in this case was whether the stipulation of dismissal satisfied the separate document requirement of Maryland Rule 2-601. Under that rule, the date on which the separate document is docketed triggers the thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal under Maryland Rule 8-202(a). The court of special appeals concluded that the appeal was untimely. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the stipulation of dismissal did satisfy the requirements of Rule 2-601 for a separate document and therefore did not trigger the thirty-day clock for filing a notice of appeal as to the summary judgment ruling; and (2) Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal was timely under Rule 8-602(d). View "Hiob v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case concerned a request for certain public records for specific nutrient management plans (NMP) of various private farming operations. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. (WKA) submitted the requests, without success, to the Maryland Department of Agriculture (MDA) pursuant to the Maryland Public Information Act (PIA). Other parties became involved in the ensuing litigation, including the Maryland Farm Bureau, Inc. (MFB). In 2009, the circuit court issued an order (2009 Order) in which it granted the MDA’s cross-motion for summary judgment and denied MFB’s motion for summary judgment. No further litigation activity was reflected on the docket. In 2010, the MDA received another PIA request regarding specific NMP information, this time from a co-plaintiff in the WKA action. In the resulting litigation, the circuit court issued an order (2011 Order) granting MFB’s motion for clarification and declaring how the 2010 PIA request was controlled by the 2009 decision. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the 2011 Order, like the 2009 Order, was not a final judgment, as it did not resolve all the claims before the trial court, and none of the immediate appealability exceptions to the requirement of a final judgment were applicable. View "Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agriculture" on Justia Law

In 2009, Trans Healthcare, Inc. (THI) filed a petition requesting that an individual and his firm be appointed as receiver over THI and forty-three related entities. THI’s petition was granted. Approximately eighteen months after the appointment, the receiver requested that a substitute receiver be appointed. The motion was granted. Almost six months later, Francina Spivery-Jones, a creditor, filed a motion to vacate the receivership, challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. The circuit court denied the motion. Spivery-Jones appealed. The court of special appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the order denying the motion to vacate the receivership was not a final judgment, nor was it appealable under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 12-303 or under the collateral order doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Spivery-Jones had no right of appeal pursuant to section 12-303(3)(iv) or the collateral order doctrine. View "Spivery-Jones v. Trans Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law