Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

David Springer was sued by J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC for, inter alia, engaging in false and misleading advertising, defamation, and false light. Springer was insured under an insurance policy issued by Erie Insurance Exchange. The policy contained a provision that excluded personal liability coverage arising out of “business pursuits.” Erie refused to provide Springer with a legal defense in the J.G. Wentworth lawsuit, arguing that the suit was triggered by Springer’s business interests and was thus barred under the “business pursuits” exclusion. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Erie. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court, holding that Erie and the trial court should have considered more than the face of the J.G. Wentworth complaint before establishing Springer’s alleged business interests and denying Springer’s claim. View "Springer v. Erie Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

Appellant owned property located within the heart of a planned development. The City of Baltimore sought to condemn the property. When the City and Appellant were unable to agree upon a price to be paid for the property, the City filed a petition for condemnation. Prior to trial, the City filed a petition for immediate possession and title, alleging that immediate possession of the property was necessary. Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that Appellant was a “hold-out,” which justified a “quick-take” condemnation of the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the facts of this case justified a “quick-take” condemnation action. View "Makowski v. Mayor & City of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Petitioners obtained a loan from a Lender by taking out a second mortgage on their residence secured by a deed of trust on that property. The Lender sold the loan to another entity, to whom it assigned the loan instruments. That entity, in turn, sold the loan and assigned the loan instruments. After Petitioners had paid off the note and Respondent had released the deed of trust, Petitioners sued the Lender and Respondent, alleging that Lender had violated the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law (SMLL) at the time of the original transaction. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Respondent. The court of special appeals affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners’ sole recourse against an assignee such as Respondent for the Lender’s violations of the SMLL would be by way of recoupment, but (2) because Petitioners filed suit only after they had paid off the loan, that remedy was not available to them. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Respondent was not liable for violations of the SMLL committed by the Lender when the loan was originated, and (2) Respondent was not derivatively liable under statute or the common law for a violation of the SMLL committed by the Lender. View "Thompkins v. Mountaineer Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

In each of these two consolidated cases, plaintiffs brought a negligence action against landlords to recover for injuries resulting from lead paint poisoning. Both plaintiffs relied on circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence that lead paint in the subject properties was a substantial contributor to the injuries. In both cases, the trial judges granted summary judgment to the landlords, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie negligence case with regard to the causation element. The Court of Appeals affirmed after setting forth principles under which a lead-paint poisoned plaintiff may establish through circumstantial evidence a prima facie negligence case for lead paint poisoning, holding that plaintiffs in this case failed to meet their initial burden of proving circumstantially a prima facie negligence case. View "Hamilton v. Kirson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of murder in the first degree. The case proceeded to trial. During the jury’s deliberations and at 5 p.m. on the Friday before a three-holiday weekend, the foreperson of the jury submitted a note to the trial judge claiming that a fellow juror stated that she was willing to change her original position of voting “not guilty” if she could go home and not return to the courthouse. One-half of an hour later, the judge reminded the jurors of their proper duties. The following Tuesday, the jury found Defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge should have granted a mistrial based on the allegations in the note. The court of special appeals disagreed with Defendant and affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial judge, in dealing with the note, (1) did not abuse her discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial and in refusing to give a modified Allen instruction; and (2) did not violate Maryland Rule 4-326(d) by recessing for the long weekend after giving additional instructions to the jurors. View "Nash v. State" on Justia Law

Claudia Natalie Cabrera sought the nomination of the Maryland Democratic Party for the office of delegate in the June 2014 gubernatorial primary election, but when she tendered for filing a certificate of candidacy she was a registered member of the Republican Party. A registered voter in the legislative district that Cabrera sought to represent filed a petition in the circuit court challenging Cabrera’s candidacy. Meanwhile, the Maryland State Board of elections informed Cabrera of its intention to exclude Cabrera’s name from the primary election ballot. The circuit court declared Cabrera’s candidacy invalid and ordered Appellant’s name to be excluded from the primary election ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a registered member of one political party may not file a valid certificate of candidacy declaring the intent to run in the primary election of another political party. View "Cabrera v. Penate" on Justia Law

Jai Medical Systems Managed Care Organization, Inc. (JaiMCO) is an entity that contracts with health care providers to provide health care services to patients enrolled in the State Medicaid program. Dr. Steven Bennett participated as a specialty care provider in the network of JaiMCO. Petitioner chose Dr. Bennett to treat a bunion on her foot that was causing her pain. After Dr. Bennett performed surgery to remove the bunion Petitioner developed gangrene, and her foot had to be partially amputated. Petitioner sought to hold JaiMCO liable for Dr. Bennett’s negligence on a theory of apparent agency, asserting that JaiMCO created the appearance that Dr. Bennett was its agent and that she reasonably relied on that appearance. A jury returned a verdict in Petitioner’s favor. The court of special appeals reversed, determining that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a managed care organization may be vicariously liable for the negligence of a network physician under a theory of apparent agency; but (2) even if Petitioner subjectively believed Dr. Bennett was an employee of JaiMCO, the belief was not reasonable under the facts of this case. View "Bradford v. Jai Med. Sys. Managed Care Org., Inc." on Justia Law

This case centered on the implied consent, administrative per se law (“Law”), under which a suspected drunk driver may choose either to take or to refuse a breath test to measure blood alcohol concentration. A test refusal or a particular test result both result in an automatic suspension of the driver’s license. At issue was whether a detained driver has a right to consult with legal counsel before making the decision of whether to take the breath test. The driver in this case (“Driver”) asked the arresting officer if she could call an attorney before making that choice. Driver's request was refused. Driver subsequently took the test, which indicated she had an elevated blood alcohol concentration. In accordance with the Law, Driver’s license was suspended for ninety days. An administrative law judge upheld Driver’s suspension. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the denial of Driver’s request to contact her attorney violated her right to due process. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, even if a suspected drunk driver is denied the opportunity to consult counsel before deciding whether to take a breath test, the driver remains subject to the administrative license suspension that the test assigns to the test refusal or test result. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Deering" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Ghana who arrived in the United States four years prior to his conviction, was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, second degree rape, and third degree sexual offense. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying him an interpreter for his criminal trial. The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) appellate review of a trial court’s decision whether to appoint an interpreter is a process in which the reviewing court must first determine whether the trial judge’s factual findings were clearly erroneous and then, if the findings were not clearly erroneous, consider whether the trial judge abused her discretion in making the determination regarding whether to appoint an interpreter; and (2) in this case, after applying the relevant standard, the trial judge acted within his discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for an interpreter. View "Kusi v. State" on Justia Law

In 2009, Trans Healthcare, Inc. (THI) filed a petition requesting that an individual and his firm be appointed as receiver over THI and forty-three related entities. THI’s petition was granted. Approximately eighteen months after the appointment, the receiver requested that a substitute receiver be appointed. The motion was granted. Almost six months later, Francina Spivery-Jones, a creditor, filed a motion to vacate the receivership, challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. The circuit court denied the motion. Spivery-Jones appealed. The court of special appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the order denying the motion to vacate the receivership was not a final judgment, nor was it appealable under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 12-303 or under the collateral order doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Spivery-Jones had no right of appeal pursuant to section 12-303(3)(iv) or the collateral order doctrine. View "Spivery-Jones v. Trans Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law