Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Citizens of a town submitted a document to the town's Board of Commissioners, seeking a referendum on a zoning ordinance that reclassified certain properties. The document contained 1,051 signatures and requested the reversal of the zoning changes. However, it did not reference the specific ordinance or request a referendum vote. The Commissioners determined that the document did not meet the requirements of the town's charter for a valid petition for referendum.The Circuit Court for Harford County reviewed the case and ruled that the Commissioners' determination was invalid. The court found that the Commissioners should have submitted the document to the Board of Election Judges for verification of signatures before making any determination on its validity. The court also ruled that the Commissioners' action by verbal motion was insufficient and that they should have acted by ordinance or resolution.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the Commissioners correctly determined that the document did not meet the charter's requirements for a valid petition for referendum. The court found that the charter did not require the Commissioners to submit the document to the Board of Election Judges for signature verification before making a threshold determination of its validity. The court also held that the Commissioners were authorized to make their determination by verbal motion, as memorialized in the meeting minutes.The Supreme Court of Maryland vacated the Circuit Court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with its opinion. The court concluded that the citizens were not entitled to a writ of mandamus or permanent injunctive relief. View "Town of Bel Air v. Bodt" on Justia Law

A group of citizens in the Town of Bel Air, Maryland, submitted a document to the town's Board of Commissioners, purporting to be a petition for a referendum on a comprehensive rezoning ordinance. The document, however, did not meet the requirements of the town's charter for such a petition. The Board of Commissioners determined that the document was invalid and did not send it to the Board of Election Judges for verification of signatures. The citizens filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Harford County, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board of Commissioners' determination was invalid and an order directing the town to verify the signatures on the document. The circuit court ruled in favor of the citizens, declaring the Board of Commissioners' determination invalid and ordering the town to verify the signatures.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the Board of Commissioners correctly determined that the document did not meet the requirements of the town's charter to be considered a valid petition for a referendum. The court also held that the Board of Commissioners was not required to send the document to the Board of Election Judges for verification of signatures before making this determination. The court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with its opinion. View "Town of Bel Air v. Bodt" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between a homeowner and a citizens association over a parcel of undeveloped land, which was divided into two sections by a stone wall. The homeowner claimed adverse possession over the entire parcel. The homeowner moved for summary judgment on the claim to the smaller section, which the circuit court granted. However, a different judge presided over the bench trial on the homeowner’s claim to the larger section. When the homeowner finished his case-in-chief, the citizens association moved for judgment. The trial court granted the citizens association’s motion and entered judgment for it on the homeowner’s claims, including the claim to the smaller section that had been resolved in the homeowner’s favor on summary judgment.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s disposition of the homeowner’s claims to both the smaller and larger sections. The Supreme Court of Maryland granted the homeowner’s petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by implicitly vacating the summary judgment entered in the homeowner’s favor on his claim to the smaller section and then entering judgment for the citizens association on that claim. The court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Riley v. Venice Beach Citizens Ass'n" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between a homeowner and a citizens association over a parcel of undeveloped land. The parcel was divided into two sections by a stone wall. The homeowner claimed adverse possession over the entire parcel, but in an amended complaint, treated the two sections as distinct parcels acquired at different times and on different grounds. The homeowner moved for summary judgment on the claim to the smaller section, which the circuit court granted. A different judge presided over the bench trial on the homeowner’s claim to the larger section. When the homeowner finished his case-in-chief, the citizens association moved for judgment. The trial court granted the citizens association’s motion and entered judgment for it on the homeowner’s claims, including the claim to the smaller section that had been resolved in the homeowner’s favor on summary judgment.The trial court's decision was appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland which affirmed the trial court’s disposition of the homeowner’s claims to both the smaller and larger sections. The homeowner then petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the circuit court abused its discretion by implicitly vacating the summary judgment entered in the homeowner’s favor on his claim to the smaller section and then entering judgment for the citizens association on that claim. The court also held that the Appellate Court erred in conditionally reinstating the Association’s counterclaim for a prescriptive easement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Riley v. Venice Beach Citizens Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Maryland has ruled that the term "rent" under Real Property § 8-401, as applied to residential leases, refers to the fixed, periodic payments a tenant is required to make for use or occupancy of a rented premises. This definition excludes additional charges such as late fees, attorney’s fees, and court costs. The court also ruled that any provision in a residential lease that allows a landlord to allocate payments of "rent" to other obligations, thereby subjecting a tenant to eviction proceedings based on failure to pay "rent", violates Real Property § 8-208(d)(2). Further, penalties for late payment of rent, capped at 5% of the monthly amount of rent due, are inclusive of any costs of collection other than court-awarded costs. Finally, the court ruled that the Circuit Court erred in declining to review the merits of the tenants’ second renewed motion for class certification. The case has been remanded for further proceedings in line with these holdings. View "Westminster Management v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Maryland Tort Claims Act's (MTCA), Md. Code Ann. State Gov't (SG) 12-104(a)(1), waiver of sovereign immunity as to a "tort action" does not extend to federal statutory claims.Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants, her former employer and supervisor, regarding her termination from Morgan State University (MSU). Because Plaintiff included claims of retaliation in violation of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 41 U.S.C. 4712, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 11-5, 1553 Defendants removed the suit to federal district court. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the matter with directions to address whether Maryland has waived state sovereign immunity against federal whistleblower claims by enacting the MTCA. The district court answered the question in the negative. The Supreme Court answered an ensuing certified question by holding that "a tort action" under the MTCA does not include federal statutory claims. View "Williams v. Morgan State University" on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeals chose to adopt Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), as the governing standard by which trial courts admit or exclude expert testimony, thus replacing Maryland's "Frye-Reed Plus" standard.The Frye-Reed standard, born of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978), started in Maryland and continued to be the standard for determining the reliability of expert testimony after the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert. The Frye-Reed standard eventually morphed into the Frye-Reed Plus standard, which adopted several Daubert principles. For that reason, Appellant argued that this Court should adopt the Daubert standard and apply it to this case. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed this matter for pretrial proceedings and a new trial consistent with this opinion, holding (1) this Court adopts the Daubert standard in Maryland because those factors are persuasive in interpreting Maryland Rule 5-702; and (2) this case is remanded for the circuit court to apply this new evidentiary standard. View "Rochkind v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the circuit court's decision determining that it had personal jurisdiction over Defendant and entering a judgment in favor of Plaintiff, holding that the factors weighed against the constitutional reasonableness of causing Defendant to defend this suit in Maryland.This case was filed by Defendant's stepson, who was a North Carolina resident, against Defendant, who was also a North Carolina resident. Plaintiff ultimately obtained a default judgment against Defendant in the amount of $99,856.84. The court of special appeals reversed the circuit court's decision with respect to the finding of personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's act of filing a sole lawsuit through counsel did not rise to the level of a "persistent course of conduct" to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over her in this matter. View "Pinner v. Pinner" on Justia Law

In this appeal concerning whether a school board was liable for a judgment against its employee when the board was dismissed from the case prior to trial the Court of Appeals held that, under Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-518, even if a board is entitled to substantive dismissal from a case the plaintiffs are required to maintain the board as a party or request that the board be brought back into the case to indemnify an employee.As a matter of trial strategy in a case against the Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners, counsel for Plaintiffs decided to not appeal the dismissal, via summary judgment, of the Board from the case and to avoid joinder of the Board under after the conclusion of the trial. After the trial, Plaintiffs filed motions to enforce the judgments, arguing that the Board was obligated to satisfy the judgments pursuant to section 5-518. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motions. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in order to force a county school board to indemnify a judgment against a county board employee, the mandatory joinder requirement under section 5-518 requires that a county board be joined as a party throughout the entire litigation. View "Neal v. Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals denying a motion to dismiss an appeal, holding that, to constitute an effective judgment under Maryland Rule 2-601 and start the thirty-day appeal period set forth in Maryland Rule 8-202(a), the entry of judgment must satisfy both rule 2-601(b)(2) and (b)(3).Petitioner obtained a default judgment against Respondent and submitted a request to file notice of lien based on the federal judgment. More than a decade later, Petitioner filed a request to renew judgment. The clerk entered a notice of renewed judgment on the docket. Respondent filed a motion to vacate renewal of judgment. The circuit court denied the motion. However, the date of the entry of judgment was not entered in the docket entries. Respondent then noted an appeal. Petitioner moved to strike the notice of appeal as untimely. The Court of Appeals held that the notice of appeal, although initially premature, had become ripe and vacated the renewal of the judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the initial docket entries concerning the denial of the motion to vacate failed to satisfy the requirements of rule 2-601(b) and that the trial court erred in denying the motion to vacate the renewal of the judgment. View "Lee v. Lee" on Justia Law