Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Complainants were disabled residents of a condominium. Complainants filed a complaint against the condominium's board of directors (the Condo) and their property management company, alleging that the Condo had discriminated against them by refusing to grant a reasonable accommodation for their disabilities. Specifically, Complainants alleged that the Condo refused to provide keys to the side and back doors to their building. The Office of Administrative Hearings ruled that Complainants had not proven that giving them the keys to the side and back doors was necessary and reasonable. The Appeal Board of the Commission on Human Relations (Board) disagreed and determined that the Condo (1) was required to prove that giving Complainants keys was an unreasonable financial burden, and (2) failed to establish that giving Complainants keys presented an undue burden. The circuit court reversed. The court of special appeals vacated the circuit court's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Condo was required to prove that providing keys to Complainants was unreasonable in light of the costs attendant in doing so; and (2) the Board properly performed the requisite balancing test when it concluded the Condo unreasonably denied Complainants' requests to be given the disputed keys. View " Cameron Grove Condo. Bd. of Dirs. v. Comm'n on Human Relations" on Justia Law

On March 30, 2009, Petitioner committed a theft of property. After a trial held on December 11, 2009, Petitioner was convicted of the theft of property having a value of $615. Petitioner was sentenced to ten years in prison. On October 1, 2009, amendments to the Maryland theft statute took effect that would have made Petitioner's crime a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not exceeding eighteen months, a $500 fine, or both. The Court of Appeals granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to decide whether the penalty provisions of the 2009 theft statute amendments were applicable to Petitioner's sentencing. The Court reversed, holding that the sentence imposed upon Petitioner was illegal because it was not authorized by the statute in effect at the time of his trial and sentencing. Remanded. View "Waker v. State" on Justia Law

The Town of Oxford introduced a resolution proposing to annex a number of acres of submerged lands. Petition circulators subsequently submitted a petition for referendum regarding the proposed solution. The petition was submitted before the public hearing on the annexation resolution but before the final enactment of the resolution. The Town Commissioners determined that the signatures affixed before final enactment of the resolution were invalid, and therefore, a referendum was not required. Petitioner filed this action, contending that the referendum petition was valid. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioner, holding that signatures on a referendum petition may be collected before final enactment of the targeted annexation resolution. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the court of special appeals was correct in concluding that, pursuant to Md. Code Ann. art. 23A, 19, petition signatures gathered after introduction, but prior to commencement of the forty-five day period after final enactment of the resolution, could not be counted toward petitioning the resolution to referendum; and (2) by not counting pre-enactment signatures, the referendum effort did not succeed in obtaining a sufficient number of petition signatures for a referendum election to be held. View "Koste v. Town of Oxford" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree assault in connection with an attack on his girlfriend. The court of special appeals affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the trial court acted within its discretion in responding to a jury question concerning evidence that was not presented at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in crafting the jury response it did, as (1) trial courts have a duty to answer, as directly as possible, the questions posed by jurors; (2) the circuit court's response in this case closely tracked a pattern jury instruction given earlier; (3) the court's answer did not contradict the trial judge's earlier instructions; and (4) the answer given allowed the jury to draw what inferences it might from the evidence without the court impermissibly suggesting what inferences to draw. View "Appraicio v. State" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of the alleged exposure of Plaintiff to lead paint at the homes in which she spent her childhood. Petitioner, by her mother, sued the owners of two of the homes, for negligence and unfair trade practices under the Consumer Protection Act. Only the claims against the second owner proceeded to trial. The circuit court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant after excluding proposed expert opinion testimony of a pediatrician to establish Defendant's building as the source of Plaintiff's lead exposure and elevated blood lead levels. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the proposed expert testimony; but (2) summary judgment in this case was not appropriate, as disputes of material fact existed to foreclose a grant of summary judgment. View "Ross v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore City" on Justia Law

This case involved the adoption of a minor child, Sean, by his stepfather. William, the putative father of Sean, filed an objection to the stepparent adoption one day after the expiration of the thirty-day deadline provided by the show cause order issued by the circuit court. The trial court granted Stepfather's motion to strike William's untimely objection and directed that the adoption proceed as an uncontested matter, noting that William did not allege any circumstance to excuse his failure to timely file his objection. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) William's failure to file a timely objection constituted an irrevocable consent to the adoption of Sean; and (2) the deemed consent statutory scheme of the Maryland Family Law Article and the Maryland Rules does not offend due process. View "In re Adoption of Sean M." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a challenge by a borrower, Respondent, to the authority of various individuals and entities to effectuate a valid foreclosure on her residential property. After a foreclosure sale was scheduled by the substitute foreclosure trustees, but before the sale took place, Respondent filed a separate action seeking compensatory damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against the substitute trustees, Deutsche Bank, and BAC Home Loans Servicing for alleged defects in the foreclosure process and the authority of Defendants to foreclose on her property. Deutsche Bank and BAC (Petitioners) filed a motion for summary judgment on Respondent's action, which the circuit court granted. The court of special appeals reversed, finding that Petitioners did not prove they were persons entitled to enforce the promissory note, and thus genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that BAC was entitled to enforce the note. Remanded. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Brock" on Justia Law

To facilitate the transition to a competitive market for the supply of electricity, the Legislature provided that consumers would receive certain credits over the period of a year to mitigate a large projected increase in Baltimore Gas & Electric Company's (BGE) rates for the supply of electricity. The overall scheme involving credits, charges, and bond financing was known as the rate stabilization plan. Following passage of the rate stabilization law, BGE took the position that the legislation had the effect of deferring part of its franchise tax liability during the period that credits were applied to customers' bills. The Department of Assessments rejected BGE's position. BGE filed a refund claim, which was rejected. The tax court upheld the Department's denial. The circuit court concluded that the deferral credit affected BGE's distribution revenues for purposes of computing its franchise tax liability, that the tax court decision would subject BGE to double taxation, and that BGE was entitled to the claimed refund. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, in establishing the rate stabilization plan, the legislature neither intentionally nor inadvertently provided for the credits and charges to affect BGE's franchise tax liability. Remanded. View "Dep't of Assessments v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law

In 2006, Petitioner was convicted of child sexual abuse. Petitioner's conviction was based on his inappropriate contact with a minor during the 1983-84 school year when Petitioner was employed as a school teacher. Petitioner was sentenced to ten years incarceration with three years supervised probation upon release. In 2008, Petitioner was released early from prison. In 2009, the General Assembly passed a new law changing the sex offender registration requirements. The new statute retroactively required a child sex offender who committed a sex offense prior to October 1, 2005, but was convicted on or after October 1, 1995, and had not previously been required to register under Maryland law, to now register as a child sex offender. In October 2009, Petitioner unsuccessfully sought a declaration that he not be required to register as a sex offender under the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the imposition of the registration requirement upon Petitioner violated the ex post facto prohibition contained in the Maryland Declaration of Rights. View "Doe v. Dep't Of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs." on Justia Law

Gladys Garner and Randolph Scott defaulted on their respective automobile loan agreements. Both contracts were governed by the provisions of the Creditor Grantor Closed End Credit Act of the Commercial Law Article (CLEC). The contracts were later assigned to Ally Financial, Inc., Nuvell National Auto Finance, and Nuvell Financial Services (collectively, GMAC). GMAC repossessed both vehicles and informed the debtors that the vehicles would be sold at a "public auction." Both cars were later sold. The debtors filed separate complaints against GMAC alleging, in part, that GMAC violated the CLEC because the sales of their cars were in reality "private sales," requiring GMAC to provide a detailed post-sale disclosure to them under the CLEC, which GMAC had not done. The federal district court combined the cases and granted summary judgment for GMAC, concluding the sales were "public auctions" because they were both widely advertised and open to the public for competitive bidding. The federal appellate court then certified an issue for clarification to the Maryland Court of Appeals. The Court answered that the auctions were in reality "private sales" because attendance was limited to those who paid a refundable $1,000 cash deposit. View "Gardner v. Ally Fin., Inc." on Justia Law