Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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In 2000, Adnan Syed was convicted of the murder of Hae Min Lee and sentenced to life in prison plus 30 years. In 2022, the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City moved to vacate Syed’s conviction, citing new evidence and alleged Brady violations. Young Lee, the victim’s brother, was given less than one business day’s notice of the vacatur hearing, which he attended remotely. The court granted the motion to vacate and ordered the State to either retry Syed or enter a nolle prosequi (nol pros) within 30 days. The State later entered a nol pros, effectively dismissing the charges against Syed.Young Lee appealed the vacatur order, arguing that his rights as a victim’s representative were violated due to insufficient notice and the inability to attend the hearing in person. The Appellate Court of Maryland vacated the circuit court’s order, reinstated Syed’s convictions, and remanded for a new hearing, holding that the entry of the nol pros did not moot Lee’s appeal and that Lee had the right to reasonable notice and to attend the hearing in person.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that the entry of the nol pros did not moot Lee’s appeal. The Court concluded that a victim has the right to be heard at a vacatur hearing under CP § 11-403, which applies to hearings where the alteration of a sentence is considered. The Court also held that Lee’s rights were violated due to insufficient notice and the inability to attend the hearing in person. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for further proceedings, starting from the point immediately after the State’s Attorney filed the motion to vacate. View "Syed v. Lee" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involves a historic Black burial ground in Montgomery County, Maryland, known as Moses Cemetery. The land, which contains the remains of many individuals, including formerly enslaved persons, was sold and developed into an apartment complex and parking lot in the 1960s. The development process desecrated the burial ground, and it is likely that human remains are still interred there. The current owner of the property is the Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County (HOC). The plaintiffs, including descendants of those buried in Moses Cemetery and a local church, sought to challenge HOC's plan to sell the land to a developer.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale and later issued a writ of mandamus compelling HOC to file an action under Maryland's Business Regulation Article § 5-505 before selling the property. The court found that there was overwhelming evidence of the burial ground's existence and that many bodies likely remain on the property.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that § 5-505 is an optional procedure for selling burial grounds and does not impose a mandatory duty on HOC to file an action before selling the land. The Appellate Court reasoned that the statute is designed to allow certain burial grounds to be sold free from claims but does not require this procedure to be followed in all cases.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment in part and reversed it in part. The Court held that the common law of burial places in Maryland provides an appropriate framework for disputes regarding burial grounds and that extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of mandamus was not appropriate. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court, allowing the plaintiffs to seek leave to amend their complaint to state a claim for relief based on an alleged violation of specific rights protected under the common law of burial places. The Court also held that § 5-505 does not abrogate the common law of burial places and provides an optional procedure for selling burial grounds. View "BETHESDA AFRICAN CEMETERY COALITION, v. HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY" on Justia Law

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In 2000, Adnan Syed was convicted of the murder of Hae Min Lee and sentenced to life in prison plus 30 years. In 2022, the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City moved to vacate Syed’s conviction, citing new evidence and alleged Brady violations. Young Lee, the victim’s brother, was given less than one business day’s notice of the vacatur hearing, which he attended remotely. The court granted the motion to vacate and ordered the State to either retry Syed or enter a nolle prosequi (nol pros) within 30 days. The State later entered a nol pros, effectively dismissing the charges against Syed.Young Lee appealed the vacatur order, arguing that his rights as a victim’s representative were violated due to insufficient notice and the inability to attend the hearing in person. The Appellate Court of Maryland vacated the circuit court’s order, reinstated Syed’s convictions, and remanded for a new hearing, holding that the nol pros did not moot Lee’s appeal and that Lee had the right to reasonable notice and to attend the hearing in person.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that the entry of the nol pros did not moot Lee’s appeal. The court ruled that a victim has the right to be heard at a vacatur hearing under CP § 11-403, which includes hearings where the alteration of a sentence is considered. The court also held that Lee’s rights were violated due to insufficient notice and the inability to attend the hearing in person. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for further proceedings, starting from the point immediately after the State’s Attorney filed the motion to vacate. View "Syed v. Lee" on Justia Law

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In 2002, Steven Anthony Thomas was indicted for three hotel robberies in Charles County, Maryland. He pleaded guilty to two counts of armed robbery and one count of second-degree burglary, resulting in a total sentence of 40 years. In 2014, his sentence for the first armed robbery was reduced to 12.5 years, triggering a new five-year period for filing a motion to modify his sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(e). Thomas filed a timely motion in 2015, which the court held in abeyance. He supplemented his motion multiple times, but the court took no action before the five-year period expired in December 2019.The Circuit Court for Charles County eventually held a hearing in 2021 and concluded it lacked authority to revise the sentence after the five-year period. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, relying on Schlick v. State, which held that the circuit court retained fundamental jurisdiction over a timely-filed motion even after the five-year period expired.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and overruled Schlick v. State. The court held that under Rule 4-345(e), a circuit court does not have jurisdiction to revise a sentence more than five years after its imposition. The court emphasized that the rule's language is unambiguous and imposes a strict temporal limit. The court also clarified that deferring a motion to reduce a sentence for the full five-year period is equivalent to denying it within that period. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court's decision, affirming that the circuit court lacked authority to modify Thomas's sentence after the five-year deadline. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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A hospital and a physician entered into a settlement agreement to resolve a dispute over the suspension of the physician's clinical privileges. The agreement required the hospital to submit a report to a regulatory authority using specific language agreed upon by both parties. The hospital, however, selected codes for the report that generated additional text, which the physician claimed contradicted and was inconsistent with the agreed language. The physician sued for breach of the settlement agreement.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, ruling that the settlement agreement did not restrict the hospital's selection of codes for the report. The Appellate Court of Maryland disagreed, holding that a reasonable person would understand the hospital's obligation to report using specific language to preclude it from including contradictory and materially inconsistent language. The Appellate Court vacated the summary judgment, finding that whether the hospital breached its obligation was a question for the jury.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court's decision. The court held that the hospital's obligation to report using specific, agreed-upon language precluded it from including additional language that contradicted and was materially inconsistent with the agreed language. The court also affirmed that the physician's claim regarding the hospital's failure to provide a timely hearing was released in the settlement agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine if the hospital's actions constituted a breach of the settlement agreement. View "Adventist Healthcare v. Behram" on Justia Law

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In 1999, Mark McCloy was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) for tampering with a potential witness in an EEOC proceeding. In 2021, he applied to purchase a handgun in Maryland, stating he had no disqualifying convictions. The Maryland State Police (MSP) disapproved his application, determining his federal conviction was equivalent to a disqualifying Maryland crime under CR § 9-305.McCloy appealed the MSP's decision to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) was not equivalent to CR § 9-305 but sua sponte determined it was comparable to CR § 9-306, affirming the MSP's disapproval. McCloy sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision but on the grounds that CR § 9-305 was the appropriate equivalent Maryland crime.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that the relevant Maryland law for determining equivalency is the law in effect at the time of the application, not the conviction. The court used a two-step approach to determine equivalency, comparing the elements of the statutes and considering whether a reasonable mind could conclude the statutes prohibit similar conduct.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court’s decision. It held that the relevant Maryland law for determining whether an out-of-State crime is disqualifying is the law in effect when the application is submitted. The court adopted a modified categorical approach, comparing the elements of the out-of-State crime with the Maryland crime. If the elements are broader, the MSP must have conclusive evidence of the acts forming the basis of the conviction to determine if those acts would support a conviction under a disqualifying Maryland crime. The court concluded that McCloy’s federal conviction was not equivalent to a disqualifying Maryland crime and remanded the case with instructions to reverse the MSP’s disapproval of McCloy’s firearm application. View "In the Matter of McCloy" on Justia Law

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The case involves Thomas Dwayne Cook, who was convicted of first-degree assault and reckless endangerment for attacking Lieutenant Aubrey Fletcher while serving a prison sentence. Cook sought post-conviction DNA testing of a shirt he wore during the incident, claiming that the DNA results could support his self-defense claim and challenge the severity of the victim's injuries.The Circuit Court for Somerset County denied Cook's petition for DNA testing without a hearing, stating that there was overwhelming evidence of Cook's guilt and that DNA testing would not produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. Cook appealed this decision, arguing that the court applied the wrong standard and that he should have been allowed to respond to the State's answer to his petition.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Cook did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that DNA testing would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. The court found that even if the DNA testing showed the blood on Cook's shirt was his own, it would not support his self-defense claim or negate the severity of the victim's injuries. The court also held that the Circuit Court did not err in denying the petition without waiting for Cook's response to the State's answer, as the rules do not require the court to wait for such a response before ruling.In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Circuit Court's denial of Cook's petition for post-conviction DNA testing, finding no reasonable probability that the testing would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. View "Cook v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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A collection of Dutch and Luxembourgish energy companies invested in solar power projects in Spain, relying on promised economic subsidies. Following the 2008 financial crisis, Spain withdrew these subsidies, prompting the companies to challenge Spain's actions through arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The companies prevailed in arbitration, securing multi-million-euro awards. However, the European Union (EU) argued that the ECT's arbitration provision does not apply to disputes between EU Member States, rendering the awards invalid under EU law.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the cases. In NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain and 9REN Holding S.A.R.L. v. Kingdom of Spain, the court held it had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) arbitration exception and denied Spain's motion to dismiss. The court also granted anti-anti-suit injunctions to prevent Spain from seeking anti-suit relief in foreign courts. Conversely, in Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, the district court deemed Spain immune under the FSIA and denied the companies' requested injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the cases. The court held that the district courts have jurisdiction under the FSIA’s arbitration exception to confirm the arbitration awards against Spain. However, it found that the district court in NextEra and 9REN abused its discretion by enjoining Spain from pursuing anti-suit relief in Dutch and Luxembourgish courts. The court emphasized that anti-suit injunctions against a foreign sovereign raise significant comity concerns and that the domestic interests identified were insufficient to justify such extraordinary relief. Consequently, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part in NextEra, reversed in 9REN and Blasket, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Turenne v. State" on Justia Law

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The petitioner was arrested under a warrant for allegedly violating Maryland's juror intimidation statute. After a bench trial, the circuit court acquitted her based on its interpretation of the statute. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a civil suit against a sheriff’s deputy, claiming false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and violations of her rights under the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The deputy had filed the application for charges after consulting with the State’s Attorney’s Office, which determined that the petitioner’s conduct violated the statute.The Circuit Court for Wicomico County granted summary judgment in favor of the State, ruling that the deputy could not be held civilly liable for the petitioner’s arrest pursuant to a warrant issued by a judicial officer. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed this decision, concluding that the warrant provided legal justification for the arrest and that the officers’ interpretation of the statute was objectively reasonable.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and upheld the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the State on the common law claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment, as well as on the constitutional claims under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court emphasized that when an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, probable cause is predetermined by a judicial officer, creating a strong presumption of objective reasonableness. The petitioner failed to overcome this presumption.Additionally, the Court held that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment on the petitioner’s claim that her arrest and imprisonment violated her free speech rights under Article 40. The Court found that the judicial officer had probable cause to believe that the petitioner’s speech constituted a “true threat” and thus fell outside the protections of Article 40. Finally, the Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling that the juror intimidation statute was not unconstitutionally vague. View "Rovin v. State" on Justia Law

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In this case, Charles Mitchell was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of sexually abusing his nine-year-old daughter. During voir dire, Mitchell's defense counsel requested the court to ask potential jurors if they had concerns about a child testifying and if they believed a child could lie about such a serious crime. The court only asked the first part of the question, omitting the second part. The jury found Mitchell guilty, and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison, with all but five years suspended.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the conviction, holding that Mitchell had preserved his claims of error related to voir dire. The court noted that trial courts have broad discretion in voir dire but must ask questions reasonably likely to reveal specific cause for disqualification. The Appellate Court, bound by the precedent set in Stewart v. State, ruled that questions about the credibility of child-witnesses did not support disqualification for cause and thus found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to ask the second part of the proposed question.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and abrogated part of its decision in Stewart v. State, recognizing that significant changes in the law had occurred. The court held that bias regarding a child witness could be a specific cause for disqualification of a juror when the child's testimony is crucial to the trial. The court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion by not rephrasing the defense's question to properly inquire about potential juror bias against child-witnesses. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Mitchell v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law