Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 4 (the FOP), the bargaining agent for covered Baltimore County police employees, submitted to the Baltimore County’s Director of Human Resources (Director) an unfair labor practice complaint based on a unilateral change made by the County to a policy included in the County’s personnel manual but which was not part of the memorandum of understanding between the County and the FOP and was not subject to collective bargaining negotiation. The Director refused to designate an independent third party agency to consider the FOP’s unfair labor practice complaint. The FOP sought a writ of mandamus, claiming that the Director had a ministerial duty pursuant to section 4-5-204(a)(1)(i) of the Employee Relations Act (Act) of the Baltimore County Code (BCC) to designate a third party agency to investigate and determine whether an unfair labor practice charge had been committed. The circuit granted the writ compelling the Director to designate an independent third party to investigate the FOP’s unfair labor practice complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that nothing in the Act or the BCC imposes an undisputable, non-discretionary duty on the Director to refer every unfair labor practice complaint to an independent third party agency. View "Baltimore County v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 4" on Justia Law

The question before the Court of Appeals in these three consolidated cases was the appropriate method for crediting payments made under a workers’ compensation award when that award is increased on appeal. At issue was whether the credits should be computed on the basis of the number of weeks paid or the amount of money expended. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue in favor of the workers in each case by relying on legislation passed specifically to supersede earlier decisions of the Court, holding that, when crediting an employer/insurer for payments made under a workers’ compensation award that is subsequently amended, credit should be given for the total amount of dollars paid under the initial award. View "W.R. Grace & Co. v. Swedo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the owner and operator of a used car business, filed an action against two Baltimore City police officers, claiming that the two officers, along with several other officers, had entered private property without a warrant or court order and towed Plaintiff’s vehicles. Plaintiff alleged that the warrantless towing of the vehicles without a prior hearing violated the Maryland Declaration of Rights as well as 42 U.S.C. 1983. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the State constitutional claims were barred by the Local Government Tort Claims Act and that, in regard to the federal constitutional claims, the two officers had qualified immunity because they were acting pursuant to various provisions of the Baltimore City Code. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s state law claims were barred by the Local Government Tort Claims Act and that the two officers were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims. View "Dehn Motor Sales v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Appellant used NVR Mortgage Finance, Inc. to apply for a mortgage and paid NVR Mortgage a broker fee. More than three but fewer than twelve years later, Appelalnt sued NVR Mortgage and NVR, Inc. (collectively, NVR) for allegedly violating Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-805(d) by failing to make certain disclosures to Appellant and similarly situated homebuyers before collecting finder’s fees for brokering mortgages. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an alleged violation of CL 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-102(a)(6), which is subject to a twelve-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court answered the certified question of law in the negative, holding that an alleged violation of CL 12-805(d) is not an “other specialty” under CJP 5-102(a)(6), and thus is subject to the default three-year statute of limitations. View "NVR Mortgage Fin., Inc. v. Carlsen" on Justia Law

The Driver License Compact is an interstate agreement that requires party states to report all convictions of an out-of-state driver to the state that issued the driver a license to operate a motor vehicle. For certain offenses, the home state gives the same effect to the conduct underlying the conviction as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state. Respondent in this case paid a fine for speeding in Delaware, which is a party state to the Compact. The Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) reported to the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA), that Respondent had been convicted of speeding. The MVA subsequently recorded a speeding conviction on Respondent’s Maryland driving record and suspended Respondent’s license. Respondent contested the suspension, arguing that payment of the speeding ticket did not constitute a conviction under Delaware law. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) refused to consider the argument. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court with direction to reinstate the decision of the OAH, holding that Respondent’s grievance was with the Delaware DMV for reporting his payment of a fine as a conviction and that Respondent’s redress should be sought in Delaware. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Salop" on Justia Law

After Elms Construction Company, owned by Richard Elms (Elms), began installing windows and doors for Renewal by Anderson (Renewal), Elms fell from a ladder and injured his right foot. Elms filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission, alleging that he was Renewal’s common law employee at the time of the injury. The Commission concluded that Elms was an independent contractor, rather than a common law employee of Renewal, and was therefore not entitled to collect workers’ compensation benefits. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Elms was Renewal’s common law employee. The court of special appeals vacated the circuit court’s opinion and remanded. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and remanded with directions to affirm the circuit court’s judgment, holding (1) the Commission misconstrued the law as applied to the facts when it concluded that Elms was an independent contractor and not an employee of Renewal; (2) the court of special appeals erred when it held that a statutory employment analysis under section 9-508 of the Workers’ Compensation Act must precede a common law employment analysis; and (3) by application of the common law to the facts of this case, Elms was Renewal’s employee at the time of the accident. View "Elms v. Renewal by Anderson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether apportionment of damages is appropriate in the wrongful death and asbestos litigation context and whether a “use plaintiff” - a plaintiff for whom an action is brought in another’s name and does not join in the action - is precluded from recovering damages by not formally joining in the proceedings. In four asbestos cases, plaintiffs and use plaintiffs were separately awarded damages for their wrongful death claims against Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust (WGAST). The court of special appeals concluded (1) the failure of the use plaintiffs to join the action as party plaintiffs before the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations precluded the use plaintiffs from recovering damages; and (2) the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on apportionment of damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) apportionment of damages is appropriate only where the injury in question is reasonably divisible among multiple causes, and in this case, the resulting injury was not reasonably divisible; and (2) the use plaintiffs in this case were part of the action for purposes of the trial resulting in jury verdicts and money judgments entered in their favor. View "Carter v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust" on Justia Law

Ex-Wife and Husband entered into a property settlement agreement that included an allocation of future benefits from the retirement plan sponsored by Husband’s employer. The agreement implied that Husband’s retirement plan was regulated by ERISA, although Husband’s plan was exempt from that law, and incorrectly contemplated that the divorce judgment itself would effect the division of the retirement plan benefits. Husband later remarried and designated his new wife (Wife) as his beneficiary under the retirement plan. After Husband died, Ex-Wife filed a complaint alleging that Wife had been unjustly enriched in receiving Husband’s entire pension and death benefits. The circuit court issued an order establishing a constructive trust in favor of Ex-Wife with respect to a portion of the benefits already paid to Wife and ordered the retirement plan to allocate future benefits between Wife and Ex-Wife in a similar manner. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a posthumous order directing the retirement plan to allocate a portion of the Husband’s death benefit to Ex-Wife and in imposing a constructive trust on a portion of those benefits already received by Wife. View "Robinette v. Hunsecker" on Justia Law

This case concerned a request for certain public records for specific nutrient management plans (NMP) of various private farming operations. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. (WKA) submitted the requests, without success, to the Maryland Department of Agriculture (MDA) pursuant to the Maryland Public Information Act (PIA). Other parties became involved in the ensuing litigation, including the Maryland Farm Bureau, Inc. (MFB). In 2009, the circuit court issued an order (2009 Order) in which it granted the MDA’s cross-motion for summary judgment and denied MFB’s motion for summary judgment. No further litigation activity was reflected on the docket. In 2010, the MDA received another PIA request regarding specific NMP information, this time from a co-plaintiff in the WKA action. In the resulting litigation, the circuit court issued an order (2011 Order) granting MFB’s motion for clarification and declaring how the 2010 PIA request was controlled by the 2009 decision. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the 2011 Order, like the 2009 Order, was not a final judgment, as it did not resolve all the claims before the trial court, and none of the immediate appealability exceptions to the requirement of a final judgment were applicable. View "Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agriculture" on Justia Law

In Doe I, the Supreme Court held that the retroactive application of the provisions in the Maryland sex offender registration statute that the Court deemed punitive violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the Maryland Declaration of Rights. At issue in this appeal was whether sex offenders’ federal obligations require them independently to register and whether circuit courts have the authority to order the State to remove sex offender registration information from federal databases. The Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding the registration obligations placed directly on individuals by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, circuit courts have the authority to compel the State to remove sex offender registration information from Maryland’s sex offender registry when the inclusion of such information is unconstitutional as established in Doe I. View "Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe" on Justia Law